

THE WORLD'S MONETARY PROBLEMS

TWO MEMORANDA

BY
GUSTAV CASSEL

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FOREWORD

THE two memoranda here printed were originally written on invitation of the League of Nations, the first for the International Financial Conference in Brussels in 1920 (originally published in Vol. V. of the Proceedings of the Conference and now reprinted by permission of the League), the second for the Financial Committee of the League of Nations for their meeting in September. 1921 (not hitherto published in any form). The two memoranda are so intimately connected with one another that it has been thought desirable that they should appear together in book-form. It is also hoped that this publication may give a wider circle the opportunity to study the nature of the present monetary difficulties and of the means for restoring sound conditions which I have tried to expound in recent years.

GUSTAV CASSEL.

DJURSHOLM, SWEDEN. October, 1921.

THE WORLD'S MONETARY PROBLEMS

FIRST MEMORANDUM

I

THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTS OF THE MONETARY SITUATION

THE most conspicuous features of the economic changes which have taken place during the war and since are: an enormous increase in the supply of money, a decrease in the supply of commodities, and an enormous rise in prices.

Before entering upon an analysis of these changes, their causes and their mutual relations, some attention should be given to an investigation of their nature and of the ways of measuring them.

As to the increase in the supply of money, we have then first to observe that the gold standard which, before the war, formed the common basis of most monetary units and kept them in nearly fixed relations to one another has, in most countries, been given up and replaced by paper money without any definite relation either to gold or to the paper money of other countries. The new paper standards are, therefore, quite independent of one another and the increase

in the supply of money is a fact which must be considered separately in each separate currency.

In regard to the supply of money, we have to give special attention to those means of payments which are recognised as "legal tender," and which, therefore, always must be taken as payment. The supply of such money has obviously a fundamental influence on the total supply of means of payment. This money is either metallic coins, notes of the central banks or paper money issued by other institutions. To them may be added notes of private banks, paper money issued by local bodies and similar material means of payment which, though not having the character of legal tender, are actually circulating at the side of such money. The total sum of these material means of payment which is at any time in the hands of the public (i.e., outside the issuing institutions) is the "circulation" of the country.

There has been, since the beginning of the war, an enormous increase of this circulation in every country, but the rate of this increase has been very different in different countries.

In addition to this increase of circulation a more or less proportionate increase of bank deposits, used as means of payment, has taken place.

The circulation itself has, in most countries, altered its composition. Gold coins have nearly completely been drawn out of the circulation in all countries. In many countries the same is the case with token coins of silver and sometimes even with those of copper or nickel. In some countries the circulation of silver coins has been increased by silver coins pouring in from countries with the same monetary unit. This is, e.g., the case in Sweden, where Danish silver coins

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are in general circulation, and in Switzerland, which has received a lot of silver francs from other countries of the Latin union. If we wish to have a reliable measure of the increase of circulation it is necessary to take into consideration the sums of coins in circulation now and before the war. These sums are never exactly known, but it is better to use some approximate figures for them than to leave them out altogether, for metallic coins have in many cases represented a considerable part of the pre-war circulation, and every error in our estimation of this figure will cause a proportionate error in the calculated relative increase of the circulation.

In some countries only a part of the circulation is active. One part may be hoarded within the country and another part may have been exported to foreign countries. Hoarding seems to have been relatively more important during the first months of the war than it has been later. At present there is probably in most countries not much more hoarding than would correspond to the customary pre-war hoarding, and it is then not necessary to take any account of hoarding in the calculation of the relative increase of circulation.

The part of the currency which has been exported to foreign countries is in some cases very important. The actual circulation within Germany is, e.g., much lower than the total mass issued, the rest being held in foreign countries. This must be taken into account if we wish to have an idea of the active circulation within Germany.

In some cases it is necessary to have regard to an increase or decrease of the geographical area within which the currency is used. In the case of Germany, e.g., the present active circulation should strictly be

compared with the pre-war circulation within the present boundaries of the country.

The customary ways of payment and of cashkeeping of a nation seem to alter themselves very slowly. Therefore, the proportion between the payments made by currency and those made by bank deposits must be expected, generally, to remain about the same, even though the volume of currency increases. This means that the volume of bank deposits should be expected to show about the same proportional rise as the active currency of the country. However, at a higher level of prices, some payments which used to be made in currency will have reached an amount which is preferably settled by aid of cheques. For this reason the volume of cheque payments and of bank deposits might rise somewhat quicker than the total volume of currency. This seems to have been the case in the United States.

In some Continental countries a deliberate and very intense action has been displayed by the governments and the central banks in order to encourage payments by cheques, the aim being to "save currency." A success for this campaign could hardly have diminished the total volume of payments and would, therefore, have had no other effect than to make the continually-rising figures of note issues somewhat less alarming in the eyes of a public which did not look deeper into the matter. However, these efforts do not seem to have had in any country much influence on payment customs. Where they have, to some extent, "saved currency," our estimation of the total increase in the volume of payments must only be proportionately raised.

Even in other cases it might be necessary, in order

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to get a more exact measure of the increase in the total volume of payments, to take into account alterations in the payment customs of a nation. But such alterations nowhere have had that importance which sometimes is attributed to them by people trying to apologise for the enormous increase of the circulation.

A natural explanation for the great expansion of the means of payment which has taken place could have been found if the supply of commodities had swollen in the same degree. But quite the contrary has been the case. At the same time as the volume of the means of payment has grown, there has been in all countries a more or less marked decrease in the mass of commodities to be bought. This decrease has, however, been proportionately much less than the increase of the means of payment. Where the supply of commodities has been reduced by tens per cent., the means of payment have generally been increased by at least as many hundreds per cent. The scarcity of commodities has, therefore, from a monetary point of view, much less importance than is generally attributed to this factor.

The third group of economic changes which we have to take account of is the general rise in prices. A more or less exact measure of this rise is afforded by the several index numbers of wholesale or retail prices of commodities or of cost of living. The figures are mostly, to a certain degree, influenced by maximum prices enforced by governments; but it is an open question how far government price-regulations have really been able to keep down the general level of prices or whether the artificial restriction of some prices has caused a corresponding increase of the

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unregulated prices. Where regulations have been ineffective, as they to a certain extent always have been, the official price statistics probably are based on legal prices only, and give in so far a false impression of the real rise in prices. The figures for the rise of the total cost of living are specially influenced by rents, which in most countries seem to have been kept down by legislation to a larger extent than any other prices.

This accounts, partly at least, for the lower degree of increase which these index numbers show in comparison with others.

The rise of prices has been very different in different countries.

As soon as the common metallic standard is abandoned and each country, as stated above, has got its own paper currency, the price level of each such country becomes a fact for itself, independent of the price levels of other countries. The often-heard talk of a general rise in "world prices" and of "international waves of rising prices" is under these circumstances singularly misleading and apt to foster false conceptions as to the nature of the phenomenon in question.

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THE PROCESS OF INFLATION

THE war has been financed by all countries involved, to a great extent, by means of creating more money, which has been, more or less directly, handed over to the exchequer, partly in the form of new issues of bank-notes or State paper money; partly in the form of extended bank credits, which could be used as means of payment. The latter method has indirectly caused a corresponding increase of the circulating medium of exchange to satisfy the increased demand for cash for smaller payments; for the proportion between the payments in bank credits and those in cash has, as stated above, been pretty constant as determined by the customs of each people.

The result of the creation of new money has been, in both cases, that a new buying capacity has been put at the disposal of the government. The total buying capacity of the community having in this way been increased without a corresponding increase in the commodities to be bought, a general rise in prices has followed. With higher prices, the need for means of payment has been increased proportionally, and the mass of the medium of exchange which could be kept in circulation has, therefore, at every time been proportional to the general level of prices. But

the primus motor to the enhancement of prices has always been the creation of an artificial buying capacity.

Under normal conditions, it should be observed, a fresh buying capacity is created only by production and marketing of commodities and services of a corresponding value, and such buying capacity does not tend to raise prices. As artificial, we must then denote a buying capacity which is not based on such production and which must, therefore, lead to a rise in prices.

Against the so-called "Quantitative Theory of Money" it is generally objected that an additional supply of money could not be expected to have such a considerable influence on the total buying capacity of the community as to cause a corresponding increase in all prices. It is also often held that no more money can be forced upon the public than the public asks Both these objections contain some truth. But a sum of fresh-created money put into the hand of an eager buyer, such as a government involved in a war, undeniably increases his buying capacity without taking a corresponding buying capacity from anybody else. Thus a certain rise of prices must take place in order that equilibrium should be restored between the community's buying capacity, as expressed in money, and its available supply of commodities and services to be bought. We cannot tell, on theoretical grounds, how great this rise in prices will be. is enough to know that some rise in the general level of prices must result from an artificially-increased supply of money. Given the new level of prices, the public need of money in circulation will have increased in proportion to the enhancement of prices which

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has taken place, and just so much more money will be kept in circulation. It is quite possible, therefore, that a part of the fresh-created money will flow back to the issuing bank because the public does not want it. But the artificially-created purchasing power has had its effect in raising the general level of prices. Now if the same operation is repeated, the effect will be a new rise in prices and a corresponding new increase in the quantity of money which will be kept in circulation. If this process goes on month after month, year after year, the result will be a continued rise in prices and a continual and proportionate increase of the circulation of the country. This is just what has been going on before our eyes during recent years.

In this way an inflation has taken place in every one of the countries involved in the war. The process is essentially the same whether the artificial buying capacity put at the disposal of the government has had the form of bank-notes, other notes or book credits in the banks. With the rise of prices an increase will, as now explained, take place in all these means of payment irrespective of where the first addition is Nevertheless, the means of payment which made. have the character of legal tender, have a special importance in the process of inflation, for an increase of other means of payment will, generally, ultimately require a more or less proportionate increase in the stock of legal tender and is, therefore, so far impossible where no arbitrary additions to the sum of legal tender circulation can be made. Thus, ultimately, the process of inflation generally resolves itself in an arbitrary creation of more legal tender money.

Of course, no government has paid the war expenditures exclusively by sinflation. The other way open

has been to get hold of the real savings of the people, either by aid of taxes or by loans. But neither of these ways involves an absolute guarantee that the means put at the disposal of the government represent real savings. It is generally recognised that war loans which are taken over by the banks, or by private investors by aid of advances of the banks, lead to inflation, and that the sound loans are those which are paid for by real savings of the investing public. But the same holds true in regard to taxes. And high progressive taxes on income and capital, especially those which are levied on business firms and public companies, are generally to a certain degree paid by bank assistance or by other forms of credit which may involve inflation.

Now, as soon as the State, in any form whatever, has given out more for the war than it could get at its disposal in the form of real savings, a rise in prices has necessarily been the result. The high prices have forced the great classes of the population whose incomes have not risen in the same proportion to severe restrictions in their consumption. In this way a certain amount of real commodities has been set free for the disposal of the State, who has been able to buy these commodities for the fresh money artificially created. Thus, ultimately, the expenses of the government have been financed, as they necessarily must be, as far as they are not covered by assistance from abroad, by the aid of real savings of the country. But these savings have to a large extent been compulsory and the means for this compulsion has been inflation. This inflation has, therefore, without doubt, been an effective means of war finance; but certainly a means which has caused great hardship to wide

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circles of the people, and has had the most pernicious influence on the whole economic life of the country.

The process of inflation has also extended itself to neutral countries, which have been more or less compelled to give advances to the belligerents. As long as these advances could be kept within the limits of the saving capacity of the lending country they would not cause any inflation. But as soon as this limit was exceeded the advances could be given only by aid of creation of more money and the process of inflation began. Wide classes of the peoples concerned were forced to severe restrictions of their consumption, and in this way the real commodities were set free which had to make up for the buying capacity put at the disposal of the belligerents.

The war and its economic consequences have also in many neutral countries given rise to extraordinary State expenditure to cover which no adequate income has been found, and these financial burdens have, in such cases, had their part in driving the country into the road of inflation.

The process of inflation has not ended with the war; on the contrary, it has in many cases only been continued on a still larger scale. At the present moment, when our first aim must be to revert to stable conditions in monetary matters, it is naturally of special importance to trace the causes which are responsible for this continued inflation. The most general factor in this process seems to be an endeavour to keep down certain prices beneath the level to which they would have been brought up by the inflation or to relieve certain classes of consumers considered to be particularly oppressed by the high prices or otherwise in need of aid. The various measures taken to this end

have this in common, that they all tend to strengthen the consumers' monetary purchasing power, while some of them also tend to weaken production. The expenditure involved is either borne by the State (or by local bodies) or by certain classes of producers and owners of commodities. Instances of the first case are: Unemployment allowances; the selling of commodities to the poor beneath cost; general subsidies for lowering the prices of certain commodities, e.g., bread, coal, railway fares; subsidies for house building; tariffs beneath cost in State enterprises, such as post, telephone, railways, etc. Instances of the second case are maximum prices on products such as coal, sugar, etc., and regulation of rents.

Uneconomically low prices on certain commodities keep consumption of these commodities on an uneconomically high level and retard the necessary adjustment of consumption to the limits prescribed by available supply. At the same time such prices leave the consumer with a greater purchasing power for other commodities than he would have possessed in the natural course of matters, and thus become a factor in raising the whole level of other prices. The artificial regulation of rents must particularly have had a considerable effect in this direction.

The public expenditure for the subsidy system now prevailing in so many countries is, generally, too big to be covered by any real income which could be put at the disposal of the State by taxes or loans; and the system, therefore, almost invariably drives the government to a policy of inflation. But to try to counteract the evil results of inflation by measures involving a continual fresh inflation seems singularly bad economic wisdom.

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Of course, all sorts of extravagant government expenditure contribute to make the total financial burden too heavy, and thus to bring the exchequer to the point where further inflation is the only way left. From this point of view we must certainly regard the enormous military expenditures which still prevail in Europe as a very important factor in the process of inflation. That the revolutionary movements have the same effect, even in a still higher degree, is only too evident.

However, government finance is not the only factor to be taken account of in the process of inflation. Every extension of bank credits beyond the limit set by the fresh savings put at the disposal of the banks is aut to cause inflation. A certain restriction of the credit giving of the banks is therefore always necessary. This restriction is achieved partly by discriminating between the demands for credit, partly by a reduction of their amount and partly by the rates of discount or interest charged. Where these means are not applied with sufficient severity, the credit giving will involve the creation of artificial buying capacity; and if such practice is made possible by a supply of legal tender adapted to it, the result must inevitably be an inflation of the currency. This is in fact what has been going on since the war in a good many countries.

But even this form of deterioration of the currency is to a great extent a consequence of bad State finance. The industrial development of the country necessarily requires a liberal supply of fresh capital. When the State is continually absorbing most of the savings of the people there is not enough left for this industrial development and the requirements of bank assistance

will be very pressing. The banks will naturally hesitate in cutting down demands which seem to be of the first importance, for the enterprises as well as for the community at large. And if the way to creating fresh bank credits is open it most probably will be resorted to.

The recent development of the methods of taxation has without doubt seriously aggravated this situation. As all private income is used either for consumption or for saving, taxes must necessarily be paid either by a reduction of consumption or by a reduction of savings. There is no other choice. But the relative degree in which both these sources of taxes are used by the financial policy of a country has the most serious bearing on the economic development of the country. Now the tendencies in taxation which have prevailed during and after the war all go in the direction of placing the burden more and more on savings. This means that the State more and more covers its expenses by a continual consumption of the current savings of the people. Business enterprises are especially hardly hit by this pernicious practice, because they must pay out in taxes the money which in the first place ought to have served the need of fresh capital. In many cases the profits go, and must go immediately, to cover the pressing requirements of fresh money for the development of the business; and when the term for the payment of taxes comes on there is perhaps no free money left for the purpose. It is then necessary to apply for bank assistance, and if the enterprise is sound the bank cannot possibly refuse such assistance. But it may well happen that the banks, as a whole, have to give so great advances for payments of the taxes of their clientele

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that an artificial creation of bank-money is unavoidable. In such cases it is clear that the taxation is a direct cause of inflation. But even if this result is avoided the wholesale consumption of the savings of the nation in taxes must have the most pernicious influence on the necessary capital supply of industry and trade, and may easily drive them into such situations that an arbitrary extension of credit making presents itself to the business community as the only possible way out.

In all countries the rates of discount of the central banks have been kept far beneath the heights which would have corresponded to the extraordinary scarcity of capital caused by the war and by extravagant State expenditure after the war. The rate of interest has, as all other prices, the fundamental function in social economy of restricting demand so far as the limited supply requires. With a too low rate of interest the equilibrium of the capital market is disturbed, and a need for artificial restrictions of the demand for capital arises, expressing itself in schemes for bureaucratic control of the use of capital, "rationing of capital," etc. Such means are always more or less pernicious for the wholesome growth of economic life, but they are seldom effective enough to bring about the necessary restriction of the demand for capital. And as long as the banks, and ultimately the central banks, have to meet greater demands than can be satisfied by real savings, an arbitrary creation of bank money is inevitable. Thus the result of an endeavour to keep down the bank rate beneath the point which the real scarcity of capital would require must always be an inflation.

There are obviously many interests at work to hide

this truth. But foremost among them stands without doubt the fiscal interest of a government in constant need of fresh loans or anxious to fund floating debts. Most governments have, under such circumstances, been inclined to keep down the bank rate in order to smooth the way for their loan operations. Such practice seems still to be in very general use. The business world is naturally against a high rate of interest which seems to work as a restriction on the development of economic life, and it is thereby only too easily overlooked that the real and necessary restriction lies in the scarcity of capital, and that the high rate of interest is only an expression of this scarcity. Labour might sometimes be aroused against a high bank rate, namely, when it begins to realise that dear money means a pressure on money wages.

Whatever now may be the reasons for keeping down the bank rate beneath its true level, such a policy always means a falsification of the money market, giving an impression of an abundance of capital which, in reality, does not exist. As long as there are objective limits to the supply of legal tender, the bank will very soon be reminded of the dangers of its policy; but when these safeguards are removed and legal tender can be supplied in arbitrary quantities there is nothing to show the bank unquestionably that it is on a wrong way, and the bank may well go on on the downward road of inflation in the bona fide belief that it is only supplying the business community with the money the latter has need of.

The actual process of inflation which we have to deal with now, at least in most European countries, is the combined result of an artificial creation of purchasing power in order to finance government

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expenditure beyond the real capacity of the country, and a falsification of the money market by a too low rate of interest, in both cases with assistance of an arbitrary supply of legal tender.

III

EFFECT ON THE VALUE OF GOLD

Inflation of the currency and depreciation of the standard have in most countries driven the gold coins out of circulation. In several countries the chief part of the circulating gold was, already in the earlier stages of inflation, brought to the central banks by patriotic motives or by a strong pressure on the citizens. The gold has then been hoarded in the central banks. But even there it could not have been kept if the bank had freely paid it out against its notes. In most countries, however, the notes have been declared irredeemable and, when this formal acknowledgment of depreciation has been avoided, this has only been possible by a prohibition of every practical use of the gold, particularly gold export or the melting of gold coins for industrial purposes.

The general withdrawal of gold from circulation has naturally created a considerable abundance of gold for monetary use, and this abundance has probably in some degree been increased by the melting of articles of art or luxury caused by patriotism or by distress. Some central banks, as the Austrian and later on the German, have been forced to part with the greater portion of their gold funds, which have gone to increase the supply in other countries. To the superabundance

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of gold thus created has been added the considerable production of gold since the beginning of the war. As the consumption of gold in the arts has probably been more restricted during the war than normally, this production must have had a special importance for the monetary supply of the metal.

The superfluous gold must of course find some

The superfluous gold must of course find some outlet. It poured, during the first years of the war, into the central banks of the neutral countries of Europe, it went in enormous quantities to the United States, and even found its way to South America and Eastern Asia. But still the capacity to receive all this gold proved too small, and the yellow metal suffered a severe loss in value. In this way the masses of paper money created have in fact pressed down the value of gold as against commodities to less than half of what it used to be before the war.

In earlier cases when a country has flooded itself with paper money, the gold has gone out to other countries. Gold, thus having become more abundant in the rest of the world, has without doubt lost a part of its value, but in most cases a rather insignificant part. Now when gold has been driven out, not only from the circulation, but sometimes also from the central banks of so many and so large countries, there has been very narrow space left for the superfluous gold, and the following depreciation of the metal has necessarily been severe. The dollar at present most truly represents gold. The general level of prices in the United States being about 250 as against 100 before the war, the dollar has clearly come down to something about 40 per cent. of its old value measure in commodities and the same should then be the case in regard to gold. A fully reliable estimation of

the value of gold as against commodities is, however, hardly possible so long as the gold movements in the world are not free and so long as the value of gold, in consequence thereof, may be different in different countries.

The inflation of any monetary standard should of course not be measured by the agio on a metal which is itself depreciated, but by the agio that has to be paid for commodities, and no country must think that it has gone free from the process of inflation because it may see its way to resume gold payments.

The depreciation in the value of gold has, during the war, caused some neutral countries to protect themselves against an import of gold which would have meant a further depreciation of their monetary standard. Sweden, which in 1916 took the lead in this policy, has, however, only temporarily attained its aim, other depreciating factors, viz., more or less compulsory loans to foreign countries and extravagant State expenditure, having been quite predominant. The Swedish crown was, as a matter of fact, very much depreciated during the following years and has now, without doubt, lost far more of its purchasing power as against commodities than the dollar.

IV

THE ENHANCEMENT OF PRICES

THE creation of more money is not the only cause of a rise of prices. A reduction of the total mass of commodities to be handled by a given stock of money must have the same effect on prices, as long as this stock of money is unaltered. Such a reduction has probably taken place during the war in most European countries. If the mass of commodities decreases by 10 per cent, and the stock of money at the same time increases by 100 per cent., the result must be a rise of prices in the proportion of 90:200 or approximately from 100 to 222. The main cause of the rise of prices has in reality, as in this example, been the increased supply of money, the reduction of the mass of commodities having always played a very secondary rôle in this respect. For such a reduction is very sharp indeed if it surpasses the limit of say 20 to 30 per cent. But the stocks of money have very generally been increased by 200 or 300 per cent. and in the most impoverished countries even far more.

If the mass of commodities in any country diminished by 10 per cent., the stock of money of that country ought strictly to be diminished by 10 per cent. too. Where this is done no rise of prices will take place. In this sense one may say that every rise of prices is

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caused by a too abundant supply of the means of payment and is proportional to this abundance.

Inflation has been defined by the Federal Reserve Board of the United States as "the process of making additions to credits not based upon a commensurate increase in the production of goods." (Fed. Res. Bulletin, July 1, 1919, p. 614.) But the omission to make reductions in credits commensurate to a decrease in the production of goods must have the same effect upon prices, and may therefore justly be called an inflation too. Thus we may speak of "Inflation" in a more narrow or in a more general sense. If there has been no increase in the mass of commodities, as is probably the case for most European countries during the war, the increased supply of money represents inflation in the narrow sense. But in a wider sense inflation is measured by the rise of the general level of prices.

The popular idea that a shortage in commodities could cause a rise of prices which would necessitate the creation of more money is obviously a fallacy.

Popular explanations of the rise of prices generally start from such factors as the high costs of transportation, the prohibition of imports, the diminished output of labour, etc. Such factors can obviously have an influence on the general level of prices only so far as they contribute to a decrease in the total mass of commodities. But so far due regard has already been paid to those factors in the explanation here given. Other factors which need to be set forth in the discussion refer themselves ultimately to an increased supply of money. This is the case, e.g., when people speak of high wages, high costs of raw materials, etc., as causes of a general increase of

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prices. In reality there can be no other independent causes of an upward movement in the general level of prices than those two which have been stated above.

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INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES—PURCHASING POWER PARITIES

OUR willingness to pay a certain price for a foreign money must ultimately and essentially depend on the fact that this money has a purchasing power as against commodities and services in the foreign country. On the other hand, when we offer so and so much of our own money we offer, in fact, a purchasing power against commodities and services in our own country. Our valuation of a foreign money will, therefore, essentially depend on the relative purchasing power of the currencies of both countries.

Given a normal freedom of trade between two countries, A and B, a rate of exchange will establish itself between them and this rate will, smaller fluctuations apart, remain unaltered as long as no alteration in the purchasing power of either currency is made and no special hindrances are imposed upon the trade. But as soon as an inflation takes place in the money of A, and the purchasing power of this money is, therefore, diminished, the value of the A-money in B must necessarily be reduced in the same proportion. And if the B-money is inflated and its purchasing power is lowered, the valuation of the A-money in B will clearly increase in the same pro-

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portion. If, e.g., the inflation in A has been in the proportion of 320 to 100, and the inflation in B has been in the proportion of 240 to 100, the new rate of exchange will be three-fourths of the old rate (approximately the case of England and the United States). Hence the following rule: When two currencies have been inflated, the new normal rate of exchange will be equal to the old rate multiplied by the quotient between the degrees of inflation of both countries. There will, of course, always be fluctuations from this new normal rate, and in a period of transition these fluctuations are apt to be rather wide. But the rate calculated in the way indicated must be regarded as the new parity between the currencies. This parity may be called the purchasing power parity, as it is determined by the quotient of the purchasing powers of the different currencies.

During the war the buying capacity of the different monetary standards has, owing to the over-abundant supply of means of payment, been much reduced, though in very different proportions. Consequently the purchasing power parities have undergone very important alterations and are now quite different from the parities which were in force before the war. There is no reason to believe that exchanges will ever be restored, generally, to their old parities. These old parities have, in fact, lost their old significance and can no longer in any respect be regarded as normal. The constant references still made to them are a most serious hindrance against a clear understanding of what has really happened to the world's monetary standards. In statistics, likewise, it is only confusing to retain the old custom of converting foreign money on the basis of the pre-war parities.

The purchasing power parities represent the true equilibrium of the exchanges, and it is, therefore, of great practical value to know these parities. It is in fact to them we have to refer when we wish to get an idea of the real value of currencies whose exchanges are subject to arbitrary and sometimes wild fluctuations. Every care should therefore be taken to ascertain the rate of inflation of each country, as measured by the increase of circulation or by the rise of prices, and from these data calculate the purchasing power parities of the different currencies. Such figures, based on monthly mean inflation in different countries, ought to be laid before the world some few days after the end of each month.

In the popular explanations of the enhancement of prices a prominent place usually is given to the fact that prices have risen in other countries. In regard to the independent paper currencies now in use in most countries this explanation is obviously false. The exchanges adjust themselves, as we have now seen, to the general price level of each country. If, then, a general rise of prices has taken place in A, the value of the money of A in B will sink in the same proportion, and with this new rate of exchange the higher price level in A cannot cause a higher price level in B. If only the supply of means of payment in B is kept scanty enough the purchasing power of the B-money will be unaltered and quite independent of any inflation in A. On the other hand, a country which has kept up an effective gold standard must obviously experience a rise of prices commensurate to the fall in the value of gold referred to under III.

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ABNORMAL DEVIATIONS OF THE EXCHANGES

In the earlier part of the war, when a certain amount of freedom still was left for international trade, the actual rates of the exchanges used to coincide fairly well with the purchasing power parities. the sharp restrictions of the trade between nations have often distorted the exchanges from these parities. trade between two countries is more hampered in one direction than in the other, the value of the money of the country whose export is relatively more restricted will fall, in the other country, beneath the purchasing power parity. This result is only in accordance with our general conception of the rate of exchange as an expression of the valuation of a means of securing the supply of foreign commodities; if this supply is made artificially difficult, the actual value of the foreign currency must sink in proportion. There are many instances of such abnormal deviations of the exchanges. Thus, the inflation in the United States has without doubt been much smaller than in Sweden, and the dollar has kept much more of its old purchasing power than the Swedish crown. The purchasing power parity must therefore have risen considerably above the old parity of Kronor 3.73 for the dollar. But the actual rate fell, during the time of the severest war

restrictions of American exports to Sweden, far beneath this old parity, the mean monthly rate for November, 1917, being as low as Kronor 2.55. As soon as the restrictions were removed, the dollar exchange rose to a height corresponding to the purchasing power parity and even, for a short time, above it. The explanation of the temporary undervaluation of the dollar is to be sought in the absence of any immediate employment for dollars in Swedish possession.

The restrictions of which we have to take account in this connection may be of different kinds. Absolute prohibition of export, prohibition with a system of licences, rationing of export, export duties, measures to keep up higher prices for foreigners than those of the inland market, etc., are samples of methods which have been in use during the war and are still retained in numerous cases. They all work in the direction of a corresponding depression of the international value of the currency of the country applying them. If this were clearly seen, the eagerness for such methods would probably be considerably mitigated. restrictions can also take the shape of artificial hindrances or natural difficulties hampering transport from the country A to the country B more seriously than the transport in the opposite direction. The result will be some undervaluation of the money of A in that of B. The same result will, of course, follow from every import-restricting measure in B. Thus, the severe French import restrictions on luxuries tend to enhance the international value of the franc, or perhaps rather to counteract, to a certain degree, other influences tending to depress the franc beneath its purchasing power parity. The explanation is, from the French point of view, that foreign money is

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no longer so much worth having when it cannot be used for acquiring foreign luxuries; and from the foreigner's point of view, that the import restrictions make it more difficult to procure francs.

We can imagine several other factors which might depress the international value of a currency beneath its purchasing power parity. But if there is no special hindrance against export from a country, every undervaluation of its currency will obviously call forth an increase of its export tending to counteract this undervaluation. For as soon as the currency of a country is undervalued in comparison with its purchasing power parity there will be a special profit in buying this currency and using the money to procure commodities from that country. The stimulus thus given to the demand must very soon bring the price of the currency up to the purchasing power parity. Therefore, where no extra restrictions on the export of a country are imposed, other causes depressing the exchange beneath the purchasing power parity can have only a temporary effect

As instances of such depressing tendencies we can quote: a distrust in the future of a monetary standard, leading to a discounting of an anticipated fall of the internal value of the money; operations of speculators, etc. By far the most important of these depressing factors is, however, the practice of selling out the currency of a country abroad. This practice has, during the last year, reached such proportions and become such a prominent factor in the international monetary situation that it is necessary to devote special attention to it.

The whole operation can best be studied in the case of Germany. German marks have been sold out abroad

on an enormous scale, and at almost any price they would fetch. As the central government, local bodies, banks and business enterprises were in absolute need of foreign means of payment, and these did not seem to be procurable in any other way, the country was driven to this selling out of its currency. The process must be looked upon as a substitute—a bad substitute indeed-for the more regular device of securing foreign loans. As lenders could not be found, Germany turned to a new class of investors, the speculators in currency, and offered them, instead of a high rate of interest, the inducement of an extraordinary low rate of exchange. Of course, the speculators suffered heavy losses as the exchange went down step by step. But new ranks of speculators were always ready to believe that "the bottom has been reached"; as a matter of fact, the last of them have made enormous profits. selling out of marks is said to have been considerably increased by the endeavours to evade in this way an exorbitant taxation.

Now, this process, carried on on such a scale, inevitably must have a tendency to depress the German mark beneath its purchasing power parity. Such a depression has also taken place, at certain periods, to a most alarming degree. When the mark was at its lowest international value it had certainly not more than a third or a fourth part of the value which would have corresponded to its internal purchasing power. It would, under such circumstances, have been extraordinarily profitable to use German marks for buying in the cheap German markets. In fact almost everything could then have been exported from Germany with great advantage. This was, of course, an impossible situation for Germany. She was simply compelled

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to protect her scanty supplies of food and raw materials, and thus to prohibit exports of them. In regard to other commodities she tried to defend herself against buyers, seeking to take advantage of the low exchanges, by raising prices for foreigners to some multiple of the inland price. These measures, however, must, according to what has been stated above, have the effect of pressing down, permanently, the exchange value of the mark beneath its purchasing power parity.

On the other side, the measures have not been quite effective. It has not been possible to prevent the enormous buying capacity put into the hands of foreigners from reverting, to a certain extent, to Germany and making itself felt on its internal market, by forcing up prices even for inland buyers. This means, however, that the internal purchasing power of the German mark has been reduced. In fact, the general rise of prices in Germany during the last twelve months has been enormous. But then, of course, the purchasing power parities of the mark have been proportionally cut down.

From these experiences it seems clear enough what disastrous effects are connected with an endeavour to sell out a currency of a country to foreign speculators. Although the case of Germany is the most conspicuous, the practice has by no means been restricted to that country. Other countries which have been tempted on the same downward road should now see the necessity of stopping the process.

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EVERY alteration in the purchasing power parity of the exchange between two countries naturally must have a disturbing influence on their mutual trade. But as soon as this parity has been stabilised at a certain level it is of no importance whether this level is high or low. Thus, the export trade of a country is not hampered by low quotations of the foreign exchanges as long as these quotations only correspond to a high level of prices in foreign countries or a low level at home; nor is it specially stimulated by high quotations of the foreign exchanges as long as these only correspond to the relative purchasing power of the monetary standards quoted. Likewise, low prices on foreign currencies do not mean an encouragement of imports from them or a handicap for the home producer, provided these exchanges are a true expression for the purchasing power of the foreign money; on the same condition, high prices of foreign currencies do not in any way hamper the import from them. In fact, the terms "high" or "low" exchanges have no sense in themselves; if they are to be used they must obviously refer to the normal rates of exchange, i.e., to the purchasing power parities. But when used, as is generally the case,

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in reference to old parities which have lost all real significance they are in the highest degree misleading.

Equally clear it is that every deviation of the actual rates of exchange from the purchasing power parities must cause considerable disturbances in international trade. The export from A to B must be very much hampered if the money of B is quoted in A lower than would correspond to the general level of prices in B as compared with that in A. At the same time, the import to A from B would get an artificial stimulus from such a quotation. True, both these effects would tend to enhance the value of the B-money in A, and to bring it up again to its purchasing power parity, which shows that this parity is the true point of equilibrium for the exchanges.

But in reality this restoration to equilibrium may take a long time, especially if the forces depressing the exchange are strong and work continually. And this period may prove very disturbing for trade and industry in both countries. Generally, the country which has got its money undervalued is regarded as the sufferer, and the difficulties of its position are clear to everybody. In fact, however, it is not much better for the country whose currency is overvalued, such a country being exposed to quite a new sort of dumping of the most reckless and incalculable kind, and at the same time very much hampered in its export trade. Most European countries have had such disagreeable experiences of the extraordinary depression of the German mark during the winter 1919-20, while Germany herself has had to go through all the sufferings and curious disturbances of a country exposed to an abnormal undervaluation of its currency. But this is by no means the only case. There has been,

in the first months of 1920, a very substantial undervaluation of the French franc and the Italian lira in relation to British, American and neutral currencies. It is obviously of great importance that the fullest light should be thrown upon the causes of these abnormal movements of the exchanges and on their effects on trade.

Here we have, however, first of all, to emphasise the general truth that exchanges are disturbing to international trade only in so far as they deviate from their purchasing power parities. To judge the present exchanges from the point of view of the pre-war parities is a grave mistake, which is, however, incessantly repeated, even in otherwise sound expositions of the monetary situation. The result is that people often represent an exchange as being against a country when the opposite is the case, and vice versa. questions of such vital practical bearing, no obscurity in regard to first principles can be allowed without serious risk, and it seems, therefore, highly desirable that a full understanding on this point should be arrived at. The world will never come back to the pre-war parities, and we shall therefore, in any case, sooner or later, have to accustom ourselves to look upon the new purchasing power parities, which, we may hope, will gradually crystallise themselves out of the present muddle, as the true parities.

The months of May and June of 1920 have witnessed a very sharp rise of the German mark. One could have imagined that this recovery should have been a great advantage for Germany, as well as for the countries trading with Germany, and, to a certain extent, this has undoubtedly been the case. But the very alteration and its suddenness have, in reality, proved almost

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fatal, not only to the international trade of Germany, but also to her production and her whole internal economic life. These consequences have, naturally, been aggravated by the violent daily fluctuations of the exchanges which have taken place and which seem to have become worse and more incalculable than ever.

These experiences, and similar experiences in regard to other currencies, seem to show that exchanges which are very much depressed beneath their purchasing power parities are liable to more violent and arbitrary fluctuations than exchanges which move in the vicinity of their purchasing power parity.

Certainly, a situation which allows such fluctuations of the exchanges is quite intolerable: the complete impossibility of making an ordinary business calculation or an economic forecast of any kind threatens not only international trade, but the whole economic life of a continually growing part of the world with a complete breakdown.

When the exchanges move against a country—i.e., when the currency of the country sinks in international value—people generally explain it as a result of an adverse balance of trade. But this explanation is obviously inadequate if the deviation of the exchanges is considerable, and has more than a quite temporary character. For if a country buys more from another than it sells to it, the balance must be paid in some way; say, by export of securities or by loans in the other country. Thus the balance of payments must on the whole equalise itself, and there is no reason for a definite alteration in the rates of exchange. Should such an alteration occur, it must generally be taken as a proof of an inflation which has brought down the

internal value of the monetary unit of the country and raised its general level of prices. With an unaltered price-level and an adverse rate of exchange, the country's export trade should get a strong stimulus, which would tend to bring the exchange back soon enough to its normal rate.

On the other hand, if an inflation has taken place, a new normal equilibrium of the exchanges must establish itself, quite irrespective of any balance of trade. If, e.g., the French inflation is 600 (in comparison with 100 before the war) and the English inflation is 300, it is altogether superfluous to look for another cause to explain the normal rate having doubled from 25 francs for the £1 to 50 francs. (These figures are, of course, somewhat simplified, but may be taken as representing the essential of what has really happened.) If then, in addition, France suffers from an adverse balance of trade, this balance must be paid for by fresh credits, or by export of securities; and no further depression of the franc will follow. Were the country really cut off from all normal ways of procuring means of payment, and were it for this reason turning to sell out its own currency abroad to speculators, that would without doubt be a factor tending to a further depression of the international value of the franc. But even then a definite depression beneath the purchasing power parity could only take place if the export of commodities from France were particularly restricted, and the foreign holders of francs thereby cut off from a free use of their purchasing power on the French market. This ought to make it clear that an adverse balance of trade, or even, more generally, an adverse balance of daily obligations, is quite insufficient as an explanation of any lasting

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depression of the exchange value of the currency of the country.

Now, if we are bound, on these grounds, to abandon altogether the popular theory of trade balances as an explanation of the movements of international exchanges since the beginning of the war, another very popular theory has to be buried too, viz., the theory that depressed exchanges can be corrected by an adjustment of the trade balance. In fact, it is very generally believed that a country which has seen the price of its money abroad sink very much below its pre-war parity will be able, after the war, to restore the old exchanges only by increasing its exports. This will certainly be possible if the low quotations of the money of the country have been caused exclusively by one-sided hindrances against its exports. But if they are signs of a deteriorated internal value of the money, no development of the export of the country can better the exchanges. These will in the future be governed exclusively by the purchasing power parities, and will therefore only be improved if the country succeeds in reducing its inflation, and thus in giving its monetary unit a higher internal value. But this is, as we shall see, a very complicated process, involving difficulties of another kind than that of increasing exports.

VIII

THE STABILISATION OF THE DIFFERENT MONETARY STANDARDS

If we really wish to make an earnest effort for the recovery of the world's economic life, we shall invariably find, from whatever point we take up the problem, that the first thing to be done is to stop the process of inflation. As long as inflation is allowed to go on, deteriorating still further the monetary standards, there is no hope for any work of reconstruction. Now, the stopping of inflation necessarily involves the establishing of a definite scarcity of money. Where the supply of money can be arbitrarily increased, demands for money will always be sure to come forward. Governments will spend more than the actual savings they have at their disposal, enterprising promoters will require more capital than the community can save, housing schemes will be pushed without regard to the real possibilities of the supply of capital, labourers will ask for higher wages and other labourers will follow them, tradesmen will increase their selling prices, and profiteers will take advantage of the general wave of price-enhancement. In one word, we shall have all the factors set moving which people generally look upon as the real causes of a general rise of prices. The deficiency of the popular explanations is plain

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enough: these factors are always at work as tendencies: but they are, normally, kept within due limits by a definite scarcity of money, imposing the hard necessity of restriction. Only when this natural scarcity is done away with by measures allowing an arbitrary creation of fresh money, and when thus the sluices of inflation are thrown open, will the tendencies develop into factors actually at work in the process of price-enhancement. Therefore, the only possible way of combating this enhancement of prices and the rising cost of living is to restore the necessary scarcity of money, and definitely shut out all arbitrary measures tending to make the supply of money artificially easy. The popular idea that a rise of prices can be prevented by legislation enacting maximum prices and inflicting severe punishments on speculators and profiteers, while the country is incessantly flooded with fresh money is a fallacy which it is very important to get rooted out.

The problem of stopping inflation is obviously, in the first instance, a problem for each country to decide for itself. By carrying through such a policy, the country will be able to attain a *stabilised* standard of value; and whatever may be the further aims of the monetary policy of the country, this is undoubtedly the first thing to be done.

The general means of keeping up a monetary standard is the sufficient limitation of the supply of means of payment in that standard. The principal regulator of this supply is the rate of discount. In the whole world the rates of discount have been too low during the war. The real scarcity of capital would have commanded a much higher interest than the 5 or 6 per cent. which have generally prevailed, but which

have only been the results of a continual falsification of the money market. Even now, after the war, the world's need of capital is so great, in comparison with the scanty supply, that a real equilibrium can be attained only by the aid of higher rates of interest than those generally prevailing. This has begun to be more and more recognised, as is shown by the latest increases of the discount rates of some central banks up to 7 per cent. But still there are many countries lagging behind in this regard in the belief, as it seems, that they can really afford the convenience of a much lower rate; and curiously enough these countries are by no means always among the richest.

It is often said that a high rate of interest hampers production and makes it dearer. This is false. interest policy which gives the scarcity of capital its true expression in a sufficiently high rate of interest can in no way prevent the productive powers of the community from being fully employed. It only directs these powers, to a certain extent, from future needs to present, and in this way it secures a better provision for the present than otherwise would be possible. If, e.g., a sum of a hundred millions is spent in one year on some sort of future needs-say, on extensive house building-nearly all the money distributed will be turned into purchasing power claiming to be satisfied with commodities and services to be immediately consumed. But practically no such goods have been produced by this expenditure. Most probably, no new housing accommodation will have been provided during the year, and even in the following years only a very small amount of the original expenditure will be repaid, annually, by the housing accommodation procured. If the hundred millions

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are not actually saved by some persons reducing their consumption so much beneath their income, the mass of consumable goods at the disposal of the community during the year will therefore meet a demand out of proportion to its value, and the result will inevitably be a rise of prices. Now, if the rate of interest had been raised so as to correspond to the real scarcity of savings, and if the sum spent on house building had been, in consequence thereof, reduced within the limits of real savings available, the productive powers of the community would have been directed to a greater extent to satisfy its immediate needs, and an equilibrium would have been attained between the buying capacity directed to consumption and the mass of consumable goods. Thus, a right interest policy would have prevented a rise of prices.

The first condition which must be fulfilled, if a stabilisation of prices shall be attained, is, therefore, that the rate of interest at which the banks lend their money shall, broadly at least, correspond to the real scarcity of capital.

Besides the rate of interest, there are other means for enforcing the necessary restriction on the demand for capital. The banks always discriminate between the proposals for which their accommodation is sought, and in periods of particular scarcity of capital it is only natural that this discrimination is made more severe than usual. It seems sound, under present circumstances, to discriminate particularly against a use of capital which, though preferable enough, will require a long time to become remunerative; or which involves mainly the strengthening of a monopoly without adding materially to the productive capacity of the community; or which is calculated to serve a

demand for luxuries which now ought to be excluded. But the proposition that is sometimes put forward that the banks should restrain their fresh advances to purposes of "public utility," refusing assistance even to the most profitable bargains or enterprises, seems thoroughly unsound, considering that it must be a rather important public interest—particularly in a poor country or in times of distress—that capital shall be used, generally, in the most profitable way. The device of using capital for "public utility" has, in reality, proved itself to lead to particularly wasteful dispositions of capital, without due regard to the actual limits of supply, and therefore to be one of the most prominent factors in the process of inflation.

The bureaucratic control of the use of capital which has been introduced in some countries does not seem capable of doing much good. If the rate of interest is kept so high as to correspond to the real scarcity of capital, there will be no need for a further restriction of the demand on bureaucratic lines. And if bureaucratic regulation is to supply the additional restriction to the market which a too low bank rate makes necessary, it seems almost sure that the employment of the available capital in the community will be rather uneconomical. Besides, the control itself must be a serious hindrance against trade and enterprise, and, therefore, must diminish the effectivity of the business life of the country.

The popular idea that it is possible to improve a monetary standard by heaping up gold in the vaults of the central bank must be abandoned. The value of the money of any country is determined by the scantiness of the relative supply of means of payment in that money. As long as this supply is not reduced,

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no measures whatever can give the monetary unit a higher value. If the money of the country is kept about par with gold by a sufficient limitation of the supply of means of payment a gold reserve may prove useful for the actual carrying through of gold payments. But if this fundamental condition is not fulfilled, the gold in the vaults cannot save the currency of the country from being depreciated.

The value of the money of a country is often confounded with the credit of that country. It is believed that the low international valuation of the money is simply an expression of distrust in the country's financial situation, and, therefore, also that a higher value can be restored to the monetary standard if only the government can re-establish its credit. According to what has been stated here, this view must be false, though, of course, if a currency has been depressed, on international exchanges, beneath its purchasing power parity, an improved State credit may help to restore it to that parity. But the internal purchasing power altogether depends on the limitation of the supply of money, and the financial situation of the State has an influence on the inner value of the money only so far as it makes such a limitation possible.

If the stabilisation of the monetary standard depends on a limitation of the supply of money, and, therefore, ultimately on the supply of legal tender money, it would seem a simple solution of the problem to enact a rigid maximum for the issue of such money. But such a course will easily involve the country in the gravest difficulties if it is not combined with a policy suited to restrict the buying capacity in general. With an incessant creation of fresh buying capacity,

the need of legally recognised circulating means of payment will increase proportionally, and the rigid limits to the supply of them will, ultimately, prove unbearable and probably be abolished. If this supply, as in the case of the British currency, is made dependent on gold reserves, the formal limitation of the restriction of the currency will result in extraordinary efforts to acquire more gold, which efforts will be of little real use for the stabilisation of the monetary standard, but which, as we shall see later on, may make the ultimate restoration of the gold parity more difficult. Thus, the formal limitation of the issue of notes. important and, indeed, necessary as it may be, should not be thought to be more than a part of the general scheme required for the restriction of the total monetary buying capacity of the community.

IX

ITS EFFECTS ON STATE FINANCE

A STABILISATION of the monetary standard obviously cannot be attained by imposing restrictions on the business community only. Equally severe restrictions must be laid upon the government's demand for money. These demands have, as a matter of fact, been the chief factor in the inflation which has taken place since the beginning of the war, and cessation of inflation must consequently, first of all, require cessation of the manufacturing of money to fill the gap between State expenditure and real buying capacity put at the disposal of the State. Now there are limits to the real savings a government can get hold of by taxes or loans from its citizens. Pushing its demands beyond these limits, the government virtually drives the taxpayer or the buyer of government securities to rely upon bank accommodation, leading ultimately to inflation. Thus there are also limits to the expenditure a government can undertake without causing, directly or indirectly, further inflation and depreciation of the monetary standard of the Stabilisation of the monetary standard will in all countries require a severe restriction of the State expenditure which they have got accustomed to during the last years.

To cut down expenditure on a large scale is, however, a hopeless task without radical restrictions of the field of expenditure, and hence of the functions which the State pretends to fulfil. In the first instance, there is the attempt of governments to reduce, at the cost of the exchequer, the price of certain commodities and services beneath cost. Such practices must completely and as soon as possible be abolished. This involves, of course, an increase of prices for bread or of railway fares or postage, or of whatever may be the prices artificially kept down. But the buying capacity of the consumer is thereby reduced, and the result will be a tendency to depression of other prices. At the same time the government will be able to reduce their demand for artificially manufactured buying capacity, and thus a restriction will be laid upon further inflation. A cessation of all unnecessary direct subsidies to the unemployed or other consumers will co-operate to the same effect. Before entering upon any fresh scheme of subsidies, e.g., for house building, the government should make sure that they can pay for it without fresh inflation.

Further, there is the military expenditure. Looking upon Europe from an outsider's point of view, we must recognise that the whole Continent is insolvent and cannot really afford the enormous military expenditure which still prevails. It is the common interest of Europe that its different countries should revert, in the nearest possible future, to stable standards of morey. But this very modest and extremely important end can never be attained as long as Europe continues its hostilities, its military occupations and its internal rebellions, and as long as these practices call forth a need for armaments far beyond what

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Europe can honestly pay for. Real peace conditions must be established, and this must be interpreted to mean friendly intercourse between the different members of the European State-family, earnestly co-operating in one great common effort to set the economic life of Europe going again. Those who regard this as a Utopian idea must realise what the alternative is: the continuation of the half-warlike conditions now prevailing does not only mean a direct and most serious hindrance to every revival of production and trade, but also a scale of military expenditure quite out of proportion to the financial capacity of the present Europe, and, therefore, inevitably leading to further inflation of its monetary standards. But what a prolonged inflation means should, at this moment, be clear to everybody: it means a progressive falling into pieces of all organised economic life, and of the moral forces which are its foundation, actual starvation for large classes of the population, growing social unrest, and, ultimately, the complete catastrophe when the food producers altogether refuse to take the depreciated paper money in exchange for their products. If anybody still believes this forecast to be the exaggerations of a pessimist, he has only to lay before himself the map of Europe. All the successive stages of the process of inflation are there represented simultaneously, England, France, Italy, Germany, Austria and Russia showing some typical milestones on the downward road to the ultimate catastrophe. No country that is gliding on this slope can feel itself safe from unexpected consequences, nor can Europe as a whole regain security and strength as long as any important part of it is still involved in this most pernicious process.

Several countries in Europe are at present in such extremely bad economic conditions that they will find it altogether impossible to restore equilibrium in their State budgets. Such countries, if left to themselves, have hardly any other choice than to go on financing their State expenditures to a great extent by artificially created purchasing power and therefore to continue the inflation of their currencies. this is to be avoided, they must have assistance in some form. And it seems natural enough that such assistance should be given to them in the first place by relieving them temporarily from certain State services which in the hands of their governments only mean an additional and unbearable burden for their budget, but which if transferred to an international body could be brought up to full efficiency and byand-by even be made profitable. The most important case, is, of course, that of State railways. In Germany this service is actually worked at a loss that is responsible to a very great extent for the enormous deficit in the budget. Clearly, in such a case, no help from the outside world could immediately do more for the restoration of equilibrium in the State finance of the country than a measure which would free the exchequer from the burden of the State railwavs.

If, by the different measures here suggested, or by other means of similar character, it had become possible for a country to reduce its State expenditure within the limits of its resources, some guarantee ought to be found that such an equilibrium should actually be maintained for the future, and that no renewed recourse to inflationistic finance should occur. The natural way to secure this end is to reserve the issue

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of notes and similar means of payment to an independent institution, e.g., of the type of the Bank of England, a necessary complement to such a measure being of course an effectual limitation of the credits which such an institution should be entitled to give to the government of the country. In countries where the guarantees for the strict observance of such rules were found to be insufficient, an international control of the issuing institution ought to be made a condition of any financial assistance from abroad; for such assistance would be merely wasted charity, completely incapable of securing the economic recovery it should aim at, as long as the finance of the country were allowed to be based on a continued inflation of its currency.

A sufficient restriction of State expenditure is a necessary condition which must be fulfilled if restrictions on the capital demands of the business community are to be of any use. Indeed, if the method of creating purchasing power by inflation is left open to the government, restrictions laid upon the capital requirements of individual enterprise, e.g., in the form of a high bank rate, may be directly pernicious. Such restrictions work, as is explained above, mainly as a check against the employment of the productive forces of the community in industries producing fixed capital, directing these forces to purposes of more immediate need, the chief practical result being perhaps that labour is diverted to some extent from building and constructive work to agriculture. But this process involves, of course, always a certain unemployment in these constructive occupations and a pressure on the wages in such trades. The danger is then that the government, under the influence of

false philanthropic ideas, feels itself obliged to subsidise the labourers brought under this pressure, offering them unemployment doles or starting comprehensive schemes of constructive work, as, e.g., road and railway construction or house building, in order to create employment for the labourers which the restricted supply of capital has made it impossible for private enterprise to employ. The result is then only that the government spends the capital that private enterprise was compelled to abstain from spending. The total demand for capital will remain the same, i.e., it will surpass the real supply of capital at the disposal of the community, and the process of inflation will continue. When this is realised, the conclusion will probably be that the restrictions laid upon the supply of capital to private enterprise have not been severe enough, and a further increase of the bank rate will be advocated as necessary. The consequence will be more unemployment in constructing trades, and new demands for government assistance. We are then in a circulus vitiosus which may prove extremely fatal. It is necessary that these consequences, which indeed, are not only hypothetical, but have to a certain extent already begun to show themselves, should be clearly seen before we enter upon any scheme of restricting the capital market.

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THE PROBLEM OF DEFLATION

If we only pay some earnest attention to the serious difficulties we shall have to overcome in order to stabilise a depreciated monetary standard at about its present value, we shall immediately realise that the idea of a deflation, bringing back the value of that money to its pre-war level, is altogether Utopian. The popular belief that prices by some mysterious reason will come down of themselves to their old "normal" level is a result of the systematical fostering of false conceptions in regard to the causes of the rise of prices which has been carried on with such remarkable zeal during the whole period of inflation. There is, of course, no ground whatever for such a belief. Sometimes the hope is expressed, by people who see the influence of the great mass of money, that the general economic development will increase the genuine need for money so much as to match the present supply. This seems, however, to be a particularly vain expectation. general rate of economic progress has been, during the half-century before the war, about 3 per cent. per annum. With this rate it would take thirty-one years to overcome a present inflation of 250 (100 denoting the normal supply of money), and nearly

thirty-eight years to meet the abundance of money in a country where the inflation has reached 300, not to speak of other countries where the inflation is much higher. Supposing that it really would be possible, by some very severe restraints on the market. to keep down the supply of money, during this long period, at its present figure, such a policy would involve a continual depression of the general level of prices by about 3 per cent. per annum. Under such prospects, however, it is obviously impossible to expect a normal rate of progress; indeed, the most probable result would be a more or less complete killing of industrial enterprise and of the very spirit of economic progress. But then the need for money, reduced to pre-war prices, would hardly ever grow up to the figure of the present supply. Clearly the policy involved in this conception of the problem of deflation can never be seriously contemplated.

Before entering upon the question to what extent a deflation might be possible or desirable, we first have to make ourselves acquainted with the nature of the means which we should have to apply in order to press down the general level of prices, and thus to raise the value of the monetary unit. This process being the reverse of inflation, it must obviously consist in restraining artificially the monetary purchasing power in the community. Two ways are conceivable for this purpose. Eirst, the State can lay such high taxes upon its citizens, or take up such big loans from them that it gets hold of a sum of money greater than is required to cover the expenses of the State, and then use the surplus to extinguish a corresponding amount of monetary purchasing power, e.g., by burning its own notes to that amount or repaying advances

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from the central bank. But this is easier to say than to do. Considering how great difficulties a minister of finance has to surmount before he can attain even the more moderate aim of an equilibrium in the budget, and how far most European countries are from this end, it would be rather optimistic to look for a speedy recovery of the depreciated standards on this line. And, even if such a policy formally succeeded, care must be taken that the taxes or the loans did not become so oppressive as to compel the citizens to rely upon fresh advances from the banks for the payment of their obligations. And even assuming that this point were cleared, such a restrictive policy of State finance would never attain its purpose if not assisted by corresponding restrictions of the money market.

We then, secondly, have to take account of the possibility of enforcing deflation by a high bank rate, or by other restrictions of the lending of the banks. The restrictions must then be so sharp that a stage is reached where the banks lend less than the actual savings deposited with them, and use the rest to cancel nominal purchasing power. Such a policy would without doubt press down prices, but it would at the same time have a very depressing influence on trade and industrial enterprise. The difficulties of a prolonged application of such methods are obvious.

These being the means by which a deflation can be carried through, it seems clear enough that the practical possibilities of the programme of deflation are rather narrow, and that a radical realisation of this programme will, in reality, show itself very little desirable. A prolonged period of falling prices and consequent general economic depression will never

be accepted as a wise device of deliberate economic policy.

Further, the question arises whether it is in itself desirable that the purchasing power of money should be raised to something like it was before the war, or, indeed, even be substantially increased. From the point of view of State finance, the answer to this question is clear enough; a considerable increase of the value of the monetary unit in which the debts of the State are contracted would in most cases make the State definitely insolvent. Already for this reason a considerable deflation is practically impossible, and cannot be seriously discussed. It would, of course, also cause insuperable difficulties to private debtors who have entered into their contracts during the latest period of depreciation, or, more accurately expressed, at a value of the monetary unit lower than that to which it should be restored.

Still, a process of deflation within more narrow limits can be taken into consideration, and may in some cases prove desirable. The prices of commodities have not adjusted themselves yet in any uniform way to the rate of inflation, nor have the prices of services; on the whole wages probably lag behind. A stabilisation of the monetary standard may reasonably take account of these circumstances, and choose the new value for the monetary unit somewhat below the figure representing the latest rate of inflation. However, it seems hardly advisable to enter upon any deflation scheme which would involve a reduction of the general level of money wages; for every such endeavour would without doubt lead to social unrest, and in this way make harm out of all proportion to the advantage it could bring.

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The choice of the value at which to stabilise the monetary unit will probably everywhere be put into connection with the question of resumption of gold payments. Owing to causes which have been explained under (III), gold has lost a considerable part of its pre-war value as against commodities, prices of commodities having risen in a gold standard like the dollar to about 250 against 100 before the war. In a country where the depreciation of the monetary standard has not gone much further than this depreciation of gold, it will seem very desirable to uphold the old parity with gold, i.e., to make the notes redeemable in gold at their face value; and this will then be possible by a comparatively small reduction in the supply of the means of payment. A deflation within such reasonable limits is, e.g., doubtless possible in England, where a reduction of the general level of prices by about 20 per cent. would probably be sufficient to establish parity between the paper pound sterling and the gold sovereign, and therefore also to bring up the dollar exchange value of the pound sterling to its old parity. But even this moderate aim cannot be attained without a deliberate policy based on a thorough scientific analysis of the problem and ready to apply the right measures and to face the sacrifices which they involve. Formal decisions establishing a maximum for the issue of currency notes, or even reducing this maximum gradually, will not be sufficient. A reduction of State expenditure, bringing it down to what the people can and will actually pay out of their current income, is necessary. And a restrictive bank policy with a high rate of discount is also necessary. Only such measures will give full effect to the legal restrictions of the note

issue. Increased gold holdings cannot of themselves facilitate the resumption of gold payments, but the full discussion of this point must be reserved for a following paragraph.

Everybody who has given some attention to the problem of resumption of gold payments in the case of the United Kingdom will immediately realise that the corresponding aim is altogether out of reach for countries with an essentially more depreciated currency, say, for France or Italy. The French franc and the Italian lira have now hardly the half of their old value in comparison with gold, and very serious efforts would probably in both cases be required in order to stabilise the currency at half its old gold parity. Under such circumstances, it will be necessary to study the problem of stabilisation of the monetary standard very carefully before entering upon any decision as to its future relation to gold. And it should thereby constantly be kept in mind that it is far more important, and for the present time urgent, to cease inflation, perhaps even to carry through a certain amount of deflation, and thus to stabilise the internal value of the money in comparison with commodities than to try to fix a definite relation to gold. When the time has come to take up this latter problem, it will be easier to survey all the circumstances affecting it.

For countries with much more inflated currencies, the problem of stopping further inflation is generally so troublesome and still so far from its solution that the question of deflation, or of the ultimate value to be given to the monetary unit, can hardly be raised yet. It is important, however, that the whole world should see that further steps on the road of

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inflation can practically never be retraced. The longer the stabilisation of these monetary standards is delayed, the lower will be the values that they will get ultimately.

It is often thought that seriously depreciated monetary standards must be abandoned as altogether unfit for their function. This is not the case. If only the value of the unit has been stabilised, and the prices of all commodities and services have had time to adapt themselves to this new unit, the new money will serve just as well as the old did. Perhaps the new unit will be thought to be too small, and it may seem desirable to exchange it for a unit, e.g., ten times larger. Such a measure would leave the continuity with the old standard essentially undisturbed, and would therefore not be a real abandonment of the old standard.

XI

THE STABILISATION OF INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES

The stabilisation of the internal value of money, i.e., of its buying capacity against commoditics, is by far the most urgent object to be pursued by the monetary policy which the different countries now have to enter upon. Between two nations which have attained this end a new normal rate of exchange will establish itself, this rate being determined by the quotient of the purchasing power of money in the respective countries. As freedom of trade and general confidence are gradually restored, the abnormal deviations of the exchanges described under (VI) will be more and more restricted, and will ultimately disappear, and the actual rates will tend to coincide nearer and nearer with the normal rate.

The new normal rates of exchanges may be, and in many cases certainly will be, very different from the pre-war parities. But this is a matter of secondary importance. The essential thing is that there should be any normal rates and that these are kept as constant as possible. For this end no other measure is wanted than the stabilisation of the internal value of each monetary standard concerned.

That this stabilisation should be achieved as generally and as early as possible is obviously a common interest

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for all nations. For as long as some standards have a fluctuating internal value no stability in the exchanges between these standards and those of other countries is conceivable. It is therefore against the common interest that any country should be allowed to go on inflating its currency or left in such circumstances that such inflation is practically unavoidable. But it is also, and for the same reason, against the common interest, that any country should try, by a continued process of deflation, to go on raising the internal value of its monetary standard, e.g., to something like what it was before the war. For reasons that have already been set out, it is not probable that such a policy would ever succeed. But it is better that this should be recognised, even officially, in order that the world could begin to reckon with the standard in question as having a definitely fixed value.

We here touch upon a very essential side of the whole problem before us. The world is suffering, at present, most severely from the uncertainty of the internal value of money in the different countries, and from the incessant fluctuations of the rates of exchange. Production which involves investment of capital becomes very hazardous when the future value of money is quite uncertain. And the same holds true in regard to every international business transaction as long as nobody can tell, not even approximately, what the rate of exchanges will turn out when the transaction is completed. Under these circumstances, the revival of productive activity and of international trade is very much hampered and delayed, to the greatest material detriment to the whole world, and, indeed, to the most formidable danger for the preservation of civilised society.

In meeting these difficulties, our first aim should be to create stability and security. Every country should decide, at the earliest possible date, what internal value it is going to give to its money, what amount of deflation it thinks proper and possible to attain, or perhaps, in the worst cases, what limit it thinks it can set to further inflation. And the policy thus determined should be made public in order that people should know what they had to reckon with. Internally, this would make an end of all talk of a restoration of the pre-war level of prices, and definitely do away with all hopes and all fears attached to this second price-revolution; and the trust in the future stability of the monetary standard would afford the basis for a new development of economic life within the country. Externally, likewise, the trust in the future stability of the exchanges would give a powerful stimulus to international trade. A fixed policy for the stabilisation of the most important standard of the world would be of great value for the smaller countries anxious to adapt their standards in some definite ratio to the leading standards of the world's trade. The public announcement of a definite monetary policy would in itself be a very wholesome measure, obliging the government and the issuing bank to an earnest and comprehensive consideration of the whole problem, and after that binding them morally to a stern fulfilment of the policy decided upon.

Of course, it would be very useful if the general principles upon which to act in these matters could be agreed upon internationally. A stabilisation of the internal values of the monetary units can only lead to a stabilisation of the purchasing power parities

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between these units. But, as has been shown under (VI), deviations from these normal rates are possible, and are actually a considerable grievance in the present state of the world's monetary affairs. The problem of stabilisation of exchanges includes, therefore, necessarily a scheme for preventing such abnormal deviations.

When a country, as is the case with Germany, has a large floating debt abroad, in the form of bank-notes or other notes, or debts on current accounts of the banks, a preliminary measure must be to exchange this debt against a funded loan. For, as long as a floating debt of such a character is allowed to exist, it tends to depreciate the money of the country on the international exchanges beneath its purchasing power parity; and this pernicious effect will then lead the country to extraordinary measures for protection of its internal market against an overwhelming buying capacity. A great consolidation loan for the redemption of the outstanding means of payment in German marks is therefore a first step necessary in order to bring the German exchange problem into a normal condition. The loan should, of course, chiefly be subscribed by the present holders of German marks, who would have an inducement to do that in the probable rise of the German exchange which would follow.

There are possibly some other countries with outstanding debts of the same nature, though not at all on the same scale. Similar funding loans should then be issued by them and taken in exchange by the holders of the floating debts.

Next, some means have to be found in order to prevent the practice of selling out one's own currency in order to acquire buying capacity in foreign countries.

This is a most delicate problem, which hardly can be solved by any direct prohibitions. Although international agreements of a suitable kind ought to be of some use, the most promising way seems to be to open possibilities for a country in distress to obtain, in the normal way of loans, such credits as are absolutely necessary.

Assuming these points satisfactorily settled, the problem of preventing abnormal deviations of the rates of exchanges becomes essentially a problem of restoring freedom and equality in international trade. The first condition to be fulfilled is that the present differentiations of prices in favour of the inland market or between foreign buyers of different nationalities should be completely abolished. The possession of a certain sum in the currency of a country must represent the same right to buy on the internal market of the country, irrespective of the nationality of the possessor of the money or of the destination he wishes to give to the commodities bought. If this elementary principle is disregarded, it is vain to expect an international valuation of the currency in accordance with its internal purchasing power.

The second condition—which is, in fact, nearly connected with the first—is that one-sided hindrances against trade between one country and another should as far as possible be abolished. Practically this claim involves that export—or import—prohibitions should be done away with when not absolutely wanted for the protection of scanty supplies of commodities of primary necessity. At any rate, no prohibitions should be retained only in order to serve as a basis for a licence system calculated to be used for imposing special burdens on trade.

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These two conditions require the sacrifice of a policy trying to make profit for the home country at the cost of other countries. Such practices have long ago been rejected as detrimental for the trade between nations, and, therefore, in the long run, for the home country too, and it is much to be regretted that they should now have been taken up again. Against the advantage that may be won for the home country by any measure of this kind, there is always the disadvantage of other countries applying the same policy. And then there is the general disadvantage for all countries of a hampering of trade and of a disturbance of the international exchanges showing itself in abnormal deviations from the purchasing power parities. If people could see all these consequences of what might be styled a national profiteering policy, its popularity would certainly very soon dwindle away.

An international agreement to discontinue all measures of this kind would do very much for restoring trade and, at the same time, for securing stability to international exchanges.

The measures here proposed are necessary conditions for a real solution of the very intricate problem of exchanges now before the world. But they are also sufficient. The world's trade can be carried on at any parities between the different monetary standards; the only essential thing being that the actual exchanges should remain steady in the neighbourhood of these parities.

It is often believed that the recovery of trade which is now so urgently needed could best be furthered by the establishment of an international standard of money. This is obviously a mistake; for if every

country should retain its own currency, the international money could only fill the function of an intermediary link in international payments. there is no need whatever of such a link. As long as the international value of a currency continued to fluctuate, the exchange between this currency and the international standard would fluctuate too, and the introduction of this standard would not have brought us a bit nearer the stability of exchanges, but only created a new and unnecessary complication. other alternative would be that several countries with bad currencies should altogether abandon their old standard and introduce the new international standard instead. This is, however, an extremely difficult operation, involving the most delicate problems of conversion of the old money to the new. And if a country should really wish to abandon its old standard it could just as well introduce one of the existing standards, e.g., the dollar; and then there would be no need to create a quite new standard for the purpose. The popularity of the idea of an international standard seems very much to be based on the belief that the whole question of exchange would be eliminated by the adoption of a common unit of money. The experience of the last years has, however, demonstrated the futility of this belief to the full. The problem of keeping a stable exchange between two countries remains essentially the same whether the countries have nominally the same unit of money or not. And a country making the dollar, or even a new international unit, the basis of its monetary system would not thereby have in the least secured itself a stable exchange as against the dollar or the international standard.

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Under such circumstances it is difficult to see how a country like Austria could gain any real advantage by introducing beside its present money a new standard specially intended to serve as a basis of its foreign trade. The whole problem of the exchange value of the present Austrian money would remain substantially the same, though it had been formally transferred to an internal question. And then there would be the fresh problem of the exchanges between the new standard and those of foreign countries; the simple device of making the new standard a "gold standard" may perhaps give this problem an air of simplicity—inducing people to overlook its real difficulties.

If we analyse the different schemes put forward in favour of a new international standard, we shall almost invariably find that they involve the creating of new masses of paper currency, and that they, in fact, derive a great part of their alleged usefulness from the fresh purchasing power, which in this way is put at disposal for purposes thought to be of primary importance for the world. Ultimately, then, such schemes unveil themselves as a policy of continuing, on a world-wide scale, the process of inflation hitherto carried on as a national concern. But that this cannot be the solution of the world's present monetary difficulties seems clear enough.

XII

THE GOLD QUESTION

Whatever may be said, from a theoretical point of view, against gold as a standard of value, particularly with regard to the violent fall in the value of this metal which, as shown under (III), has taken place during recent years, it seems pretty sure that most countries look forward to the restoration of a gold standard and the resumption of gold payments as the real rescue from the hopeless muddle of the present paper-money system. We must reckon with this desire as a matter of fact, and we have, then, in the first place, to take account of its influence on the question of fixing the present fluctuating monetary standards at some definite values.

The value of gold as against commodities having been reduced to something about 40 per cent. of what it used to be before the war, the resumption of gold payments at par will be within practical reach of those countries where the depreciation of the monetary standard has not gone much further. The desire to avoid a formal reduction of the value of the monetary unit, and to be able to redeem notes at their face value, thus upholding perhaps, in the eyes of the public, the fiction of an undebased standard, will certainly in such cases call forth the most serious efforts

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for the necessary amount of deflation. But a country with still more inflated money will have to give up even thinking of a redemption of its notes in gold in conformity with the old standard. Such a country must first, as stated above, attain a certain stabilisation of the internal value of its money. When this value is sufficiently fixed and foreign exchanges have settled themselves according to it, the country may take into consideration whether a new gold parity shall be given to its monetary unit.

The United States having already resumed gold payments, the dollar may be taken henceforth to represent gold. The problem of the restoration of a gold standard will therefore practically take the form of the problem of stabilising the dollar exchange at some definite figure. England and some Continental countries will certainly do their utmost to restore the pre-war parity of their currency with the dollar. Other countries with much more depreciated money will have to relinquish this aim and to choose a new parity with the dollar, concentrating all their energies upon keeping their money in that parity for the future. Now the problem of stabilising the dollar exchange, in either of these aspects, would be aggravated if the United States increased the value of their money by a process of deflation. This was actually planned at the middle of 1919 when a great campaign against high prices was started. But relying upon the usual popular means, regulation of prices and persecution of profiteers, the campaign had naturally no success; in March, 1920, the general level of prices in the United States had risen to 253.0 against 217.0 as the average for 1919. Disagreeable as this development may have been to the United States, it has very considerably

facilitated the problem of restoration of the pre-war dollar-exchange of the pound sterling and of some of the better Continental currencies. It is now clearly in the interest of all countries endeavouring to stabilise their dollar-exchange that the United States should not enter upon any monetary policy effectively raising the internal value of the dollar. In fact, the problem of stabilising the world's exchanges being in its nature an international problem, it is desirable that one country should take the lead by fixing the internal value of its money, and it seems natural that this country should be the United States.

In the same manner, it is of great interest for all countries striving to restore a definite parity with gold, that the value of gold as against commodities should not be raised, and that, when the new parities once have been settled, the value of gold should remain as constant as possible. Though the enormous fall in the value of gold since the beginning of the war has certainly been a very injurious process, the inverse process of raising the value of gold would probably be still more disastrous. For the gold countries it would mean a prolonged process of deflation with all its pernicious effects of trade and enterprise and on the financial burdens of the State. For other countries it would seriously aggravate the restoration of a pre-war gold parity or the maintenance of a new established gold parity.

It seems then, in the first instance, to be a common interest for the world to prevent gold from rising again in value. The present low value of gold is mainly the consequence of a relatively diminished demand for gold for monetary purposes. The actual circulation of gold is very generally abandoned, and the

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great central banks have reduced their claims on relative gold-coverings considerably. Should a return to pre-war conditions in this respect set in, the inevitable consequence would be an enhancement of the value of gold. To avoid this, it is necessary that all countries should abstain from measures for reintroducing an actual gold-circulation and content themselves with their present standard of gold holdings as basis for their paper-circulation. Countries which are in a position to draw gold to themselves from the rest of the world should abstain from doing so. Thus the stabilisation of the value of gold will clearly require, in the coming years, a close co-operation of all countries. Perhaps it will be possible to come to some international agreement in this matter. For instance, some measures in order to draw gold coins out of actual circulation, including eventually the stopping of all further coinage of gold, would be a natural object for such an agreement.

The present monetary problems of Great Britain throw an interesting light upon the whole question. If the prescribed limitation of the issue of uncovered currency notes to a maximum of £320.6 millions is to be carried through, as the acquisitions of gold by the Bank of England seem to indicate, by aid of an increase in the note circulation of the bank, no rise in the internal value of English money will be achieved, but the necessity of acquiring more gold will strengthen the world's demand for this metal and help to enhance its value. If other countries should follow the example, this enhancement might become very embarrassing. On the other side, if England should at once throw on the world's market a hundred million pounds' worth of gold, the result would be a very sharp fall

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in the value of gold, perhaps sufficient to restore the old gold-parity of the English money. And if a strong combination of smaller countries acted in the same way, the result on the world value of gold would be similar. Such policy is, of course, not to be recommended because of the violent disturbance it would cause. But a consideration of the effects is useful, as it shows most clearly the futility of the usual policy of preparing a restoration of the gold standard by trying to acquire as much gold as possible.

The second chief problem of the world's gold question is to secure for the future as far as possible a stable value of gold relative to commodities. The withdrawal of gold from circulation and the disappearance of all definite standards of gold-cover have in a most serious degree impaired the stability of the value of gold. If gold is to be used henceforth as a monetary standard, it is, therefore, necessary to take special measures for stabilising the value of the metal. As these measures, which would mainly consist in the establishing of appropriate and stable principles in regard to the gold-holdings of the central banks, naturally must be of an international character, we have to do here with a problem where a co-operation between all countries is particularly required.

The stabilisation of the value of gold involves, however, special difficulties arising in connection with the production of the metal. If we have a stabilised monetary demand for gold, we must, of course, have an annual production of gold corresponding to the general rate of economic progress of the world, and, in addition, sufficient to cover the yearly waste of gold. This normal annual demand for gold amounted, during the period 1850–1910, on an average

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to about 3 per cent. of the total accumulated stock of gold in the world at the time. Of this sum 0.2 per cent. covered the loss of gold and 2.8 per cent. was added to the world's stock of gold. Thus the stock of gold, and therefore, also, the annual addition to it, increased on an average by the yearly percentage of 2.8, and that with the result that the value of gold was the same at the end of the period as at the beginning. Assuming the same rate of progress in the years before us, we should need at present an annual production of gold of about £100 millions, increasing in subsequent years at the rate of 2.8 per cent. yearly.

In 1915 the world's production nearly reached this sum with a figure of £96.6 millions. But the rise of prices of commodities in terms of gold units has hampered the production and brought it down considerably below the figure attained in 1915. In the Transvaal the falling off of the production has not been very marked, but still a reduction from the maximum of £39.5 millions in 1916 to £35.8 millions in 1918 and a somewhat lower figure in 1919 has taken place. Much greater has been the decline in the gold production in the United States, where a maximum of 101 million dollars was reached in 1915, but where the production for 1918 was only 68 million dollars and for 1919 not more than 58.5 million dollars. The total for the world's production in 1919 is estimated to be not more than £75 millions.

The production is consequently at present not sufficient for a normal increase in the world's stock of gold. As the necessary annual production of gold would, under the assumed rate of progress, in ten years be £132 millions and in twenty years £174 millions, the danger of a quite insufficient supply of gold is

much more imminent than seems to be generally recognised. Another factor is working in the same direction. Gold being the only commodity which has not risen in price while in countries with an effective gold standard other prices have been doubled, and the general level of incomes has been raised in the same proportion, it is only natural that the demand for gold as a material for articles of luxury should have increased substantially. It is also known that the use of gold in the arts is growing rapidly. consumption threatens, indeed, to absorb a large part of the diminished annual production of gold. What is left for monetary use will then be very insufficient for the necessary regular increase in the world's monetary stock of gold. This deficiency must result in a progressive scarcity of gold and a consequent continued rise in its value. This result could be avoided only if new goldfields were discovered and developed in the proportion necessary for a normal supply of gold. But leaving such a possibility out of consideration and assuming the production of gold to remain about constant, we have to face a growing scarcity of gold and a continued depression of prices.

It will therefore probably be necessary not only now to prevent the monetary demand for gold from resuming its old dimensions, but also to regulate henceforth this demand with a view to reducing it gradually, as the growing scarcity of the supply of gold may require. If we further take into consideration the possibilities of changes in the conditions of gold-mining, we shall find that the scope for this regulation of the monetary demand for gold may easily be considerably widened. Thus the task may seem to involve great difficulties. But if we are not prepared to abolish at once and for

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ever the use of gold as a standard of value, we clearly must do something to stabilise the value of gold, and this is certainly not possible without a rational regulation of the monetary demand for gold.

In addition, we may perhaps apply other means, viz., first, suitable restrictions of the industrial demand for gold; and, second, a policy aiming at checking the demand for gold from the Far East by developing Asia's needs for more useful European products.

XIII

RECONSTRUCTION

It is often contended, and still more often thoughtlessly repeated, that the present miserable situation of Europe is the result of the war. This is not true. Certainly the war has left Europe in difficult economic But the serious aggravation of the difficonditions. culties which have taken place since the war, and of which the enormous further deterioration of the monetary system is only one of many witnesses, is simply the result of an unwise policy, singularly incapable of looking upon the problems before the world from an economic point of view. The new conditions created have been of such a character as to make a revival of economic life in Europe to a great extent impossible. New political boundaries have been drawn up on the map of Europe, cutting off old lines of economic communication established by centuries of work and organisation, and, like plants with their roots cut off, old centres of economic life have been left to die. The principle of nationality has been applied with a stress quite incompatible with modern economic conditions, requiring a large home market and a wide area for the free movement of internal trade. Whatever may have been the political merits of this policy, its economic consequences have

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shown themselves to be disastrous. The defeated nations have also been shut out, in the most fatal way, from trade with the outside world; and as the life of these nations was so constructed as to depend to a large extent on foreign trade and particularly on exchange of industrial products for food and raw materials, their chance of recovery was thereby reduced to something very near to hopelessness. In this policy protectionist interests, trying to exploit political feelings, to establish private or national monopolies and to use a unique opportunity to get rid of a trouble-some competition, have had an influence which in the long run will show itself to have been adverse to the real welfare, not only of the world as a whole, but even of the nations engaged in the service of such interests.

One and a-half years after the Armistice, the economic situation of Central and Eastern Europe is much worse than it ever was during the war. As a matter of fact, it has become impossible for the present population of this area to live within its boundaries. It is not allowed to come out freely. A reduction of the population to that percentage that could subsist on the national resources is impossible. And the result is that the present population, trying to live on a half-standard, is gradually but fatally deteriorating in physical and moral force, and that the growing generation, weakened from the outset by starvation and disease, is doomed to an extremely miserable and ineffectual life. A productive organisation which used to set a good standard for the world is quickly deteriorating, and a highly disciplined social organisation is dissolving and sinking down into a state of continual unrest and even partially into pure anarchy.

No scattered humanitarian efforts can bring real help in this situation. Not even the best-organised measures of subvention can do much more than prolong this existence on the margin of death. What is required is a thorough re-modelling of the conditions under which these peoples have been left to live. does not necessarily mean a revision of the treaties of peace, which partly is now impossible, and partly would take too much time. But it means that those who have the power should begin to use it with a clear understanding of the nature and the seriousness of the situation before them. Indeed, this situation is not merely the concern of some defeated Powers. The process of economic deterioration and social dissolution going on within them cannot be confined within their boundaries. The productive capacity of an essential part of Europe cannot be seriously impaired without consequences for the rest of Europe; and the disease of social unrest and disintegration is dangerously contagious. These influences have, in fact, already made themselves felt: the unexpected, but by now unmistakable, deterioration of the situation of some of the victorious countries after the Armistice speaks clearly enough to everybody who wishes to understand. Europe is necessarily in important aspects a unit. It is completely vain to try to suppress a part of it and believe in a future for the rest.

The general pre-requisitions for any positive work of reconstruction seem to be, essentially, the following:—

First, real peace must be established, meaning not only the cessation of actual hostilities, but, indeed, sincere, friendly co-operation of all nations for the recovery of the economic life of the world.

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Equally needed is internal peace within every nation, meaning again sincere co-operation of the different classes and the definite abandonment of the idea that progress can in any way be furthered by attempts to destroy the principle of government.

The establishment of sound monetary systems is a further condition which must be fulfilled to make economic recovery possible, but which, as shown above, can itself only be attained if the world reverts to sound economy in all respects.

The economic disadvantages of the many new boundaries which the political re-modelling of Europe has drawn up have to be neutralised by the widest possible application of the principles of free trade between the different political units. No narrow separation can be tolerated in this respect. Traffic and intercourse between and through the countries must be freed from all unnecessary restrictions. The fulfilling of this programme, which has to be worked out in distinct rules, must be made an absolute condition of any outside assistance to these countries.

Then there is the case of the trade relations between Central Europe and the outside world. A country organised for an export of manufactures cannot live without free access to the world's markets. And of course, it is also in the interest of these markets that they should be free to buy where they think it advantageous. An economic recovery of the world will be best secured by the greatest freedom of the world's trade and by the complete abolition of every form of discrimination between products in regard to their country origin. This involves that even every private agitation against the products of any particular country should be stopped as foolish and

altogether opposed to the efforts for a revival of the world's prosperity.

The other side of this case is, of course, that all countries, and among them even the defeated Powers of Central Europe, should be allowed to buy raw materials and food on equal conditions in all markets of the world. It was generally recognised, before the war, as a wise rule that the possession of colonies or dependencies should never be used for establishing economic monopolies. This principle of the Open Door becomes, obviously, still more urgent when such possession has been concentrated on a few Powers. The wider the areas are which are laid under the control of one empire the more necessary is it that this control should be regarded as a function of a trustee, having to serve the interest of the world at large. the case of mandates under the authority of the League of Nations, this principle is fundamental.

The programme of securing the greatest possible freedom to international trade does not, of course, involve any interference with taxation of consumption. And particularly a country in serious distress should in no way be hindered from taxing imports of luxuries or even from prohibiting such imports. Neither is it necessary to interpret the programme so strictly as to exclude a customary moderate protectionism.

Finally, it is required that the principle of private property should be universally recognised, and that in this respect an equal treatment of the subjects of all nations should be guaranteed.

Obviously these pre-requisites of reconstruction are to a certain extent of such a character that they cannot be fulfilled immediately, and their realisation can be expected only during the progress of the work of

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reconstruction. But much could be done at once to assure the world that it is on these lines and in this spirit that the world is going to be governed in the future. And that is essential.

When we come to discuss the positive measures of reconstruction that are likely to be the most effectual, we have constantly to have in mind that the aim of such measures must be the development of the production and of the trade of the countries at present in need of help. Advances of food, as well as those of raw materials, must be looked upon as means to revive their economic life, and to enable them to become, at the earliest possible date, positively useful members of the world's trading community. But if this is our sincere aim, it is obvious enough that we shall have to do away, unhesitatingly, with all endeavours to suppress the same countries or keep them back in their economic development.

Until a regular exchange of commodities on the basis of payment in money can be arranged, it may prove useful to send materials to be worked up in the distressed country, and take the finished product back, paying for the work done by a part of the materials or otherwise. The method requires a mortgage right in the materials, extending to the products made of them; such rights must then be recognised not only by the legislation of the country itself, but also by the Powers under the control of which the country may be. As a provisional measure, it may perhaps also be useful to arrange clearing centres for the direct exchange of commodities; but the efforts in that direction seem hitherto not to have had very satisfactory results.

Among the positive measures for reconstruction of the economic life of Europe, the organisation of transport has a very prominent place. An important part of this problem has already, as is well known, been taken up under the auspices of the League of Nations. But the problem has other sides deserving attention. A country in the position of Germany, depending so essentially on sea transport, ought not to be deprived of tonnage to a degree which, looked upon from the point of view of the world's economy, would be judged to be uneconomical.

And then there is the great problem of railway transport in Central Europe, including the eastern States on the Russian frontier. If the whole railway system of this area could be brought under the control of some central body with the programme of securing equal treatment to all traffic, of putting the economy of the railways on a paying basis and of supplying them with the capital most urgently needed for their efficiency, probably more would have been done to promote reconstruction than is possible in any other way. The capital borrowed for this purpose would serve the economic recovery of the countries in question in the most effectual manner, and it would be backed by the best security obtainable, and have the best prospects of being repaid with interest. These advantages would, presumably, make it easier to raise capital abroad for such a definite purpose than for any assistance to the governments of the countries for reconstruction in general. At the same time, the work done for increasing the effectiveness of the railway system would be a pioneer work for development of industry and trade and would therefore probably pave the way for fresh supplies of capital to private enterprises.

Some help towards reconstruction of distressed

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countries has without doubt been brought by the purchases from abroad of industrial concerns or of shares in public companies of those countries. When the buyers take a sincere interest in the development of such enterprises and use their profits for further investments in them, such purchases seem on the whole to be for the good of the economic recovery of the country. But occasional purchases of houses, shares or other property probably only furnish the selling country with money for paying for current consumption.

There are, of course, serious questions of reconstruction even in other countries, such as Italy, France and Belgium. The solution of these questions depends to a great extent on the fulfilling of the general conditions of the world's economic recovery, as stated above. The world's capacity of supplying these countries with capital will, at any rate, essentially be determined by its economic development in the coming years. A more complete discussion of this question must, however, be reserved for the next paragraph.

Taking a broader view, and looking upon Europe as a whole, we have to recognise that the problem of reconstruction is not merely, or even principally, a problem of physical reconstruction of what has been destroyed during the war or of a restoration of European production to what it used to be before the war. The position of Europe in the world's economy has changed. The world suffers unmistakably from a relative scarcity of food and of certain raw materials supplied by non-European countries. This means that the production of the world must be directed, to a greater extent than it has been hitherto, to the production of such food and materials. And this

again requires a certain adjustment of the distribution of the world's population. Europe is over-populated in the sense that it would be more economical for the world at large if a part of Europe's industrial population could be transferred to other continents, where it could be employed in production of food and materials. The problem of reconstruction before us cannot be stated truly without due regard to this situation. It would be a mistake, from the point of view of the world's economy, to employ the whole available surplus of the world's productive powers for European reconstruction in a narrower sense. A part of this surplus can be used, with greater and more immediate advantage, for the development of other countries, with the aid of superfluous European labour. Europe fails to recognise this truth, it will be disagreeably reminded of it by the rates of interest rising in other parts of the world to a level far above what Europe thinks a proper level for itself.

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INTERNATIONAL LOANS

It is often believed that the problem of reconstruction is essentially a question of supply of capital from abroad, and that this capital can be taken from the accumulated wealth of other countries. This is not so. Reconstruction—in the wide sense we have taken the word—is in its nature primarily a revival of work within the distressed country, involving restoration of order, of intensity of labour, of organisation and of private enterprise. To help this work, a supply of means of subsistence and of materials from the outside world is required, and as this supply cannot immediately be paid for by a corresponding export, it has to be made on credit. This is the real meaning of a "supply of capital from abroad." It is then also clear that this supply cannot be taken from any accumulated wealth of the lending countries, but has to be provided by their current production. In order to do that, the lending countries must have a surplus of production over their consumption and their own needs of fresh capital. Out of such available savings, produced day by day, loans for reconstructive work can be made, but from no other source.

True, during the war, some neutral countries were pressed to give loans beyond this limit, but this meant,

as shown above, the creating of an artificial purchasing power leading to inflation of the countries' currency and to enforced privations of whole classes of their population. This, of course, cannot be repeated now. No country should be expected to furnish loans, driving itself to further inflation. The loans for the reconstruction of the world's economic life on a sound basis must come from a sound source; and this can be no other than deliberate savings.

In addition to the loans representing material assistance, help can, of course, be given to distressed countries by relieving them—temporarily or definitely—from obligations of paying interest or capital to other countries. In cases of serious distress some measures of this kind seem to be necessary in order that assistance for actual reconstructive work shall be possible. In the following we shall leave such postponing or cancelling of claims out of consideration, and the term "international loans" will then have to be understood as meaning a real supply of fresh capital.

Now, if international loans can only be made out of real daily savings, we shall obviously have to abandon altogether the fantastic ideas of huge world loans, sufficient to make up at once for all damage caused by the war. We must accustom ourselves to look upon an "international loan" as merely a form for financing an export surplus from the lending world to the borrowing. We shall then have less difficulty in realising that there are definite limits to the amounts of such loans which can possibly be raised. There is at present a great scarcity of capital in the world, showing itself in unusually high rates of interest in all countries where the rates are not artificially kept

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down by a falsified money market. This scarcity means that the daily supplies of fresh savings are insufficient to meet the enormous demands for capital. It is therefore necessary to reduce these demands and only satisfy the most important among them. In addition, everything should be done to increase the amount of savings.

Given the amount of savings, new claims for capital can obviously only be satisfied by putting aside purposes for which this capital would otherwise have been used. Big loans to distressed countries necessarily involve that the lending country should sacrifice plans for development of industry and transport or restrict their house building. This can, of course, only be expected when it is felt that the savings thus made free are turned to a still more important and urgent use. A natural expression for the higher importance of the borrowers' needs is that a higher rate of interest is offered. And it certainly cannot be expected that countries where the scarcity of capital makes it necessary to pay 7 or 8 per cent. for urgent developments of railways or industrial undertakings should restrict their capital market still more in order to supply capital to a country with a much lower level of interest -except, of course, when it is done for purely humanitarian reasons. Rates of interest have generally been higher in America than in Europe, and this was a natural thing as long as America was a borrower in Europe. Now the reverse is the case, and European countries looking for capital supply from America have to accustom themselves to American rates of interest.

If, however, such high rates of interest are to be paid for reconstruction loans, the imperative need for

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a very careful scrutinising of the use of them becomes apparent. The distressed countries have to recognise that only the most urgent needs of reconstruction can be satisfied in the immediate future. And naturally, then, such use of capital must be preferred as is most immediately remunerative. It is impossible to make all reparations at once. Very much of what might seem desirable to do must be postponed. On the other side there is in Europe certainly a great amount of work of reconstruction which on purely economic lines would justify the necessary expenditure of capital in the most immediate future for the simple reason that there is hardly any more profitable use of capital than setting economic life going again where it has come to a standstill.

In a period of such urgent need for capital, it is of course highly desirable that the amount of saving in the world should be increased to the utmost. This not only involves a general restriction of unnecessary consumption and the abandonment of showy luxuries, private and public, very inappropriate at such a time as this, but also that the greatest efforts should be made to increase production. To make it possible to give effective help to the distressed countries, the whole economic life of the world has to be brought up to the highest standard of efficiency. But the first condition for this is the immediate resumption of peaceful intercourse between all nations. tries anxious to get assistance in the form of international loans should realise that it is in their own interest to do their utmost to favour such a development.

In addition, such countries ought to pay some attention to the interests of the lenders. These

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interests are largely concentrated on the restoration of production and of trading possibilities in Europe and on the establishment of stable political and social conditions. Lenders who take a broad businesslike view of the problem of financing reconstruction will wish to see their way to a material result in the form of the resumption, at the earliest possible date, of a profitable exchange of commodities with a Europe of high productive capacity; and will, therefore, naturally ask for guarantees not only that the money lent will really be used for such purposes and not for any display of military power, but also that the borrowing countries earnestly set themselves to work for their own economic recovery, and sincerely cooperate in the recovery of other countries, in any way dependent upon them. Surely those countries which are most willing to meet these requirements are most likely to get any financial assistance from abroad. But it should never be forgotten that there is a solidarity between all necessitous countries in so far as assistance from the outside world is dependent upon a general restoration of sound conditions.

The problem of loans for reconstruction is in many ways interwoven with the indemnity question. First, it must be very difficult to raise any considerable sums abroad for the economic restoration of Germany as long as there are no sufficient guarantees against such loans or their fruits being prematurely absorbed for indemnity payments. There is obviously a need for some postponement of indemnity claims until the loans for restoration of economic life in Germany have achieved their end to a reasonable extent; and clearly some preference has to be given to loans

furnished to help a ruined debtor to his feet and thus to make him able to pay.

It is also important that the obligations of Germany under the title of indemnity should be fixed. This involves that some scheme for yearly payments for a definite period should be fixed in relation to Germany's capacity to pay. But the question how such payments are actually to be made must be carefully looked through; the usual fault of talking of payments as merely figures is dangerous and must be avoided. Germany's capacity to pay is in itself an undetermined question as long as the way in which Germany is going to be treated is not clearly decided upon. Had everything been done, immediately after the Armistice, to revive German industry and trade. Germany would certainly have been capable of paying, during a period of years, a very substantial sum. On the other hand, if the victorious Powers think it more in their interests to crush Germany economically, they will have no difficulty in doing that so thoroughly that Germany's capacity to pay further indemnity will be practically nil. If between these two extremes a middle way is to be taken, it is all-important to know precisely which. A definite answer to this question is of the greatest interest, not only for Germany, but for the Powers claiming indemnity, and, not least, for the lenders who may be called upon to give their money to the task of restoring soundness and effectivity to European economic life. In the question of indemnity as in that of international loans, it is essential that it should be generally recognised that the money which can be expected to come forward has to be taken out of future income, not of any accumulated capital, and that income

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represents necessarily the results of production and trade.

It is often believed that a fixed sum of indemnity could be discounted and thus turned into immediately available money. This would involve that lenders could be found willing to offer an international loan on the security of the indemnity. There would perhaps be something to say for such a plan if full guarantees were given for the free economic development of the country responsible for the indemnity, and if a great lending country-say, for instance, the United States—on such ground could see itself reasonably secured of compensation, not only for the indemnity loan but also for the vast sums it necessarily would have to invest in the debtor country in order to develop it up to its highest capacity. As a matter of fact, however, the prospects of a solution of the question on such lines are practically none. For private lenders without any such guarantee it would clearly be bad business to discount the indemnity, thus relieving the countries claiming indemnity from all anxiety as to the economic future of the debtor country, while the latter would remain under the military, and therefore also, to an undetermined extent, under the economic control of the former. The impossibility of such a solution ought to be clear enough.

On the whole, there seems to be no reason why the indemnity should be mixed up with the question of finding security for the international loans which the victorious countries are in need of. The name of a firm which is admittedly crushed and ruined does not generally add much to the security of a bill; and certainly the prospect of being made

something of a co-partner and co-executor in the German indemnity does not add anything to the attractiveness for outside lenders of loans to the victorious countries.

SECOND MEMORANDUM

I

THE PRESENT SITUATION

My "Memorandum on the World's Monetary Problems" (in this paper referred to as "the first Memorandum "), which was published by the League of Nations for the International Financial Conference held at Brussels in 1920, was completed in June of the same year, and consequently refers to monetary conditions in the earlier part of 1920. Since that time, much has occurred which makes further observations on the subject necessary. New experience has been accumulated, furnishing material by which the earlier analysis can be tested; and in some important respects conditions have altered so essentially that a new situation has to be taken into account in drawing general conclusions, and particularly in framing practical recommendations.

In the beginning of 1920 inflation was still going on in most countries; the general level of wholesale prices reached its maximum for England, France and the United States in the spring months, for Sweden in the summer, for Norway and Denmark only towards the end of the year. It was natural, under such circumstances, that a discussion of the monetary situation should concentrate on the process of inflation, the evils accompanying this process and the measures required to stop it. The aspect of the problem has now been radically changed. During the year May, 1920, to May, 1921, a fall of prices has taken place, perhaps more violent than any other in the economic history of the world. This fall is still going on, and, although it seems to have been retarded during the last few months, the definite end of the movement is not yet in sight.

The downward movement of prices has not, as is sometimes assumed, been merely a spontaneous result of forces beyond our control. It is essentially the result of a policy deliberately framed with a view to bringing down prices and giving a higher value to the monetary unit. This policy of deflation has its root in the popular idea that pre-war price-levels are still to be regarded as "normal," and that stable economic conditions can be attained only by bringing prices down to the old levels. In most countries, in spite of the enormous fall of prices that has already taken place, we are still far from this end, and there is consequently plenty of room for a continued policy of deflation on such grounds.

A prolonged fall of prices must necessarily have an extremely disturbing effect on production and trade, and it is this consequence of a policy of deflation which has manifested itself most clearly during the last twelve months.

A year ago, the productive capacity of the world was fairly well occupied, and labour, on the whole, found fairly sufficient employment. In this respect, conditions are now, as everybody knows, very different.

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The world's work has been brought to a standstill to a degree that we have never witnessed before, and unemployment has risen to alarming figures, particularly in countries where the policy of deflation has been applied most severely.

It is only natural that our attention should now be directed primarily to the situation created by this development, and that a critical examination of the whole policy of deflation should occupy the foreground in any discussion of the monetary problem at the present time. It is, indeed, of the highest importance that the aims of this policy should be reconsidered, and that the effects of it, as far as they have shown themselves hitherto, should be brought into the clearest light.

The lead in the general movement towards lower price-levels was taken in March, 1920, by Japan, where inflation, as measured by wholesale prices, had reached the figure of 320. In June, this index had already been brought down below 250. In May, a corresponding movement began in the United States, where the price index of the Bureau of Labour then stood at its highest point, 272. A year later, this index had been brought down to 151. The United States have, by this violent reduction of prices, probably brought themselves nearer to the pre-war price-level than any other country. This achievement has undoubtedly been the result of a more deliberate and consistent policy of deflation than has been enforced elsewhere, and therefore the effects of such a policy can best be ascertained by a study of American experience.

These effects have, in the case of the United States, been rather pernicious. The continuous expectation

of a further fall in prices has evidently had a very restricting influence on the buying of the general public, and important branches of production have suffered severely from this sudden collapse of the market. The trades most seriously affected have been those engaged in building and construction, because the prospect of a continued fall of prices naturally makes enterprise particularly dangerous in cases where large amounts of capital have to be sunk in an enterprise which yields only a slow return over a long period of years. The steady reduction of prices has made it impossible, in a great many cases, to pay back money borrowed at a time when prices were higher. Thus, a large amount of what is called "frozen credit" has been created. The liquidity. and even the ultimate solvency, of smaller banks have thereby been impaired to such an extent that severe measures became necessary. Further restrictions of credit have followed, with the result that prices have been forced down still more and fresh amounts of "frozen credit" have been created. The process of deflation has evidently, in this case, led to a vicious circle from which it seems extremely difficult to escape.

The monetary policy of the United States has had an important bearing on the treatment of the corresponding problems in other countries, anxious to keep up their currency at pre-war parity with the dollar, or, at any rate, not to let it suffer a further depreciation in comparison with the dollar.

Such countries have undoubtedly been driven, by the action of the United States, to proceed further on the way of deflation than they would have deemed wise or expedient had they only had to look upon

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the matter as an internal monetary problem. The incessant rise in the purchasing power of the dollar has, however, made vain every effort of other countries to keep up their monetary standards in relation to the dollar. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of England. The "Economist" index of wholesale prices (if referred to the mean of 1913 as 100) stood in May, 1920, at 304, whereas the index of the United States, as mentioned above, stood at 272. The serious efforts which England has made since that time to raise the value of the pound sterling have resulted in a fall of the general level of prices to 182 in May, 1921. But, as in the same period the American index had fallen to 151, the relative position of the pound had not been bettered. The quoted figures show that the pound sterling was only 10.6 per cent. behind the dollar in May, 1920, but 17 per cent. in May, 1921.

The results of the deflationist efforts of other countries are similar. Japan, the Scandinavian countries, France, and even, to some degree, Italy, have succeeded in bringing down, during the period May, 1920, to May, 1921, their general level of prices, and thus raising the internal value of their money. But the internal value of the dollar having in the meantime been increased still more, the relative position of the monetary units of these countries in regard to the dollar has in all cases become worse.

The race between all these different countries to increase the purchasing power of their monetary units has made any stabilisation of the relative values of these units, and, therefore, of the exchanges between the countries, impossible. The instability and uncertainty of monetary conditions are, in spite of all

sacrifices which the deflation policy has involved, just as great as they were a year ago. Indeed, the world has now every reason for calling a halt, and asking whether its monetary affairs could not have been managed more wisely if the different countries had come to a mutual understanding to find a rational solution of the problem.

The fall in prices has, of course, not been uniform for all commodities. This could hardly have been expected, even if the whole movement had been provoked exclusively by monetary policy. As it is, other factors have played an important part in the revolution of the whole system of prices which we have witnessed. We need only think of the breakdown of Central and Eastern Europe and the resulting disappearance of a demand which used to have great importance for certain commodities; or of the sudden and almost complete annihilation of the world's saving capacity, which brought the trades engaged in construction to a standstill, or of the general insecurity and distrust in the future which has necessarily held back the demand for everything not of immediate use. These factors must inevitably have caused great alterations in the usual relations between prices. The attention of the business community, like that of the general public, is naturally attracted towards such price movements, and there has therefore been a disposition to believe that the factors which have been described are the real causes even of the fall in the general level of prices. This is the reason why the rôle of monetary policy has only been recognised so slowly and so reluctantly. In reality, a fall in the general level of prices is always essentially a monetary phenomenon. The great disturbances

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alluded to can hardly have caused a reduction in the average level of prices in any country, except in so far as the general feeling of insecurity may have induced people not to exercise their buying capacity and to increase their reserves of money.

Such action, which is in itself of a monetary character, seems indeed to have been taken to a certain extent during the last year. In the preceding period of rising prices the stock of money generally grew in about the same proportion as the price-level rose. The subsequent fall of prices has, however, not been followed by a corresponding reduction of the means of payment. This anomaly, which I think can be observed in almost every country where prices have fallen considerably, cannot well be explained otherwise than as due to a hoarding of money or, say, to an unusual increase in the demand for cash. An investigation into this question which I made for Sweden revealed the interesting fact that bank deposits as well as bank-notes of the higher denomination (1,000 kronor) had been reduced about normally and that bank-notes of the smallest denominations (10 and 5 kronor) had also been reduced, although not so much. But in the notes of medium denominations (100 and 50 kronor) an actual rise had taken place. These observations gave some indication of the reason why the decline in the total volume of the means of payment—which might have been expected to decrease simultaneously with the fall in prices—has been retarded. Certain classes, perhaps mostly labourers and peasants, who do not use cheques for payments, have accumulated notes of middle denominations in the period of abundant income and now keep them as a reserve, whereas the stock

of money actually used for payments has decreased approximately as expected. Whether this result has a more than local bearing can be decided only after similar investigations in other countries.

It should also be observed that the index of wholesale prices, as now constituted, does not represent a true and stable level of prices. In many countries, wholesale prices to-day are to a great extent, so to speak, bankruptcy prices, the quotations being influenced, more or less considerably, by forced sales of stocks. It is commonly known that in a great many cases commodities cannot be produced at a cost which would be covered by the prices of the present demoralised markets. An index number which is an average of such prices is no trustworthy representation of the actual situation in regard to prices. Only when prices have adjusted themselves to one another so as to make prices of products correspond to their cost of production, can we regard the usual index number of wholesale prices as a fairly reliable index of the movements of the general level of prices. This means, in particular, that wages and prices of commodities must be adjusted to one another so that wages truly represent the price which the consumer is willing to pay for the service rendered. It also means that prices of commodities must include that remuneration of capital which is necessary in order to acquire the service of fresh capital. It is well known how very far our present system of prices is from satisfying these conditions.

Accordingly, if the present index numbers of wholesale prices give a somewhat exaggerated idea of the fall in the general level of prices, it is natural enough that the stock of money should not have

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been reduced in the same proportion as these figures indicate.

As long as price movements are as irregular as they are at present, and as long as commodity prices, wages and profits have not adjusted themselves to a true economic equilibrium, it must be extremely difficult to find sufficient guidance in any price statistics for a monetary policy aiming at a stabilisation of the purchasing power of the monetary unit. And, indeed, such a stabilisation is never practically possible as long as the whole system of prices is continually disturbed by such violent economic revolutions as are the inevitable consequence of the present unsettled or badly settled political situation. Therefore, a rational treatment of the political problems, in the spirit of mutual co-operation between all nations, must necessarily go hand in hand with the realisation of a well-devised monetary programme. And in this respect, first of all, the whole problem of the German indemnity and the other international war debts has to be settled on realistic and practicable lines and without unreasonable disturbance of the world's trade.

\mathbf{II}

THE POLICY OF DEFLATION

BEFORE entering upon a discussion of the course that should be taken in regard to the programme of deflation it is necessary to set out clearly what the process of deflation actually means, and what are its practical effects.

Deflation is, shortly, a process by which the internal value of the monetary unit is increased. This means a deliberate raising of the purchasing power of this unit in regard to commodities and services—i.e., a general and uniform reduction of prices, wages and salaries as measured in terms of the monetary unit. Even this simple observation is important if we are to clear up the current ideas on this question, for deflation has, undoubtedly, gained a part of its popularity from the widespread belief that it meant a reduction of expenses without a corresponding reduction of incomes.

The means of effecting such a rise in the value of the monetary unit is a restriction in the supply of the means of payment and a consequent reduction of the nominal purchasing power of the public. To this end there are two measures at our disposal and, in present circumstances, both must be applied simultaneously. The first and most general is a

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restriction of credit, involving a curtailment of the amounts of loans and a more stringent selection between the different demands for loans. But the principal instrument of such a policy is an abnormally high bank rate calculated to raise other rates of interest correspondingly above what the real scarcity of capital would require, and thus to place an effective brake on all forms of demand for credit. By combining such restriction of credit with a high degree of saving, a considerable reduction of the actual purchasing power of the public may be effected. The second measure consists in raising, by taxation, over and above what public expenditure would require, a sum of money to be used for cancellation of a part of the means of payment of the community.

Theoretically, it is no doubt possible to bring down prices by these means as much as need be and to raise the purchasing power of the unit of money almost indefinitely. But, unfortunately, the process is incidentally attended by some rather disagreeable effects. Indeed, we have to take care that we do not get into a position in which we have to admit that though the cure was a success the patient succumbed. warnings enunciated in the first Memorandum in regard to the dangers of a policy of deflation have shown themselves, during the past year, to be only too well founded. The first and most obvious effect of such a policy is on enterprise and production. Artificially increased difficulties in the way of obtaining necessary credit accommodation, combined with an artificially increased burden of taxation, would in themselves have a dangerously depressing influence on business activity. But the end which is expected to be attained by these means is even more disastrous

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in its effects; for the prospect of a long period of falling prices is most likely to kill industrial enterprise and the very spirit of economic progress. The experience which the United States and some European countries have gained in this respect during the last year is indeed so serious, and so valuable for every-body desirous to learn, that we should do well to pay it the very closest attention. This experience should on no account be taken as concerning only a small class of capitalists or business men; it extends more or less to the whole community, involving particularly the threat of ruin to farmers and widespread unemployment to wage-earners.

Hardly less serious are the effects of the policy of deflation on international trade. Not that a high value of its monetary unit would in itself be a drawback to the export trade of a country. The difficulties now experienced by the United States in selling goods to European countries are not due, as seems generally to be assumed, to the higher value given to the dollar by the process of deflation which has been going on in the States. If the exchange value of the dollar, as measured in European currencies, reflected only the higher internal purchasing power of American money the high exchange would clearly be fully compensated by low prices of American commodities and would in no way hamper American exports.

The real disturbance of international trade arises in connection with the *movements* of the internal value of the different monetary standards.

The general uncertainty as to the future of the exchanges, caused by these movements, is most detrimental to all regular business. The alteration of the rates of exchange, which a process of deflation

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in one country can bring about in the space of time required for the production in that country of certain commodities for export, may easily amount to such a reduction in the exchange value of the foreign money for which the commodities are sold that the whole transaction becomes a failure from a commercial point of view. True, the money of his own country which the producer receives in exchange has, in the meantime, acquired a correspondingly higher value. But that is generally of no advantage for the producer, who, as a rule, uses this money to pay back debts incurred during the process of production. This analysis shows that the real difficulty is, in principle, the same as the difficulty experienced in production for the home market where deflation, by producing a continuous fall of prices, acts as a great drawback to all forms of production that require more than a very short time.

A sudden fall of prices in the exporting country may also cause a grave economic crisis in the countries which have bought the exported goods at high prices and have delivered them only when the fall in prices has already taken place. Owing partly to such circumstances, American exporters to South American countries have recently seen their orders cancelled and their exported goods accumulated at the ports of entry, whereas, the buying countries experienced severe financial difficulties and the exchange market was brought into complete disorder.

When inflation is going on in some countries simultaneously with deflation in others, it is really not to be wondered at if the result is a general confusion of international exchanges. The prospect of further inflation has, as explained in the first Memorandum,

the effect of depressing the exchange value of the currency concerned to less than its purchasing power parity. Unsettled political conditions may increase the distrust in the future of a currency and aggravate the international undervaluation of it. All these factors have been at work during the past year. In addition, the disturbing effects of the arbitrary regulation of international trade which were set out in the first Memorandum have since that time been demonstrated to superfluity. Short-sighted protectionist measures, particularly in connection with the payment of the German indemnity, have clearly shown themselves to be a most scrious factor of irregularity and uncertainty in the whole field of international exchanges.

Finally, we have to take account of the effects of depreciation on public finance. By the enhancement of the value of money which has taken place during the past year, the real burden of public debt has in many countries been increased to a most serious extent; in some cases so much as to make it very questionable whether the country will be able to bear the burden. In consequence, a corresponding aggravation of the burden of taxation will have to be faced whereby enterprise and production will, inevitably, be gravely handicapped during a practically unlimited series of years. The uncertainty whether countries which used to be regarded as first-class debtors will be able in the future to meet their obligations is, of course, a new and a very serious influence, which operates against that restoration of confidence which we so sorely need. If deflation be carried still further in such countries there can be no doubt but that their State finances will break down and public bankruptcy

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will have to be declared, or, if this last stage is to be avoided and a veil thrown over the situation, their monetary policy will be again directed on the path of inflation, with the result that a new and probably rather violent fall in the value of the monetary unit will ensue.

Such being the content and the effects of the programme of deflation, we may reasonably ask ourselves for what purposes such a process can be regarded as particularly desirable.

There are several reasons for the general wish to see the monetary standard raised again to something like that its value was before the war. First, of course, the vague popular feeling that a sound economic future depends upon the restoration of pre-war conditions. The present price level is supposed to be abnormal and on this ground a reduction to the prewar level is demanded. Natural as this view may be, it is fundamentally wrong. No general level of prices, actually ruling in a country with paper money, can be "abnormal." There is, indeed, as explained above, some abnormality in the present situation of prices, viz., that the different prices are not balanced against one another so as to correspond to a stable economic equilibrium. This fault is of a general economic nature, and not monetary. But leaving this point aside and assuming prices to have attained an equilibrium relative to one another, the mere fact that these prices are on an average so much higher than pre-war prices does not stand in the way of the future development of the economic life of the country.

Nor is the high level of internal prices in itself a handicap against the development of the external trade of the country. As soon as exchanges have

adjusted themselves to the purchasing power parity of the money of the country relative to other standards the export and import trades of the country are in their normal state as far as monetary conditions are concerned. Therefore, as a means for securing a revival of external trade, efforts to restore the old parity with other standards are futile, and of course even detrimental because they are the most serious hindrance against the fulfilment of the most fundamental condition of sound international trade—viz., stability of exchanges.

The desire to restore the old rates of exchange is evidently, to a large extent, founded on a feeling that a degradation in the international value of the country's money is somehow a degradation of the country itself. Much might, without doubt, be said in support of this view as long as the deterioration of the monetary standard of the country was going on. But it is a false ambition to try to make good the harm that may have been done in this way by reversing the process, for in monetary matters it is the alteration itself which is most harmful.

A kindred motive for deflation is the desire to keep up the exchange with another country which is raising its monetary standard by a process of deflation. This is a very natural desire, but, having regard to the bad effects of every policy of deflation, the true remedy in such a case lies without doubt in stopping the process of deflation in the other country.

Finally, the desire to restore the old gold standard is a general and very powerful motive for deflation. This desire involves two different aims. First, it is felt that there is no way out of the present paper money muddle than the re-establishment of a gold

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standard. Secondly, it is believed, often without much criticism, that this standard must necessarily be the old gold standard. As to the first point, it is possibly true that the desire to revert to gold is so general and so strong that every effort, however well founded theoretically, to build up a sound system of money on scientifically regulated paper standards would prove, for the present at least, to be a failure. But even if this is conceded, it does not by any means follow that the new gold standard must be founded on the same parity with gold as the pre-war standard.

There is one reason, very honourable in itself, for desiring to go back to the old gold standard. Governments and issuing banks have pledged themselves to redeem their notes in gold at a fixed parity; it is looked upon as a breach of faith to declare these notes redeemable in a lower gold standard. The different aspects of the problem of a restoration of the gold standard can only be discussed more fully in connection with a more thorough analysis of the whole gold question. But it may be well to observe here that this way of looking upon the matter is a rather narrow and formal one.

The bearer of a bank-note does not ordinarily ask for gold; he expects to be able to buy commodities for it and usually does so in a very short time. The depreciation of the note during that time has in most cases been negligible and has not caused the bearer any appreciable loss. If the notes were declared to be redeemable in gold according to their present value the present bearers of the notes would in most cases suffer no disadvantage and would perhaps even not notice it.

The redemption of notes in gold has not been pre-

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scribed primarily for its own sake, but in order to secure the greatest possible stability for the value of the money of the country. This stability is the principal interest of the public in regard to the money it uses and upon which it bases all its business calculations. Now this stability has already been lost and public faith in the monetary standard has already been disappointed. This is a very bad thing. But it cannot be made good again by any process intended to raise the standard again, in a shorter or longer period, to its earlier value. This would only involve a new period of instability with fresh injury to enterprise and production. These very simple truths would, of course, be generally recognised if people could only become accustomed to look upon the banknote not in the usual formal way, as a mere promise to pay, like all other obligations, but essentially as a representative of the whole monetary system of the country. The primary object of our monetary policy must be to restore soundness and stability to this system, not to fulfil formal requirements of justice which in the overwhelming majority of cases would have no reality behind them.

III

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It was pointed out in the first Memorandum that the value of gold had declined very considerably since the beginning of the war. This observation referred to the earlier part of 1920. Since that time, a movement has taken place in the reverse direction, with the result that gold has now regained perhaps the greater part of the loss in value which it previously suffered. This, of course, alters very considerably the practical aspect of the gold problem inasmuch as the restoration of the old gold standard has been made even more difficult for countries with a depreciated paper standard than it was a year ago. But the analysis of the gold problem given in the first Memorandum is still valid. It is therefore only necessary here to add some few observations with special reference to the present situation...

The position which gold held before the war as a monetary standard depended on the general assumption that the value of gold is something fixed to which all other values can safely be related. True, the economists knew that considerable variations occur in the value of gold as measured in terms of the commodities which gold can buy. But as these variations used to be spread over long periods, extending perhaps

over the lifetime of a generation, the average business man was not concerned with them in his daily transactions and therefore usually paid no attention to them.

Now, gold having lost in some few years perhaps more than 60 per cent. of its pre-war value and then in one single year recovered something like half of this loss, it is plain to everybody that gold no longer possesses that stability of value which is the very foundation of its position as a monetary standard for the whole world. This radical alteration has been brought about by the almost complete destruction of the old gold market with its delicate machinery and by the fact that the international payments which this machinery is called upon to serve have grown to such fantastic figures that no machinery which the world ever possessed could cope with them. Prior to the war, there was a fairly free international movement of gold, permitting the metal to flow from one part of the world to another at a difference in price which would now be looked upon as absolutely insignificant. Some countries accumulated big gold funds, but they did it slowly and without appreciable disturbance of the market. And the countries which, as great creditors, might have drawn gold from the rest of the world in any amount did not do so, but used their income from investments abroad to pay for surplus imports of goods or to make new investments in foreign countries. In the case of Great Britain, the actual holding of gold was particularly small in relation to the position of that country in the world's finance and trade. Still, the fact that the country was a creditor country and that the rest of the world owed it such huge amounts of money on call enabled London to keep up a free gold market from which

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all demands for gold were normally satisfied without difficulty.

It is this machinery which has been destroyed, all the essential conditions for its working having ceased to exist. The European countries have locked up their gold funds and prohibit, more or less stringently, all export of gold. Even when they are unable to meet their foreign obligations countries refuse to part with their gold; and, curiously enough, the claimants do not insist upon having it, for any considerable reduction of these gold-holdings is believed to be impossible without causing a serious economic crisis in the debtor country, and so, of course, impairing its ultimate capacity to pay. In these circumstances, European gold funds are, for all practical purposes, locked away from the world's markets.

The war, which turned so many creditor countries into great debtors, has created one new big creditor country, the United States. The resulting situation is quite abnormal, in comparison with the conditions to which the world had got accustomed before the war. We now have a big creditor country which has, at the same time, a huge surplus of exports, and whose population has not yet acquired the habit of investing continuously, and on a large scale, in foreign securities; this situation is untenable. It has somehow to be modified so as to open out the possibility of a normal settlement of payments due to America. As it is, an inconveniently large proportion of the debts due to America are simply left unpaid, and the volume of floating credits is thereby increased in a very unsound manner. Actual gold shipments are, to a considerable extent, the only way left open for making payments; and, in fact, America has received a huge

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sum of gold from the outside world during the past year.

Of course, a certain scarcity of gold must have been created by this enormous demand for gold for America. Most countries having locked up their gold funds, as stated above, the only regular supply left to the world's market was the current production. It is difficult to see what the result would have been if an extraordinary source of supply had not been provided by the huge exports of gold from Russia which took place particularly during the first half-year of 1921.

The demand for gold for American account has, in these circumstances, undoubtedly been a factor of importance in the sharp upward movement of the value of gold, which is the most prominent feature of the monetary history of the past year. Still, we should have no sufficient explanation of this movement if we were satisfied with a reference to the abnormally great American demand for gold. The question arises: What is the cause of this demand, and how far is it a result of deliberate monetary policy?

It is generally admitted that the United States have caused great inconvenience to themselves, as well as to the rest of the world, by taking so much gold. But, it is said, they could not help doing so. They had simply to receive all gold which the rest of the world cared to send them. The formal truth of this answer cannot be disputed. But it throws no light on the essential question which, for practical purposes, is all important. Was it really necessary that so much gold should flow into the United States? The principal reason why the gold went there is, of course, that gold could buy more commodities there than in other parts of the world. And this higher

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purchasing power depended undoubtedly on the American monetary policy. By a deliberate process of deflation the general level of prices, as expressed in gold-dollars, was depressed in the most violent manner, i.e., the value of gold in terms of commodities was proportionally raised. The result was that gold could buy in America a steadily increasing quantity of commodities, and, at all times, a greater quantity of commodities than in other countries; so the gold went to America. Of course, the value of such gold as could be exported to America immediately rose in other countries. The peculiar situation of the market had this effect, that the value of gold was practically determined by the value of the dollar. This value was steadily increased, but it was always possible to buy the dollar with an unaltered quantity of gold. Dollars could, e.g., always be procured by producing gold in South Africa and sending it to New York. And the most advantageous use of this gold was to let it go to America. Had no deflation taken place in the United States, i.e., had the internal value of the dollar been left at the level where it stood a year ago, the steady improvement of the pound sterling and of some other currencies would soon have brought the internal value of each of those currencies to its old parity with the dollar, and therefore with gold; and the condition of the exchanges would then, at any rate, no longer have acted as an additional stimulus to the influx of gold into the United States, which their suddenly won position as a creditor country perhaps, to a certain extent, made unavoidable.

The amount of gold which the United States have taken during the last year is not in itself so important that it would have caused, under normal conditions, a very considerable rise in the value of gold. This is easy to see if we remember that in pre-war times the loss of a whole year's production of gold would not have raised the value of gold, normally, by more than 3 per cent. The rise in the value of gold is, essentially, a result of the peculiar situation which has bound up the value of gold with that of the dollar and of the deflationist policy of the United States which has steadily raised the internal value of the dollar.

Under ordinary circumstances, the endeavour of a country with a gold standard to bring down prices and thus to raise the internal value of its money would, according to classical doctrine, have caused an influx of gold into that country with a consequent increase in the total volume of the monetary purchasing power within the country. Thus, the depression of prices would have been counteracted and the internal value of the money of the country would have been brought down to that of gold. In the present case, this automatically regulating machinery has not had sufficient opportunity to work effectively. First, the natural influx of gold into the United States has been held back by the prohibitions against gold exports now prevailing in other countries, and the increase in the gold holdings of the States, great as it has been absolutely, has undoubtedly been made smaller than it would have been if the movements of gold had been quite free. Secondly, the gold which has gone to the States has not increased the circulation, or, more generally, the sum total of the monetary purchasing power within the country. On the contrary, this sum has been diminished. The deliberate deflation policy of the Federal Reserve Banks, has, by its severe restriction of credits, resulted in a greater monetary

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stock of gold now serving as foundation for a smaller volume of means of payment. Thus the depression of prices has continued and the internal value of the dollar has risen with the result that, instead of the dollar being levelled down to the value of gold, gold has been raised to the value of the dollar. Of course, such a result would only have been possible in the case of a great country like the United States to which the rest of the world incessantly has to pay huge sums for old debts and for fresh export surpluses.

This analysis makes it clear that sound conditions in the world's gold market will never be attained as long as no satisfactory means is found of settling the huge balance of payments due to the United States. The side of this question which concerns the debt of the Allied Powers to the Government of the United States will be discussed more fully below. As to the commercial side of the question, no more need here be said than that a policy by which the tariff walls of the United States are raised to almost prohibition limits must aggravate, to a serious degree, the solution of a problem which is in itself already difficult enough. If the United States wish to get paid. they must take commodities in payment. Indeed their newly-won position as a creditor country, claiming huge amounts of interest and profit on foreign investments, seems to involve the necessity of a radical change in their balance of trade, turning the traditional export surplus into an import surplus. This necessity can hardly be avoided, but might, to some extent, be mitigated if the American people could get accustomed to buying foreign securities and to investing capital abroad, both regularly and on a large scale. But the development of such habits

will necessarily be a slow process and have a comparatively narrow scope as long as the rich natural resources of the States give abundant opportunities for a more profitable use of capital at home. Therefore, the problem of the payments to America will, even with the wisest commercial policy, present great difficulties.

A situation which makes the world's gold market dependent, to an extreme degree, upon one single country with an unsettled balance of payment must inevitably involve great insecurity in respect to the future value of gold. It is quite conceivable that the monetary policy of the United States may take a new course and that the period of deflation which has been discussed here may be followed by a new period of inflation reducing the internal value of the dollar and, therefore, of gold, perhaps very considerably. This would, of course, for the moment make resumption of gold payments for some European countries comparatively easy. But there would be no security in a gold standard established in such a manner. As long as the very foundation of the gold market is insufficient to give it the necessary stability there is always the risk that fresh violent alterations in the value of gold may make it impossible, or at least inadvisable, for most countries to keep up their gold standard. Our present experiences will, by and by, teach us that the use of gold as a common standard for all countries, to which we were accustomed before the war, necessarily depends on two conditions-viz., first, that we have a world-wide gold market with fairly free movements of gold, and secondly, that the world's balances of payment are normally settled, without much recourse to this gold market.

Turning now to European conditions, it is plain

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enough that the German indemnity and the Inter-Allied war debts constitute factors of uncertainty of such importance that it is vain to expect any stability in the system of international payments as long as no satisfactory settlement of these debts has been arrived at. The disturbing effects on the machinery of the exchanges, which any attempt at an actual payment of these debts would have, has been sufficiently demonstrated by the relatively small indemnity payments already made. It is hardly conceivable that even the best established system of gold standards could stand the strain of the payments which an actual liquidation of these debts would require. It is easy enough to stipulate that such-and-such sums shall be paid in gold. But it is much more difficult to foresce what effect such stipulations, if actually enforced, will have on the gold market and on the value of gold. The mere existence of huge debts for which no regular machinery of payment has been provided makes the future of the value of gold extremely uncertain.

In late years, the Eastern demand for gold has also proved to be a considerable factor of insecurity in the gold market. The amounts of gold taken by India and China have shown extraordinary variations; they have varied from less than nothing in 1918 to a maximum in 1919 of more than half the world's total production for that year. These variations have, of course, seriously affected the balance of fresh gold available as money for the Western world, and have thereby contributed to the instability of the gold market.

International economic relations and the actual situation of the gold market being such as here out-129

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lined, it seems to be almost a practical impossibility for any European country, acting alone, to restore a gold standard, even at a reduced parity. This is clear enough so far as the smaller countries are con-Theoretically, any country which attained an equilibrium in its State finance might choose a gold parity corresponding to the present value of its money, and henceforth regulate this money so as to secure its convertibility in gold at the fixed parity. To meet the demand for gold which would arise from occasional fluctuations in the exchanges, the country would need a gold fund of a certain size. But a small country which accumulated a gold fund sufficient for occasional demands from its own internal market would find this fund quite insufficient for satisfying similar demands from abroad. the country had been alone among European countries to restore the gold standard, it might quite easily see its whole gold fund suddenly exported to satisfy foreign demands for gold. For this reason, no small country can take the lead in the restoration of the gold standard in Europe.

The only European country which can conceivably become strong enough to resume gold payments independently of the others is Great Britain. But the maintenance of a gold standard and a free gold market would meet with great difficulties so long as the old position of London as the world's creditor for short-term loans had not been restored. A serious obstacle to the restoration of a British gold standard seems to lie in the British war-debt to the United States Government. Until an agreement has been arrived at which removes the threatening influence of this debt upon the equilibrium of international payments

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a re-establishment of a free gold market in England can hardly be expected.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, if all European countries which are now locking up their gold funds decided to let gold out freely, the United States would soon get so much gold that it is difficult to see how they could prevent a violent fall in the value of gold. It would hardly be possible to increase the percentage of gold reserves to liabilities indefinitely, and the banks would therefore be forced to extend their credits and thus to increase the volume of the means of payment. Then the general level of prices would rise—i.e., the purchasing power of the dollar would fall, perhaps so much as to bring down the international value of the dollar to the old parity with the pound sterling. In this way, English money might, as pointed out in the first Memorandum, regain its old gold parity. The same would then probably be the case with the Swedish, Dutch and Swiss currencies. But whether any real stability in international monetary relations were thereby reached, would still depend on the fa-rsightedness and stability of American monetary policy and on the other conditions described above.

A real stability of the gold market can, in fact, never be obtained until the gold standard has been restored in several countries and actual gold payments have been resumed in a considerable part of the world. The true basis of a trustworthy gold market can only be a world-wide international trade, carried on on a gold basis. On the other hand, such a restoration of the gold standard is only possible on the condition that the gold market has already acquired some stability. The only way to a solution of a problem

which presents such complications seems to lie in a mutual co-operation of the nations with a view of securing that agreement in policy and that unity of effort which alone promise success where isolated action would necessarily fail. A rational settlement of the question of war debts and their payment is, of course, a sine qua non if any effort to restore stability and reliability to the world's monetary machinery is to be successful. But the co-operation here suggested would be specifically directed at an arrangement with regard to the way in which this machinery should be connected with gold.

Let us now suppose, in order to get a complete view of the subject before us, that the particularly disturbing factors now discussed have been removed, and that more normal conditions have thus been restored to the gold market. The resumption of gold payments would then be within the practical reach of all countries which had obtained sufficient control over their own monetary policy to enable them to secure a fair degree of stability for the value of their money in terms of commodities. The parity with gold which such a country could obtain for its monetary standard would be determined by the relations between the value of its money and the value of gold, both values being expressed in commodities. The higher the value of gold at such time, the more impossible it would be to restore the old gold parity and the lower the new parity that would have to be chosen. It is therefore a common interest of all countries desiring to restore a gold standard, that the value of gold should be kept as low as possible, or at any rate, should not be raised unnecessarily.

Now, a keen competition for gold will clearly

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tend to raise this value considerably. A general restoration of the gold standard cannot, therefore, be furthered by the usual popular device according to which every country should try to accumulate the largest possible gold fund. Such a policy can only have the effect of forcing a more general devaluation of monetary standards in comparison with gold and of making in each particular case such devaluation go much further than if a more reasonable attitude towards the problem had been adopted. If the world really wishes to see gold restored again as a common standard of value, the different countries must come to some understanding tending towards a general restriction of their monetary demand for gold.

The gold problem has one other aspect which requires some attention. Even if we could assume all the peculiar difficulties of the present situation removed, the question would still remain whether, for the future, we can reckon upon a sufficient supply of gold to give the metal a stable value.

As to the future of the world's gold market, it was observed in the first Memorandum that stability in the value of gold (assuming the relative demand for the metal to be constant) will require a yearly production of gold amounting to 3 per cent. of the total mass of gold at any time. This production would cover the need for fresh gold created by general economic progress and by the absolute loss of gold annually. At present, stability in the value of gold would require, on these grounds, an annual production of slightly over 100 million pounds, and this production would have to increase annually by about 2.8 per cent. The world's total production of gold amounted, however, in 1920 to only about 70 million pounds. After

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having reached a maximum of 96.4 million pounds in 1915, the production has steadily decreased. The actual figures are in millions sterling:—

1915			96.4	1918		79.0
1916	•		93.5	1919		$75 \cdot 2$
1917		_	86.3	1920	_	70.0

Expert opinion regards it as probable that a rise in production will take place up to something like 75 millions, perhaps 80 millions, but hardly more. We have therefore to reckon with the fact that the world's production of gold has become, definitely, insufficient for the rate of economic progress which we used to regard as normal before the war. Assuming that the world is not going to give up this rate of progress, a general restoration of the gold standard with the consequent progressive development of the monetary demand for gold would inevitably result in an increasing scarcity of gold and a continuous rise in its value. This would mean that the world condemned itself, for an unlimited future, to a slow but progressive process of deflation with all its evil effects on enterprise and production as well as on public finance. The programme suggested in the first Memorandum of a progressive reduction in the monetary demand for gold is, under such circumstances, of very practical importance. In fact, the only reasonable alternative to such a programme is the immediate and definite abandonment of the use of gold as a monetary standard.

IV

PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR STABILISATION

RESTORING of the gold standard being such an extremely complicated problem, the definite solution of which is certainly not to be expected in the immediate future, the first practical aim for the monetary policy of every country must be to give a stable internal value to its own monetary standard. This is all the more obvious because such a stabilisation is, in any event, a necessary pre-requisite for the restoration of a stable gold standard.

The question then arises what means we have at our disposal for carrying through, in actual practice, such a policy of stabilisation. On one point we must first be clear: even the best monetary policy will not be able absolutely to prevent fluctuations in the general level of prices. Least of all would this be possible when the up and down movements of the price level are so violent as they are at present. What we may aim at is to counteract these movements and thus to keep them within the narrowest possible limits. It follows that we have to apply quite opposite means in the different phases of price fluctuation. In a period of rising prices and of an increasing volume of credits and of means of payment we have to direct all our efforts towards restriction. A high rate of

interest and a severe cutting down of the demands for credit are then the right means. Again, in a period of falling prices, general lack of confidence and reduced demands for credit we have to use the opposite means. In other words, at the top, or rather already while we are approaching the top, deflation is the right thing to be recommended. In the contrary case a certain inflation is called for.

This may seem a dangerous doctrine, when so much energy still has to be bestowed on combating the tendencies to continued inflation which, indeed, cannot vet be regarded as dead: and certainly, it is dangerous. If, nevertheless, such a programme must be drawn up, it is of paramount importance that it be made clear that the ultimate aim of monetary policy is stabilisation. If the authorities wish to command the confidence of the public they must bind themselves in the most solemn manner to such an aim. But this involves their having decided for themselves what value they wish to give to the money of the country; that is to say, what is the general level at which they will attempt to stabilise prices. And such a decision must be made public. Indeed, the co-operation of the whole nation is necessary for attaining the end, and, therefore, the nation must know that there is a definite aim and a unity of purpose in the changing phases of action and in the seemingly opposite measures applied.

The principal practical difficulty in carrying out such a policy of stabilisation is the irregularity in the movements of prices. Different categories of prices move differently. Generally, wholesale prices lead the way, retail prices and wages lagging behind; and this is true in the downward as well as in the

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upward movement. It is then not quite easy to say, at any particular moment, in which phase the whole development stands; the more so as even prices of the same category often show very divergent movements. We may find some guidance in the following rule: when wholesale prices are considerably above cost of production (including normal profits), this is a sign of inflation, and a policy of deflation should be applied; again, when wholesale prices are generally insufficient to cover the cost of production we may take this as a proof that the process of deflation has gone too far, and that more normal relations have to be restored by an extension of credit and an increase in the monetary purchasing power of the community.

The level at which we wish to stabilise wholesale prices should be chosen so that the necessary equilibrium between the price of products and the cost of their production is established with the least disturbance to wages and other prices entering into the cost of production. But as different classes of wages have, generally, moved very differently, and as their relative position is not now compatible with a true economic equilibrium, a readjustment of wages will in most cases be necessary. This readjustment will inevitably involve some curtailment of real wages for certain classes of labourers, and is therefore likely to cause some unrest and some difficulties. In order to avoid any unnecessary aggravation of these difficulties, it is probably wise to abstain from every attempt to press down the general level of monetary wages. this has already been done to some extent, there is all the more reason for not insisting upon a further reduction. The general level at which nominal wages should be stabilised having been agreed upon in this manner, the stable level of wholesale prices is the level at which cost of production is covered.

Even with these general rules we shall certainly, in practical life, have to face situations where it is extremely difficult to find reliable guidance for the rational treatment of the problem of stabilisation. We can therefore only hope to realise our aim gradually and in a relative manner. But it is already a very important step forward if we can considerably reduce the present abnormally wide fluctuations in the price-level.

Every policy of stabilisation will, as already explained, necessarily involve the direction of monetary policy in periods of depression, towards a rise in prices. It is then interesting to analyse the effects of such a policy of inflation as distinguished from the continuance of inflation at a time when inflation has already brought prices to an abnormal height. The difference in effect is indeed very considerable.

When production has already been artificially stimulated by inflation, every further extension of credit and creation of money means a net increase in the nominal purchasing power of the community without any corresponding increase of the mass of commodities to be sold. The productive capacity of the community being already fully employed there is no possibility for an extension of production. The fresh purchasing power created can therefore only find something to buy by causing a general rise of prices. Thus prices, as explained in the first Memorandum, must rise.

In a period of severe depression brought about by a process of deflation, a return to more liberal credit policy will set production going where it has

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come to a standstill, and procure employment for labour, machinery and other instruments of production which have before been idle. The mass of commodities to be bought will therefore very soon be increased, and thus there will be something to set up against the additional purchasing power which may have been created. The rise of prices caused by the extension of credit must, consequently, in this case be smaller than in the case of continued inflation. The policy now discussed will have a decidedly beneficial effect on the economy of the community, increasing its real income and mitigating the social troubles connected with prolonged and widespread unemployment. These advantages will go far to balance the evils unavoidably caused to certain classes by every reduction in the value of the monetary unit. And if the policy of stopping deflation and reverting to a higher normal level of prices is managed well, it is quite possible that the balance for the community as a whole may show a very considerable net advantage.

The condition is, of course, that the new credit created is used exclusively for productive purposes, and not only that, but for such investments which are likely to call forth, in the most immediate future, an important increase of production. There are always, under the circumstances assumed, ample opportunities for investments of this kind. For such productive concerns as have been going and are fully equipped, but have been brought to a standstill by the economic depression caused by deflation, generally need little fresh capital to set them going again. The confident belief that prices have ceased to fall, and are even likely to rise moderately, is in itself a very

potent factor in setting the wheels of industry turning round. Further, there are, particularly in the present state of things, several points in the productive organisation of the community where something, perhaps very little, is lacking which would give to the whole machinery its full officiency. If at such points the needed equipment is provided, the addition to the total output may prove out of all proportion greater than the expenses involved. If, e.g., some bridges of a great railway system have been destroyed, or if there is a lack of locomotives, an investment of capital for making good such deficiencies will soon be productive of increased efficiency, not only in the whole railway system, but in the productive machinery of the country at large. If, at the lowest stage of depression caused by a continued process of deflation, fresh credit is created for these and similar purposes, the community may very soon see its real income, e.g., in the shape of home and colonial supplies of food and raw materials, increased so much as to justify the increase in the sum of nominal means of payment.

The public will probably be inclined to believe that such credits may just as well be used for any other purpose, and particularly there is always the risk that such an opening will be exploited for an increase of public expenditure. Therefore, when recommending, under the circumstances here assumed, a more liberal credit policy, one feels obliged to underline very strongly the warning against any abuse of such policy.

A return to a more liberal credit policy during the deepest depression is not likely to cause a fresh wave of over-speculation or to be a temptation for investors to spend further capital on industrial equipment which is already more than sufficient. The psychological

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conditions are very different from those prevailing in a period of continued inflation, and the effects of a more plentiful supply of means of payment will therefore be different even in this respect. A low rate of interest may certainly call forth considerable issues of new securities on the stock exchange. But, in reality, such a result will mainly represent the transformation of old floating engagements to more durable investments, and ought therefore to be greeted with satisfaction as a sign of a wholesome consolidation.

Still, the directions which investments take and the purposes for which fresh capital is required should be carefully watched. A certain selection will be necessary and for this purpose the co-operation of the whole business community, and particularly of the banks, is required.

DISTURBING EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL WAR DEBTS

It is generally recognised that the existence of the huge international debts which the war has left behind it has a disturbing influence on exchanges, and adversely affects the restoration of a gold standard. But the real gravity of this influence is not always perceived, nor is the true character of the difficulties created by these debts sufficiently clear to the public mind. Certain aspects of the problem of post-war international indebtedness having been brought into fuller light by the experience and the discussions of the last twelve months, it is necessary, even within the limited scope of this paper, to give some attention to this problem.

Foremost in practical importance among the international war debts stands the German indemnity, not merely on account of its magnitude, but still more because payments have actually begun to be exacted, and will continue to be exacted in the near future, under the threat of heavy and far-reaching penalties, whereas in the case of other war debts payment is still looked upon as a problem of to-morrow. The difficulties involved in the actual payment of the debts and the disturbing effects of an attempt to enforce such payment are, however, in both cases of the same nature; and an analysis of the case of the German

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indemnity has, accordingly, a bearing beyond the limits of the particular case, which it would be well to have in mind in every discussion of this controversial subject.

The adverse influence of the indemnity on the world's recovery in general, as well as on efforts to restore sound monetary conditions, is due in the first instance to the fact that it is considered extremely dubious whether Germany will really be able to fulfil the payments fixed in the London Agreement. It is indeed feared among those best acquainted with the details of the matter that the payments of the present year will more or less exhaust Germany's available supplies of foreign exchange; and that, therefore, the whole scheme for the payment of the indemnity will break down in 1922. What then will happen is the very troublesome question which more than anything else prevents the establishment of equilibrium in the world and which at the same time is one of the foremost causes of the general distrust of the stability of any system of money or international exchanges.

The relatively small indemnity payments hitherto required according to the London scheme seem to have been made possible only by aid of extraordinary measures, and particularly by a further resort to the practice of selling German marks abroad. This practice must, as explained in the first Memorandum, depress the international value of the currency concerned beneath its internal value, and the depth of the depression must increase with the extension of the sales. In the case of the German mark the undervaluation has gone so far that, whereas the internal value of the currency may perhaps roughly be estimated at about two pence, the value in exchange is

less than one penny. Buyers of German marks speculate on a rise of the exchange value to something approaching the internal value; but evil experience has taught them that this is a rather dangerous speculation, and, therefore, a wide margin of possible profit, at present more than 100 per cent., is required to call forth fresh buyers. Of course, there is a limit for such sales beyond which no margin is able to call forth an appreciable demand, and every considerable extension of the sales naturally strengthens the fear of an approaching collapse of the market.

The danger of Germany's being unable in a near future to fulfil her obligations, and of the political consequences which this failure would involve, is another important element in the growing distrust felt towards the German currency; and with a complete lack of stability in this part of the world's monetary system, there is little hope of any real stability being restored to the system as a whole.

Assuming an arrangement to have been made which removed the difficulties as to the German payments for the immediate future, the question will arise whether Germany will be able in the long run to fulfil the obligations laid upon her by the London scheme. In this connection it should be recognised that calculations of Germany's capacity to pay based on the estimated pre-war saving capacity of the country are entirely unsound. In the first place, the savings of the community are not, as is so often preached and believed in internal politics, a sum of money which may be used for any purpose which may be thought desirable. On the contrary, such savings are a necessary condition of economic progress, and they immediately take the form of the real capital

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(houses, machinery, etc.) required for this progress. Of course it may be said that a country must sacrifice progress in order to pay its debts. But progress cannot well be stopped altogether without injury to the producing capacity of the country. The constant improvement of technical methods makes it necessary that the whole industrial equipment of the country should be continually renewed, and this is practically impossible without a constant supply of fresh capital, *i.e.*, of savings. A growth of population clearly creates an equally imperative need for capital.

Secondly, the savings of a country of the West European type normally amounted before the war to something about one-fifth of the current income of the country, and this rate of saving sufficed to secure the normal rate of progress. The savings of Germany were approximately on that scale. It seems a very moderate estimate to say that five years of the most terrific warfare, ultimate defeat and subsequent heavy penalties, must have reduced the earning capacity of Germany would then only correspond to that part of her pre-war income which was consumed, and any indemnity would have to be paid out of this income. Undoubtedly the main source of the indemnity must be a reduction of the pre-war standard of life of the German people. Such a reduction, however, is not practically possible without injuriously affecting the standard of life of the mass of labourers, and involves an imminent danger that the efficiency of labour also will be reduced. But with a diminished efficiency of labour and a curtailment of the supply of fresh capital, the producing capacity of the whole

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country must decrease. Once this effect has been produced by too heavy claims for payment of the indemnity, further exaction of such claims will be economically impossible, and no "sanctions" will be able to alter this fact.

On this ground it seems natural enough that there should steadily become more general and more profound the fear that the whole plan of indemnity payments, as now contemplated, will ultimately break down and the world be plunged again into political and economic chaos. In such a state of things it is obviously somewhat difficult to lay the foundation of the monetary system of the future, or, indeed, to do anything for the stabilisation of currencies and exchanges. As a matter of fact, practical business men in leading positions are now more and more often found to doubt the usefulness, in present circumstances, of any efforts in this direction. Still, if we are true to ourselves, we must feel that no one can really take the responsibility of abandoning all such efforts and acquiescing in the present monetary confusion

A disturbing element of a more technical nature, but of an immense practical importance, is the stipulation according to which the indemnity has to be paid in gold. The future value of gold is, as explained above, extremely uncertain, even the main factors determining it being beyond our control so long as no agreement has been reached between the leading countries with regard to their monetary demand for gold. The probabilities point, as we have seen, to an increasing scarcity of gold, with a consequent rise in the value of the metal. The stipulation of such huge payments in gold as the German indemnity

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represents cannot but materially affect the market, and will probably tend to strengthen still more the demand for gold in a world already insufficiently supplied. Thus it might easily happen that the enhanced value of gold made the burden of the indemnity much heavier than was originally contemplated, and in the end rendered it impossible to bear. At the same time, such a rise of the value of gold would make all other debts contracted in gold much heavier. and in many cases would completely undermine the solvency of debtors, public as well as private. addition, all efforts and sacrifices for the restoration of a gold standard would probably prove futile, and the countries which had made such attempts would find themselves thrown back again on a paper basis. Even if a country succeeded in keeping up the gold standard the confusion would hardly be diminished, for it would have to face a heavy fall in prices, and probably, as a result thereof, a serious depression in trade and production.

It may be taken as certain that these grave consequences of the fixing of the indemnity in gold have not been taken sufficiently into consideration. There is, however, clearly no hope of a restoration of stability in the world's monetary system until some means has been found of removing this particularly disturbing factor.

Another side of the question before us is the problem of what has been called "the mobilisation of the indemnity." The idea that the indemnity, or a part of it, could be discounted and thus turned into immediately available money has certainly not yet been definitely abandoned. It was said in the first Memorandum that the prospects of a great lending country

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-the United States-offering an international loan on the security of the indemnity were practically nil. This view has since been confirmed. American bankers are not even willing to have the Reparation Bonds introduced into the American market. The declaration given in this matter on behalf of the American delegation at the meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce in London this summer was very clear. It was feared that any attempt to sell Reparation Bonds in America would depress prices and "spoil the market, not only for these bonds, but for foreign offerings generally, and thus seriously interfere with all efforts to aid the European situation." That the sale of the bonds in any other country is still more impossible is plain enough. As long, however, as the owners of the bonds are in urgent need of money, it must always be feared that attempts will be made to put huge amounts of the bonds on the market. This danger will be a constant element of insecurity in transactions in international exchange and will make the much-desired stabilisation of rates still more difficult.

Finally, we have to consider the indemnity question from the aspect which has so prominently engaged international discussion on the subject during recent months, viz., the unwillingness of the claimants to receive the indemnity which they claim. This absurd situation, as it might be thought, is a result of the widespread influence which protectionist ideas have acquired since the war, principally by the exploitation of war-antagonism. The countries which are entitled to participate in the indemnity are not willing to receive German products; nor do they wish, in cases where actual reparation is required, to open their

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doors for German labour or German enterprise which would share the employment and profits offered by reparation work.

Sometimes the ultimate consequences of this standpoint are recognised and it is declared that the indemnity must do more harm than good to the country receiving it and that it is better to abandon the whole indemnity. This is, of course, wrong. No economist, reasoning on purely economic grounds, could endorse such a view. To receive an indemnity is undoubtedly an economic advantage. But it is not an unmixed advantage. The indemnity must somehow be paid in commodities and services: these commodities and services must compete with commodities and services supplied by the receiving country itself, and the competition must be so far successful as to allow the indemnity to be paid. In some branches of industry such competition is bound to have very disagreeable effects. The full real advantage can only be drawn from the indemnity payments when the economic life of the country has been adjusted to the new conditions. During the first period of adjustment the disadvantages will probably even preponderate. When the indemnity has ultimately been paid, a new adjustment will be necessary and will cause disturbances which, though probably not so serious as those of the first adjustment, will be disagreeable enough.

At present, the primary problem for the countries which claim the indemnity would appear to be that of avoiding the initial disturbances, or at any rate mitigating them as much as possible. The usual plan is to throw these disturbances on to other countries, close the frontiers against German compe-

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tition and let the flood of German goods go elsewhere. This course does not seem entirely just to other countries which have nothing to do with the indemnity. and these countries can hardly be expected to give their support to such a policy of economic devastation. The consequence has been a general growth of protectionism and, notwithstanding all that was said at the International Financial Conference at Brussels in favour of free trade and free intercourse between nations, the world is unmistakably moving in the opposite direction. This result of the indemnity is most unfortunate and injurious and is perhaps the most important hindrance to the economic recovery of the world which, even for the Allied countries, is of much greater interest than any indemnity. What makes the protectionism of to-day so especially pernicious is that it leaves everything in a state of uncertainty. The world's trade can adapt itself to adverse conditions, but in the present state of affairs no one knows to what conditions trade should be adapted.

As long as the general situation of production and trade remains so abnormal and so uncertain it is, of course, vain to hope for the restoration of any stability to the international exchanges. In this connection the intimate connection between the present monetary problem and the problem of the indemnity shows itself with singular clearness, and it becomes plain how indispensable a complete settlement of the whole question of the indemnity, and of the means by which it is to be paid, is as a condition for the success of any positive work on the reorganisation of the world's monetary system.

What has been said here about the German indem-

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nity applies also to the other international debts which the war has left behind it. There is great uncertainty with regard to at least the greater part of these debts, as to whether the debtor countries will ever be able to pay the debts. There is also the fear that attempts may be made to bring these debts on the market, and to enforce payments for interest and sinking fund. This general uncertainty with regard to the future of the international war debts causes a corresponding amount of insecurity in the international exchange market. The effects on the value of gold of an attempt to enforce the payment of these debts in gold can hardly be ascertained. Further, so soon as payment of these debts is seriously considered, the world will realise the immense difficulties of such a reorganisation of the world's trade as must be required for effecting the payment. It will then perhaps also be recognised more generally how unfair it is that a creditor country should be free to aggravate the real burden of the debts for the debtor country by not allowing payment in what it can deliver, or by raising high tariff walls against the commodities by means of which it is most convenient for the payment to be made. These considerations will, we may hope, lead to the recognition of a new rule of international justice creating more equality of rights between creditor and debtor nations.

Such are the almost unsurmountable difficulties of the problem of the international indebtedness created by the war. The more attention one gives to this problem, the more unavoidably one is driven to the conviction that some reduction of this debt must take place. This reduction would necessarily mean a sacrifice for the principal creditor countries,

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Great Britain and the United States. But as these countries are, at the same time, the greatest participants in the world's trade, they would also have the foremost interest in the compensation which would accrue from a revival of the world's trade and a facilitation of the restoration of stability to the different monetary standards and the international exchanges. Great Britain could exchange claims on her Allies for certain amounts of indemnity bonds and cancel them. The United States could do the same on a still greater scale. They would thereby avoid all the disagreeableness and the real inconvenience of becoming Germany's creditors. Such a policy would, I do not hesitate to say, be for the real interest of the two leading commercial countries of the world. But it would require a magnanimity which must be spontaneous and which no outsider is entitled to demand.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

THE monetary problem of the world is at present so interwoven with political difficulties that it is vain to expect a definite solution until the chief political pre-requisites for stability in economic conditions have been realised. It is first of all necessary that the international indebtedness inherited from the war should be settled on such terms as satisfy the world that the debts can really be paid, and make it clear by what concrete means payment can be offered and accepted. It might therefore seem that the whole discussion of monetary questions has to be deferred to some future day. But this would be a grave mistake. The world's monetary problem involves great technical difficulties which require a thorough examination by experts and a certain amount of co-operation between the different nations. are two principal questions to be considered: the question of the stabilisation of the internal value of currency, and the gold question. How these questions are related to one another, and to what extent they are of an international character, has been shown The elucidation of these questions not only is an indispensable condition of the establishment in the future of a sound basis for the world's economic

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life, but also would be of great immediate utility. The experience of the past year has shown conclusively that some guidance is needed amid the confusion into which the world's monetary affairs have fallen, continued inflation on one side and excessive deflation on the other having deprived the world of every sense of equilibrium in the purchasing power of money and in international exchange.

The only way to secure such guidance within a reasonable time would seem to be to refer the whole problem; as far as it involves purely monetary questions, to a small committee of experts. In view of the central position which the United States have come to occupy since the war in all monetary affairs, and particularly in connection with the gold market, the representation of the United States on such a committee is most important. In principle, however, the committee should not represent nationalities for expert knowledge and experience. The creation of such a committee would be a sign of the willingness of the world to solve its monetary difficulties by mutual understanding and action along common lines. The feeling that the time is ripe for such action is visibly growing stronger day by day.

The Quintessence of Ibsenism. By Bernard Shaw. Now Completed to the death of Ibsen.

Constable and Company Ltd. London: 1913.

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PREFACE: 1913

In the pages which follow I have made no attempt to tamper with the work of the bygone man of thirty-five who wrote them. I have never admitted the right of an elderly author to alter the work of a young author, even when the young author happens to be his former self. In the case of a work which is a mere exhibition of skill in conventional art, there may be some excuse for the delusion that the longer the artist works on it the nearer he will bring it to perfection. Yet even the victims of this delusion must see that there is an age limit to the process, and that though a man of forty-five may improve the workmanship of a man of thirty-five, it does not follow that a man of fifty-five can do the same.

When we come to creative art, to the living word of a man delivering a message to his own time, it is clear that any attempt to alter this later on is simply fraud and forgery. As I read the old Quintessence of Ibsenism I may find things that I

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see now at a different angle, or correlate with so many things then unnoted by me that they take on a different aspect. But though this may be a reason for writing another book, it is not a reason for altering an existing one. What I have written I have written, said Pilate, thinking (rightly, as it turned out) that his blunder might prove truer than its revision by the elders; and what he said after a lapse of twenty-one seconds I may very well

say after a lapse of twenty-one years.

However, I should not hesitate to criticize my earlier work if I thought it likely to do any mischief that criticism can avert. But on reading it through I have no doubt that it is as much needed in its old form as ever it was. Now that Ibsen is no longer frantically abused, and is safe in the Pantheon, his message is in worse danger of being forgotten or ignored than when he was in the pillory. Nobody now dreams of calling me a "muck ferretting dog" because I think Ibsen a great teacher. I will not go so far as to say I wish they did; but I do say that the most effective way of shutting our minds against a great man's ideas is to take them for granted and admit he was great and have done with him. It really matters very little whether Ibsen was a great man or not: what does matter is his message and the need of it.

That people are still interested in the message is proved by the history of this book. It has long been out of print in England; but it has never

been out of demand. In spite of the smuggling of unauthorized American editions, which I have winked at because the absence of an English reprint was my own fault (if it be a fault not to be able to do more than a dozen things at a time), the average price of copies of the original edition stood at twenty-four shillings some years ago, and is no doubt higher now. But it was not possible to reprint it without additions. When it was issued in 1891 Ibsen was still alive, and had not yet produced The Master Builder, or Little Eyolf, or John Gabriel Borkman, or When We Dead Awaken. Without an account of these four final masterpieces, a book entitled The Quintessence of Ibsenism would have been a fraud on its purchasers; and it was the difficulty of finding time to write the additional chapters on these plays and review Ibsen's position from the point of view reached when his work ended with his death and his canonization as an admitted grand master of European literature, that has prevented me for twenty years from complying with the demand for a second edition. Also, perhaps, some relics of my old, or rather my young conscience, which revolted against hasty work. Now that my own stream is nearer the sea, I am more inclined to encourage myself in haste and recklessness by reminding myself that le mieux est l'ennemi du bien, and that I had better cobble up a new edition as best I can than not supply it at all.

I have taken all possible precautions to keep the

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reader's mind free from verbal confusion in following Ibsen's attack on ideals and idealism, a confusion that might have been avoided could his plays, without losing the naturalness of their dialogue. have been translated into the language of the English Bible. It is not too much to say that the works of Ibsen furnish one of the best modern keys to the prophecies of Scripture. Read the prophets, major and minor, from Isaiah to Malachi, without such a key; and you will be puzzled and bored by the almost continuous protest against and denunciation of idolatry and prostitution. Simpletons read all this passionate invective with sleepy unconcern, concluding thoughtlessly that idolatry means praying to stocks and stones instead of to brass lectern eagles and the new reredos presented by the local distiller in search of a title; and as to prostitution, they think of it as "the social evil," and regret that the translators of the Bible used a much blunter word. But nobody who has ever heard real live men talking about graven images and traders in sex, can for a moment suppose them to be the things the prophets denounced so earnestly. For idols and idolatry read ideals and idealism; for the prostitution of Piccadilly Circus read not only the prostitution of the journalist, the political lawyer, the parson selling his soul to the squire, the ambitious politician selling his soul for office, but the much more intimate and widespread idolatries and prostitutions of the private snob, the domestic tyrant

and voluptuary, and the industrial adventurer. At once the prophetic warnings and curses take on meaning and proportion, and lose that air of exaggerated righteousness and tiresome conventional rant which repels readers who do not possess Ibsen's clue. I have sometimes thought of reversing the operation, and substituting in this book the words idol and idolatry for ideal and idealism; but it would be impossible without spoiling the actuality of Ibsen's criticism of society. If you call a man a rascally idealist, he is not only shocked and indignant but puzzled: in which condition you can rely on his attention. If you call him a rascally idolater, he concludes calmly that you do not know that he is a member of the Church of England. I have therefore left the old wording. Save for certain adaptations made necessary by the lapse of time and the hand of death, the book stands as it did, with a few elucidations which I might have made in 1891 had I given the text a couple of extra revisions. Also, of course, the section dealing with the last four plays. The two concluding chapters are new. There is no fundamental change: above all, no dilution.

Whether this edition will change people's minds to the extent to which the first did (to my own greatastonishment) I do not know. In the eighteennineties one jested about the revolt of the daughters, and of the wives who slammed the front door like Nora. At present the revolt has become so general that even the feeblest and oldest after-dinner jesters

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dare no longer keep Votes for Women on their list of stale pleasantries about mothers-in-law, rational dress, and mixed bathing. Men are waking up to the perception that in killing women's souls they have killed their own. Mr. Granville Barker's worthy father of six unmarriageable daughters in The Madras House, ruefully exclaiming, "It seems to me Ive been made a convenience of all my life," has taken away the excited attention that Nora once commanded when she said, "I have been living all these years with a strange man." When she meets Helmer's "No man sacrifices his honor for awoman" with her "Thousands of women have done that for men," there is no longer the old impressed assent: men fiercely protest that it is not true; that, on the contrary, for every woman who has sacrificed her honor for a man's sake, ten men have sacrificed their honor for a woman's. In the plays of Gorki and Tchekov, against which all the imbecilities and outrages of the old anti-Ibsen campaign are being revived (for the Press never learns anything by experience), the men appear as more tragically sacrificed by evil social conditions and their romantic and idealistic disguises than the women. Now it may be that into this new atmosphere my book will come with quite an old-fashioned air. As I write these lines the terrible play with which Strindberg wreaked the revenge of the male for A Doll's House has just been performed for the first time in London under the title of Creditors. In that, as in Brieux's Les Hannetons, it is the man who is the victim of domesticity, and the woman who is the tyrant and soul destroyer. Thus A Doll's House did not dispose of the question: it only brought on the stage the endless recriminations of idealistic marriage. And how has Strindberg, Ibsen's twin giant, been received? With an even idler stupidity than Ibsen himself, because Ibsen appealed to the rising energy of the revolt of women against idealism; but Strindberg attacks women ruthlessly, trying to rouse men from the sloth and sensuality of their idealized addiction to them; and as the men, unlike the women, do not want to be roused, whilst the women do not like to be attacked, there is no conscious Strindberg movement to relieve the indifference, the dull belittlement, the spiteful hostility against which the devotees of Ibsen fought so slashingly in the nineties. But the unconscious movement is violent enough. As I write, it is only two days since an eminent bacteriologist filled three columns of The Times with a wild Strindbergian letter in which he declared that women must be politically and professionally secluded and indeed excluded, because their presence and influence inflict on men an obsession so disabling and dangerous that men and women can work together or legislate together only on the same conditions as horses and mares: that is, by the surgical destruction of the male's sex. The Times and The Pall Mall Gazette gravely

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accept this outburst as "scientific," and heartily endorse it; though only a few weeks have elapsed since The Times dismissed Strindberg's play and Strindberg himself with curt superciliousness as uninteresting and negligible. Not many years ago, a performance of a play by myself, the action of which was placed in an imaginary Ibsen Club, in which the comedy of the bewilderment of conventional people when brought suddenly into contact with the Ibsenist movement (both understood and misunderstood) formed the atmosphere of the piece, was criticized in terms which shewed that our critics are just as hopelessly in the rear of Ibsen as they were in 1891. The only difference was that whereas in 1891 they would have insulted Ibsen, they now accept him as a classic. But understanding of the change of mind produced by Ibsen, or notion that they live in a world which is seething with the reaction of Ibsen's ideas against the ideas of Sardou and Tom Taylor, they have none. They stare with equal unintelligence at the sieges and stormings of separate homesteads by Ibsen or Strindberg, and at the attack all along the front of refined society into which these sieges and stormings have now developed. Whether the attack is exquisite, touching, delicate, as in Tchekov's Cherry Orchard, Galsworthy's Silver Box, and Granville Barker's Anne Leete, or ruthless, with every trick of intellectual ruffianism and ribaldry, and every engine of dramatic controversy, there is

the same pettish disappointment at the absence of the old conventions, the same gaping unconsciousness of the meaning and purpose of the warfare in which each play is a battle, as in the days when this book was new.

Our political journalists are even blinder than our artistic ones in this matter. The credit of our domestic ideals having been shaken to their foundations, as through a couple of earthquake shocks, by Ibsen and Strindberg (the Arch Individualists of the nineteenth century) whilst the Socialists have been idealizing, sentimentalizing, denouncing Capitalism for sacrificing Love and Homeand Domestic Happiness and Children and Duty to money greed and ambition, yet it remains a commonplace of political journalism to assume that Socialism is the deadliest enemy of the domestic ideals and Unsocialism their only hope and refuge. In the same breath the worldgrasping commercial synthesis we call Capitalism, built up by generations of Scotch Rationalists and English Utilitarians, Atheists, Agnostics and Natural-Selectionists, with Malthus as the one churchman among all its prophets, is proclaimed the bulwark of the Christian Churches. We used to be told that the people that walked in darkness have seen a great light. When our people see the heavens blazing with suns, they simply keep their eyes shut, and walk on in darkness until they have led us into the pit. No matter: I am not a domestic idealist; and it pleases me to think that the Life Force may have

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providential aims in thus keeping my opponents off the trail.

But for all that I must not darken counsel. I therefore, without further apology, launch my old torpedo with the old charge in it, leaving to the new chapters at the end what I have to say about the change in the theatre since Ibsen set his potent leaven to work there.

Ayor St. Lawrence, 1912-13.

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

In the spring of 1890, the Fabian Society, finding itself at a loss for a course of lectures to occupy its summer meetings, was compelled to make shift with a series of papers put forward under the general heading of Socialism in Contemporary Literature. The Fabian Essayists, strongly pressed to do "something or other," for the most part shook their heads; but in the end Sydney Olivier consented to "take Zola"; I consented to "take Ibsen"; and Hubert Bland undertook to read all the Socialist novels of the day, an enterprise the desperate failure of which resulted in the most amusing paper of the series. William Morris, asked to read a paper on himself, flatly declined, but gave us one on Gothic Architecture. Stepniak also came to the rescue with a lecture on modern Russian fiction; and so the Society tided over the summer without having to close its doors, but also without having added anything whatever to the general stock of information on Socialism in Contemporary Litera-

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ture. After this I cannot claim that my paper on Ibsen, which was duly read at the St. James's Restaurant on the 18th July 1890, under the presidency of Mrs. Annie Besant, and which was the first form of this little book, is an original work in the sense of being the result of a spontaneous internal impulse on my part. Having purposely couched it in the most provocative terms (of which traces may be found by the curious in its present state), I did not attach much importance to the somewhat lively debate that arose upon it; and I had laid it aside as a pièce d'occasion which had served its turn, when the production of Rosmersholm at the Vaudeville Theatre by Florence Farr, the inauguration of the Independent Theatre by Mr. J. T. Grein with a performance of Ghosts, and the sensation created by the experiment of Elizabeth Robins and Marion Lea with Hedda Gabler, started a frantic newspaper controversy, in which I could see no sign of any of the disputants having ever been forced by circumstances, as I had, to make up his mind definitely as to what Ibsen's plays meant, and to defend his view face to face with some of the keenest debaters in London. I allow due weight to the fact that Ibsen himself has not enjoyed this Fabian advantage; but I have also shewn that the existence of a discoverable and perfectly definite thesis in a poet's work by no means depends on the completeness of his own intellectual consciousness of it. At any rate, the

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controversialists, whether in the abusive stage, or the apologetic stage, or the hero worshipping stage, by no means made clear what they were abusing, or apologizing for, or going into ecstasies about; and I came to the conclusion that my explanation might as well be placed in the field until a better could be found.

With this account of the origin of the book, and a reminder that it is not a critical essay on the poetic beauties of Ibsen, but simply an exposition of Ibsenism, I offer it to my readers to make what they can of.

London, June 1891.

THE QUINTESSENCE OF IBSENISM

THE TWO PIONEERS

THAT is, pioneers of the march to the plains of heaven (so to speak).

The second, whose eyes are in the back of his head, is the man who declares that it is wrong to do something that no one has hitherto seen any harm in.

The first, whose eyes are very longsighted and in the usual place, is the man who declares that it is right to do something hitherto regarded as infamous.

The second is treated with great respect by the army. They give him testimonials; name him the Good Man; and hate him like the devil.

The first is stoned and shrieked at by the whole army. They call him all manner of opprobrious names; grudge him his bare bread and water; and

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secretly adore him as their savior from utter despair.

Let me take an example from life of my pioneers. Shelley was a pioneer and nothing else: he did both

first and second pioneer's work.

Now compare the effect produced by Shelley as abstinence preacher or second pioneer with that which he produced as indulgence preacher or first pioneer. For example:

SECOND PIONEER PROPOSITION: It is wrong to

kill animals and eat them.

FIRST PIONEER PROPOSITION: It is not wrong to take your sister as your wife.1

¹ The curious persistence of this proposition in the higher poetry of the nineteenth century is not easy to account for now that it sounds both unimportant and old-fashioned. It is as if one said "It is not wrong to stand on one's head." The reply is "You may be very right; but as nobody wants to, why bother about it?" Yet I think this sensible way of treating the matterobviously more healthy than the old morbid horror-has been produced largely by the refusal of poets like Shelley and Wagner to accept the theory of natural antipathy as the basis of the tables of Consanguinity, and by the subsequent publication of masses of evidence by sociologists, from Herbert Spencer to Westermarck, shewing that such tables are entirely conventional, and that all our prohibitions have been either ignored or actually turned into positive obligations at one time or another without any shock to human instincts. The consequence is that our eyes are now opened to the practical social reasons for barring marriage between Laon and Cythna, Siegmund and Sieglinda; and the preaching of incest as something poetic in itself has lost all its morbid interest and ceased. Also we are beginning to recognize the important fact that the absence of romantic illusion as between persons brought up together, which undoubtedly exists, and which used to be mistaken for natural antipathy, cannot be depended on as between strangers, however close their consanguinity, and that any domestic or educational system which segregates the sexes produces romantic illusion, no matter how undesirable it may be. It will be seen later on in the chapter dealing with the play called Ghosts, that Ibsen took this modern view that consanguinity does not count between strangers. I have accepted it myself in my play Mrs. Warren's Profession. (1912).

Here the second pioneer appears as a gentle humanitarian, and the first as an unnatural corrupter of public morals and family life. So much easier is it to declare the right wrong than the wrong right in a society with a guilty conscience, to which, as to Dickens's detective, "Any possible move is a probable move provided it's in a wrong direction." Just as the liar's punishment is, not in the least that he is not believed, but that he cannot believe any one else; so a guilty society can more easily be persuaded that any apparently innocent act is guilty than that any apparently guilty act is innocent.

The English newspaper which best represented the guilty conscience of the middle class, was, when Ibsen's plays reached England, The Daily Telegraph. If we can find that The Daily Telegraph attacked Ibsen as The Quarterly Review used to attack Shelley, it will occur to us at once that there must be something of the first pioneer about

Ibsen.

The late Clement Scott, at that time dramatic critic to The Daily Telegraph, was a sentimentally good-natured gentleman, not then a pioneer, though he had in his time fought hard for the advance in British drama represented by the plays of Robertson. He was also an emotional, impressionable, zealous, and sincere Roman Catholic. He accused Ibsen of dramatic impotence, ludicrous amateurishness, nastiness, vulgarity, egotism, coarseness, absurdity, uninteresting verbosity, and "suburbanity," declaring that he

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has taken ideas that would have inspired a great tragic poet, and vulgarized and debased them in dull, hateful, loathsome, horrible plays. This criticism, which occurs in a notice of the first performance of Ghosts in England, is to be found in The Daily Telegraph for the 14th March 1891, and is supplemented by a leading article which compares the play to an open drain, a loathsome sore unbandaged, a dirty act done publicly, or a lazar house with all its doors and windows open. Bestial, cynical, disgusting, poisonous, sickly, delirious, indecent, loathsome, fetid, literary carrion, crapulous stuff, clinical confessions: all these epithets are used in the article as descriptive of Ibsen's work. "Realism," said the writer, "is one thing; but the nostrils of the audience must not be visibly held before a play can be stamped as true to nature. It is difficult to expose in decorous words the gross and almost putrid indecorum of this play." As the performance of Ghosts took place on the evening of the 13th March, and the criticism appeared next morning, it is evident that Clement Scott must have gone straight from the theatre to the newspaper office, and there, in an almost hysterical condition, penned his share of this extraordinary protest. The literary workmanship bears marks of haste and disorder, which, however, only heighten the expression of the passionate horror produced in the writer by seeing Ghosts on the stage. He calls on the authorities to cancel the license of the theatre, and declares that he has been exhorted to laugh at

honor, to disbelieve in love, to mock at virtue, to distrust friendship, and to deride fidelity.

If this document were at all singular, it would rank as one of the curiosities of criticism, exhibiting, as it does, the most seasoned playgoer in London thrown into convulsions by a performance which was witnessed with approval, and even with enthusiasm, by many persons of approved moral and artistic conscientiousness. But Clement Scott's criticism was hardly distinguishable in tone from dozens of others which appeared simultaneously. His opinion was the vulgar opinion. Mr. Alfred Watson, critic to the Standard, the leading Tory daily paper, proposed that proceedings should be taken against the theatre under Lord Campbell's Act for the suppression of disorderly houses. Clearly Clement Scott and his editor Sir Edwin Arnold, with whom rested the final responsibility for the article which accompanied the criticism, represented a considerable party.

How then is it that Ibsen, a Norwegian playwright of European celebrity, attracted one section of the English people so strongly that they hailed him as the greatest living dramatic poet and moral teacher, whilst another section was so revolted by his works that they described him in terms which they themselves admitted to be, by the necessities of the case, all but obscene? This phenomenon, which has occurred throughout Europe whenever Ibsen's plays have been acted, as well as in America and Australia,

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must be exhaustively explained before the plays can be described without danger of reproducing the same confusion in the reader's own mind. Such an explanation, therefore, must be my first business.

Understand, at the outset, that the explanation will not be an explaining away. Clement Scott's judgment did not mislead him in the least as to Ibsen's meaning. Ibsen means all that most revolted his critic. For example, in Ghosts, the play in question, a clergyman and a married woman fall in love with one another. The woman proposes to abandon her husband and live with the clergyman. He recalls her to her duty, and makes her behave as a virtuous woman. She afterwards tells him that this was a crime on his part. Ibsen agrees with her, and has written the play to bring you round to his opinion. Clement Scott did not agree with her, and believed that when you are brought round to her opinion you have been morally corrupted. By this conviction he was impelled to denounce Ibsen as he did, Ibsen being equally impelled to propagate the convictions which provoked the attack. Which of the two is right cannot be decided until it is ascertained whether a society of persons holding Ibsen's opinions would be higher or lower than a society holding Clement Scott's.

There are many people who cannot conceive this as an open question. To them a denunciation of any recognized practices is an incitement to unsocial conduct; and every utterance in which an assump-

tion of the eternal validity of these practices is not implicit is a paradox. Yet all progress involves the beating of them from that position. By way of illustration, one may rake up the case of Proudhon, who in the year 1840 carefully defined property as theft. This was thought the very maddest paradox that ever man hazarded: it seemed obvious that a society which countenanced such a proposition must speedily be reduced to the condition of a sacked city. Today schemes for the confiscation by taxation and supertaxation of mining royalties and ground rents are commonplaces of social reform; and the honesty of the relation of our big property holders to the rest of the community is challenged on all hands. It would be easy to multiply instances, though the most complete are now ineffective through the triumph of the original paradox having obliterated all memory of the opposition it first had to encounter. The point to seize is that social progress takes effect through the replacement of old institutions by new ones; and since every institution involves the recognition of the duty of conforming to it, progress must involve the repudiation of an established duty at every step. If the Englishman had not repudiated the duty of absolute obedience to his king, his political progress would have been impossible. If women had not repudiated the duty of absolute submission to their husbands, and defied public opinion as to the limits set by modesty to their education, they would never have gained the

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protection of the Married Women's Property Act, the municipal vote, or the power to qualify themselves as medical practitioners. If Luther had not trampled on his duty to the head of his Church and on his vow of chastity, our clergy would still have to choose between celibacy and profligacy. There is nothing new, then, in the defiance of duty by the reformer: every step of progress means a duty repudiated, and a scripture torn up. And every reformer is denounced accordingly: Luther as an apostate, Cromwell as a traitor, Mary Wollstonecraft as an unwomanly virago, Shelley as a libertine,

and Ibsen as all the things enumerated in The Daily Telegraph.

This crablike progress of social evolution, in which the individual advances by seeming to go backward, continues to illude us in spite of all the lessons of history. To the pious man the newly made freethinker, suddenly renouncing supernatural revelation, and denying all obligation to believe the Bible and obey the commandments as such, appears to be claiming the right to rob and murder at large. But the freethinker soon finds reasons for not doing what he does not want to do; and these reasons seem to him to be far more binding on our conscience than the precepts of a book of which the infallibility cannot be rationally proved. The pious man is at last forced to admit—as he was in the case of the late Charles Bradlaugh, for instance—that the disciples of Voltaire and Tom Paine do not pick pockets or

cut throats oftener than your even Christian: he actually is driven to doubt whether Voltaire himself (poor Voltaire, who built a church, and was the greatest philanthropist of his time!) really screamed and saw the devil on his deathbed.

This experience by no means saves the rationalist 1 from falling into the same conservatism when the time comes for his own belief to be questioned. No sooner has he triumphed over the theologian than he forthwith sets up as binding on all men the duty of acting logically with the object of securing the greatest good of the greatest number, with the result that he is presently landed in vivisection, Contagious Diseases Acts, dynamite conspiracies, and other grotesque but strictly reasonable abominations. Reason becomes Dagon, Moloch, and Jehovah rolled into one. Its devotees exult in having freed themselves from the old slavery to a collection of books written by Tewish men of letters. To worship such books was, they can prove, as absurd as to worship sonatas composed by German musicians, as was done by the hero of Wagner's novelette, who sat up on his deathbed to say his creed, beginning, "I believe in God, Mozart, and Beethoven." The Voltairian freethinker despises such a piece of sentiment; but is it not much more sensible to worship a sonata constructed by a musician than to worship a syllogism constructed by a

¹ I had better here warn students of philosophy that I am speaking of rationalism, not as classified in the books, but as apparent in men.

logician, since the sonata may encourage heroism, or at least inspire feelings of awe and devotion? This does not occur to the votary of reason; and the rationalist's freethinking soon comes to mean syllogism worship with rites of human sacrifice; for just as the rationalist's pious predecessor thought that the man who scoffed at baptism and the Bible must infallibly yield without resistance to all his criminal propensities, so the rationalist in turn becomes convinced that when a man once loses his faith in vaccination and in Herbert Spencer's Data of Ethics, he is no longer to be trusted to keep his hands off his neighbor's person, purse, or wife.

In process of time the age of reason had to go its way after the age of faith. In actual experience, the first shock to rationalism comes from the observation that though nothing can persuade women to adopt it, their impatience of reasoning no more prevents them from arriving at right conclusions than the masculine belief in it (never a very deeply rooted faith in England, by the way, whatever it may have been in France or Greece) saves men from arriving at wrong ones. When this generalization has to be modified in view of the fact that some women are beginning to try their skill at ratiocination, reason is not reestablished on the throne; because the result of Woman's reasoning is that she begins to fall into all the errors which men are just learning to mistrust. The moment she sets about doing things for

reasons instead of merely finding reasons for what she wants to do, there is no saying what mischief she will be at next: there being just as good reasons for burning a heretic at the stake as for rescuing a shipwrecked crew from drowning: in fact, there are better.

One of the first and most famous utterances of rationalism would have condemned it without further hearing had its full significance been seen at the time. Voltaire, taking exception to the trash of some poetaster, was met with the plea "One must live." "I dont see the necessity," replied Voltaire. The evasion was worthy of the Father of Lies himself; for Voltaire was face to face with the very necessity he was denying; must have known, consciously or not, that it is the universal postulate; would have understood, if he had lived today, that since all valid human institutions are constructed to fulfil man's will, and his will is to live even when his reason teaches him to die, logical necessity, which was the sort Voltaire meant (the other sort being visible enough) can never be a motor in human action, and is, in short, not necessity at all. But that was not brought to light in Voltaire's time; and he died impenitent, bequeathing to his disciples that most logical of agents, the guillotine, which also "did not see the necessity."

In our own century the recognition of the will as distinct from the reasoning machinery began to spread. Schopenhauer was the first among the

moderns1 to appreciate the enormous practical importance of the distinction, and to make it clear to amateur metaphysicians by concrete instances. Out of his teaching came the formulation of the dilemma Voltaire had shut his eyes to. Here it is. Rationally considered, life is only worth living when its pleasures are greater than its pains. Now (to a generation which has ceased to believe in heaven, and has not yet learned that the degradation by poverty of four out of every five of its number is artificial and remediable, the fact that life is not rationally worth living is obvious.) It is useless to pretend that the pessimism of Koheleth, Shakespear, Dryden, and Swift can be refuted if the world progresses solely by the destruction of the unfit, and yet can only maintain its civilization by manufacturing the unfit in swarms of which that appalling proportion of four to one represents but the comparatively fit survivors. Plainly then, the reasonable thing for the rationalists to do is to refuse to

¹ I say the moderns, because the will is our old friend the soul or spirit of man; and the doctrine of justification, not by works, but by faith, clearly derives its validity from the consideration that no action, taken apart from the will behind it, has any moral character: for example, the acts which make the murderer and incendiary infamous are exactly similar to those which make the patriotic hero famous. "Original sin" is the will doing mischief. "Divine grace" is the will doing good. Our fathers, unversed in the Hegelian dialectic, could not conceive that these two, each the negation of the other, were the same. Schopenhauer's philosophy, like that of all pessimists, is really based on the old view of the will as original sin, and on the 1750-1850 view that the intellect is the divine grace that is to save us from it. It is as well to warn those who fancy that Schopenhauerism is one and indivisible, that acceptance of its metaphysics by no means involves endorsement of its philosophy.

live.) But as none of them will commit suicide in obedience to this demonstration of "the necessity" for it, there is an end of the notion that we live. for reasons instead of in fulfilment of our will to live. Thus we are landed afresh in mystery; for positive science gives no account whatever of this will to live. Positive science has dazzled us for nearly a century with its analyses of the machinery of sensation. Its researches into the nature of sound and the construction of the ear, the nature of light and the construction of the eye, its measurement of the speed of sensation, its localization of the functions of the brain, and its hints as to the possibility of producing a homunculus presently as the fruit of its chemical investigation of protoplasm have satisfied the souls of our atheists as completely as belief in divine omniscience and scriptural revelation satisfied the souls of their pious fathers. The fact remains that when Young, Helmholtz, Darwin, Haeckel, and the rest, popularized here among the literate classes by Tyndall and Huxley, and among the proletariat by the lectures of the National Secular Society, have taught you all they know, you are still as utterly at a loss to explain the fact of consciousness as you would have been in the days when you were instructed from The Child's Guide to Knowledge. Materialism, in short, only isolated the great mystery of consciousness by clearing away several petty mysteries with which we had confused it; just as Rationalism

isolated the great mystery of the will to live. The isolation made both more conspicuous than before. We thought we had escaped for ever from the cloudy region of metaphysics; and we were only carried further into the heart of them.¹

We have not yet worn off the strangeness of the position to which we have now been led. Only the other day our highest boast was that we were reasonable human beings. Today we laugh at that conceit, and see ourselves as wilful creatures. Ability to reason accurately is as desirable as ever; for by accurate reasoning only can we calculate our actions so as to do what we intend to do: that is, to fulfil our will; but faith in reason as a prime motor is no longer the criterion of the sound mind, any more than faith in the Bible is the criterion of righteous intention.

At this point, accordingly, the illusion as to the retrogressive movement of progress recurs as strongly as ever. Just as the beneficent step from theology to rationalism seems to the theologist a growth of impiety, does the step from rationalism to the recognition of the will as the prime motor strike the rationalist as a lapse of common sanity;

¹ The correlation between Rationalism and Materialism in this process has some immediate practical importance. Those who give up Materialism whilst clinging to Rationalism generally either relapse into abject submission to the most paternal of the Churches, or are caught by the attempts, constantly renewed, of mystics to found a new faith by rationalizing on the hollowness of materialism. The hollowness has nothing in it; and if you have come to grief as a materialist by reasoning about something, you are not likely, as a mystic, to improve matters by reasoning about nothing.

so that to both theologist and rationalist progress at last appears alarming, threatening, hideous, because it seems to tend towards chaos. The deists Voltaire and Tom Paine were, to the divines of their day, predestined devils, tempting mankind hellward.1 To deists and divines alike Ferdinand Lassalle, the godless self-worshipper and man-worshipper, would have been a monster. Yet many who today echo Lassalle's demand that economic and political institutions should be adapted to the poor man's will to eat and drink his fill out of the product of the labor he shares, are revolted by Ibsen's acceptance of the impulse towards greater freedom as sufficient ground for the repudiation of any customary duty, however sacred, that conflicts with it. Society, were it even as free as Lassalle's Social-Democratic republic, must, it seems to them, go to pieces when conduct is no longer regulated by inviolable covenants.

For what, during all these overthrowings of things sacred and things infallible, has been happening to that pre-eminently sanctified thing, Duty? Evidently it cannot have come off scatheless. First there was man's duty to God, with the priest as assessor. That was repudiated; and then came Man's duty to his neighbor, with Society as the

¹ This is not precisely true. Voltaire was what we should now call an advanced Congregationalist: in fact, modern Dissent, on its educated side, is sound Voltaireanism. Voltaire was for some time on very friendly terms with the Genevese pastors. But what with his jests at the expense of Bible worship, and the fact that he could not formally cut himself off from the Established Church of France without placing himself in its power, the pastors had finally to conceal their agreement with him. (1912).

assessor. Will this too be repudiated, and be succeeded by Man's duty to himself, assessed by himself? And if so, what will be the effect on the conception of Duty in the abstract? Let us see.

I have just called Lassalle a self-worshipper. In doing so I cast no reproach on him; for this is the last step in the evolution of the conception of duty. Duty arises at first, a gloomy tyranny, out of man's helplessness, his self-mistrust, in a word, his abstract fear. He personifies all that he abstractly fears as God, and straightway becomes the slave of his duty to God. He imposes that slavery fiercely on his children, threatening them with hell, and punishing them for their attempts to be happy. When, becoming bolder, he ceases to fear everything, and dares to love something, this duty of his to what he fears evolves into a sense of duty to what he loves. Sometimes he again personifies what he loves as God; and the God of Wrath becomes the God of Love: sometimes he at once becomes a humanitarian, an altruist, acknowledging only his duty to his neighbor. This stage is correlative to the rationalist stage in the evolution of philosophy and the capitalist phase in the evolution of industry. But in it the emancipated slave of God falls under the dominion of Society, which, having just reached a phase in which all the love is ground out of it by the competitive struggle for money, remorselessly crushes him until, in due course of the further

growth of his courage, a sense at last arises in him of his duty to himself. And when this sense is fully grown the tyranny of duty perishes; for now the man's God is his own humanity; and he, self-satisfied at last, ceases to be selfish. The evangelist of this last step must therefore preach the repudiation of duty. This, to the unprepared of his generation, is indeed the wanton masterpiece of paradox. What! after all that has been said by men of noble life as to the secret of all right conduct being only Duty, Duty, Duty, is he to be told now that duty is the primal curse from which we must redeem ourselves before we can advance another step on the road along which, as we imagine (having forgotten the repudiations made by our fathers) duty and duty alone has brought us thus far? But why not? God Almighty was once the most sacred of our conceptions; and he had to be denied. Then Reason became the Infallible Pope, only to be deposed in turn. Is Duty more sacred than God or Reason?

Having now arrived at the prospect of the repudiation of duty by Man, I shall make a digression on the subject of ideals and idealists, as treated by Ibsen. I shall go round in a loop, and come back to the same point by way of the repudiation of duty by Woman; and then at last I shall be in a position to describe Ibsen's plays

without risk of misunderstanding.

IDEALS AND IDEALISTS

WE have seen that as Man grows through the ages, he finds himself bolder by the growth of his courage: that is, of his spirit (for so the common people name it), and dares more and more to love and trust instead of to fear and fight. But his courage has other effects: he also raises himself from mere consciousness to knowledge by daring more and more to face facts and tell himself the truth. For in his infancy of helplessness and terror he could not face the inexorable; and facts being of all things the most inexorable, he masked all the threatening ones as fast as he discovered them; so that now every mask requires a hero to tear it off. The king of terrors, Death, was the Arch-Inexorable: Man could not bear the dread of that. He must persuade himself that Death can be propitiated, circumvented, abolished. How he fixed the mask of personal immortality on the face of Death for this purpose we all know. And he did the like with all disagreeables as long as they remained inevitable. Otherwise he must have gone

mad with terror of the grim shapes around him, headed by the skeleton with the scythe and hourglass. The masks were his ideals, as he called them; and what, he would ask, would life be without ideals? Thus he became an idealist, and remained so until he dared to begin pulling the masks off and looking the spectres in the face—dared, that is, to be more and more a realist. But all men are not equally brave; and the greatest terror prevailed whenever some realist bolder than the rest laid hands on a mask which they did not yet dare to do without.

We have plenty of these masks around us still: some of them more fantastic than any of the Sandwich islanders' masks in the British Museum. In our novels and romances especially we see the most beautiful of all the masks: those devised to disguise the brutalities of the sexual instinct in the earlier stages of its development, and to soften the rigorous aspect of the iron laws by which Society regulates its gratification. When the social organism becomes bent on civilization, it has to force marriage and family life on the individual, because it can perpetuate itself in no other way whilst love is still known only by fitful glimpses, the basis of sexual relationship being in the main mere physical appetite. Under these circumstances men try to graft pleasure on necessity by desperately pretending that the institution forced upon them is a congenial one, making it a point of public decency to

assume always that men spontaneously love their kindred better than their chance acquaintances, and that the woman once desired is always desired: also that the family is woman's proper sphere, and that no really womanly woman ever forms an attachment, or even knows what it means, until she is requested to do so by a man. Now if anyone's childhood has been embittered by the dislike of his mother and the ill-temper of his father; if his wife has ceased to care for him and he is heartily tired of his wife; if his brother is going to law with him over the division of the family property, and his son acting in studied defiance of his plans and wishes, it is hard for him to persuade himself that passion is eternal and that blood is thicker than water. Yet if he tells himself the truth, all his life seems a waste and a failure by the light of it. It comes then to this, that his neighbors must either agree with him that the whole system is a mistake, and discard it for a new one, which cannot possibly happen until social organization so far outgrows the institution that Society can perpetuate itself without it; or else they must keep him in countenance by resolutely making believe that all the illusions with which it has been masked are realities.

For the sake of precision, let us imagine a community of a thousand persons, organized for the perpetuation of the species on the basis of the British family as we know it at present. Seven

hundred of them, we will suppose, find the British family arrangement quite good enough for them. Two hundred and ninety-nine find it a failure, but must put up with it since they are in a minority. The remaining person occupies a position to be explained presently. The 299 failures will not have the courage to face the fact that they are irremediable failures, since they cannot prevent the 700 satisfied ones from coercing them into conformity with the marriage law. They will accordingly try to persuade themselves that, whatever their own particular domestic arrangements may be, the family is a beautiful and holy natural institution. For the fox not only declares that the grapes he cannot get are sour: he also insists that the sloes he can get are sweet. Now observe what has happened. The family as it really is is a conventional arrangement, legally enforced, which the majority, because it happens to suit them, think good enough for the minority, whom it happens not to suit at all. The family as a beautiful and holy natural institution is only a fancy picture of what every family would have to be if everybody was to be suited, invented by the minority as a mask for the reality, which in its nakedness is intolerable to them. We call this sort of fancy picture an Ideal; and the policy of forcing in-dividuals to act on the assumption that all ideals are real, and to recognize and accept such action as standard moral conduct, absolutely valid under

all circumstances, contrary conduct or any advocacy of it being discountenanced and punished as immoral, may therefore be described as the policy of Idealism. Our 299 domestic failures are therefore become idealists as to marriage; and in proclaiming the ideal in fiction, poetry, pulpit and platform oratory, and serious private conversation, they will far outdo the 700 who comfortably accept marriage as a matter of course, never dreaming of calling it an "institution," much less a holy and beautiful one, and being pretty plainly of opinion that Idealism is a crackbrained fuss about nothing. The idealists, hurt by this, will retort by calling them Philistines. We then have our society classified as 700 Philistines and 299 idealists, leaving one man unclassified: the man strong enough to face the truth the idealists are shirking.

Such a man says of marriage, "This thing is a failure for many of us. It is insufferable that two human beings, having entered into relations which only warm affection can render tolerable, should be forced to maintain them after such affections have ceased to exist, or in spite of the fact that they have never arisen. The alleged natural attractions and repulsions upon which the family ideal is based do not exist; and it is historically false that the family was founded for the purpose of satisfying them. Let us provide otherwise for the social ends which the family subserves, and then abolish its compulsory character altogether."

What will be the attitude of the rest to this outspoken man? The Philistines will simply think him mad. But the idealists will be terrified beyond measure at the proclamation of their hidden thought—at the presence of the traitor among the conspirators of silence—at the rending of the beautiful veil they and their poets have woven to hide the unbearable face of the truth. They will crucify him, burn him, violate their own ideals of family affection by taking his children away from him, ostracize him, brand him as immoral, profligate, filthy, and appeal against him to the despised Philistines, specially idealized for the occasion as Society. How far they will proceed against him depends on how far his courage exceeds theirs. At his worst, they call him cynic and paradoxer: at his best they do their utmost to ruin him if not to take his life. Thus, purblindly courageous moralists like Mandeville and Larochefoucauld, who merely state unpleasant facts without denying the validity of current ideals, and who indeed depend on those ideals to make their statements piquant, get off with nothing worse than this name of cynic, the free use of which is a familiar mark of the zealous idealist. But take the case of the man who has already served us as an example: Shelley. The idealists did not call Shelley a cynic: they called him a fiend until they invented a new illusion to enable them to enjoy the beauty of his lyrics, this illusion being nothing

less than the pretence that since he was at bottom an idealist himself, his ideals must be identical with those of Tennyson and Longfellow, neither of whom ever wrote a line in which some highly respectable ideal was not implicit.¹

Here the admission that Shelley, the realist, was an idealist too, seems to spoil the whole argument. And it certainly spoils its verbal consistency. For we unfortunately use this word ideal indifferently to denote both the institution which the ideal masks and the mask itself, thereby producing desperate confusion of thought, since the institution may be an effete and poisonous one, whilst the mask may be, and indeed generally is, an image of what we would fain have in its place. If the existing facts, with their masks on, are to be called ideals, and the future possibilities which the masks depict are also to be called ideals—if, again, the man who is defending existing institutions by maintaining their identity with their masks is to

The following are examples of the two stages of Shelley criticism:

"A beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain." (MATTHEW ARNOLD, in the preface to his selection of

poems by Byron, dated 1881.)

The 1881 opinion is much sillier than the 1821 opinion. Further samples will be found in the articles of Henry Salt, one of the few writers on Shelley who understand his true position as a social pioneer.

[&]quot;We feel as if one of the darkest of the fiends had been clothed with a human body to enable him to gratify his enmity against the human race, and as if the supernatural atrocity of his hate were only heightened by his power to do injury. So strongly has this impression dwelt upon our minds that we absolutely asked a friend, who had seen this individual, to describe him to us—as if a cloven hoof, or horn, or flames from the mouth, must have marked the external appearance of so bitter an enemy of mankind." (Literary Gazette, 19th May 1821.)

be confounded under one name with the man who is striving to realize the future possibilities by tearing the mask and the thing masked asunder, then the position cannot be intelligibly described by mortal pen: you and I, reader, will be at cross purposes at every sentence unless you allow me to distinguish pioneers like Shelley and Ibsen as realists from the idealists of my imaginary community of one thousand. If you ask why I have not allotted the terms the other way, and called Shelley and Ibsen idealists and the conventionalists realists, I reply that Ibsen himself, though he has not formally made the distinction, has so repeatedly harped on conventions and conventionalists as ideals and idealists that if I were now perversely to call them realities and realists, I should confuse readers of The Wild Duck and Rosmersholm more than I should help them. Doubtless I shall be reproached for puzzling people by thus limiting the meaning of the term ideal. But what, I ask, is that inevitable passing perplexity compared to the inextricable tangle I must produce if I follow the custom, and use the word indiscriminately in its two violently incompatible senses? If the term realist is objected to on account of some of its modern associations, I can only recommend you, if you must associate it with something else than my own description of its meaning (I do not deal in definitions), to associate it, not with Zola and Maupassant, but with Plato.

Now let us return to our community of 700 Philistines, 299 idealists, and I realist. The mere verbal ambiguity against which I have just provided is as nothing beside that which comes of any attempt to express the relations of these three sections. simple as they are, in terms of the ordinary systems of reason and duty. The idealist, higher in the ascent of evolution than the Philistine, yet hates the highest and strikes at him with a dread and rancor of which the easygoing Philistine is guiltless. The man who has risen above the danger and the fear that his acquisitiveness will lead him to theft, his temper to murder, and his affections to debauchery: this is he who is denounced as an arch-scoundrel and libertine, and thus confounded with the lowest because he is the highest. And it is not the ignorant and stupid who maintain this error, but the literate and the cultured. When the true prophet speaks. he is proved to be both rascal and idiot, not by those who have never read of how foolishly such learned demonstrations have come off in the past, but by those who have themselves written volumes on the crucifixions, the burnings, the stonings, the headings and hangings, the Siberia transportations, the calumny and ostracism which have been the lot of the pioneer as well as of the camp follower. It is from men of established literary reputation that we learn that William Blake was mad, that Shelley was spoiled by living in a low set, that Robert Owen was a man who did not know the world, that Ruskin

was incapable of comprehending political economy, that Zola was a mere blackguard, and that Ibsen was "a Zola with a wooden leg." The great musician, accepted by the unskilled listener, is vilified by his fellow-musicians: it was the musical culture of Europe that pronounced Wagner the inferior of Mendelssohn and Meyerbeer. The great artist finds his foes among the painters, and not among the men in the street: it was the Royal Academy which placed forgotten nobodies above Burne Jones. It is not rational that it should be so; but it is so, for all that.

The realist at last loses patience with ideals altogether, and sees in them only something to blind us, something to numb us, something to murder self in us, something whereby, instead of resisting death, we can disarm it by committing suicide. The idealist, who has taken refuge with the ideals because he hates himself and is ashamed of himself, thinks that all this is so much the better. The realist, who has come to have a deep respect for himself and faith in the validity of his own will, thinks it so much the worse. To the one, human nature, naturally corrupt, is held back from ruinous excesses only by self-denying conformity to the ideals. To the other these ideals are only swaddling clothes which man has outgrown, and which insufferably impede his movements. No wonder the two cannot agree. The idealist says, "Realism means egotism; and egotism means depravity." The realist declares that when a

man abnegates the will to live and be free in a world of the living and free, seeking only to conform to ideals for the sake of being, not himself, but "a good man," then he is morally dead and rotten, and must be left unheeded to abide his resurrection, if that by good luck arrive before his bodily death. Unfortunately, this is the sort of speech that nobody but a realist understands. It will be more amusing as well as more convincing to take an actual example of an idealist criticising a realist.

¹ The above was written in 1890, ten years before Ibsen, in When We Dead Awaken, fully adopted its metaphor without, as far as I know, having any knowledge of my essay. Such an anticipation is a better proof than any mere argument that I found the right track of Ibsen's thought. (1912).

THE WOMANLY WOMAN

In 1890 the literary sensation of the day was the Diary of Marie Bashkirtseff. An outline of it, with a running commentary, was given in The Review of Reviews (June 1890) by the editor, the late William Stead, who, having gained an immense following by a public service in rendering which he had to simulate a felony and suffer imprisonment for it in order to prove that it was possible, was engaged in a campaign with the object of establishing the ideal of sexual "purity" as a condition of public life. He had certain Ibsenist qualities: faith in himself, wilfulness, conscientious unscrupulousness, and could always make himself heard. Prominent among his ideals was an ideal of womanliness. In support of that ideal he would, like all idealists, make and believe any statement, however obviously and grotesquely unreal. When he found Marie Bashkirtseff's account of herself utterly incompatible with the picture of a woman's mind presented to him by his ideal, he was confronted with the dilemma that either Marie was not a woman or else his ideal was false to

nature. He actually accepted the former alternative "Of the distinctively womanly," he says, "there is in her but little trace. She was the very antithesis of a true woman." William's next difficulty was, that self-control, being a leading quality in his ideal, could not have been possessed by Marie: otherwise she would have been more like his ideal. Nevertheless he had to record that she, without any compulsion from circumstances, made herself a highly skilled artist by working ten hours a day for six years. Let anyone who thinks that this is no evidence of self-control just try it for six months. William's verdict nevertheless was "No self-control." However, his fundamental quarrel with Marie came out in the following lines. "Marie," he said, "was artist musician, wit, philosopher, student, anything you like but a natural woman with a heart to love, and a soul to find its supreme satisfaction in sacrifice for lover or for child." Now of all the idealist abominations that make society pestiferous, I doubt if there be any so mean as that of forcing self-sacrifice on a woman under pretence that she likes it; and, if she ventures to contradict the pretence, declaring her no true woman. In India they carried this piece of idealism to the length of declaring that a wife could not bear to survive her husband, but would be prompted by her own faithful, loving, beautifu nature to offer up her life on the pyre which consumed his dead body. The astonishing thing is that women, sooner than be branded as unsexed wretches

allowed themselves to be stupefied with drink, and in that unwomanly condition burnt alive. British Philistinism put down widow idealizing with the strong hand; and suttee is abolished in India. The English form of it still flourishes; and Stead, the rescuer of the children, was one of its high priests. Imagine his feelings on coming across this entry in a woman's diary: "I love myself." Or this, "I swear solemnly—by the Gospels, by the passion of Christ, by MYSELF—that in four years I will be famous." The young woman was positively proposing to exercise for her own sake all the powers that were given to her, in Stead's opinion, solely that she might sacrifice them for her lover or child! No wonder he was driven to exclaim again, "She was very clever, no doubt; but woman she was not."

Now observe this notable result. Marie Bash-kirtseff, instead of being a less agreeable person than the ordinary female conformer to the ideal of womanliness, was most conspicuously the reverse. Stead himself wrote as one infatuated with her mere diary, and pleased himself by representing her as a person who fascinated everybody, and was a source of delight to all about her by the mere exhilaration and hope-giving atmosphere of her wilfulness. The truth is, that in real life a self-sacrificing

¹ It was to force the Government to take steps to suppress child prostitution that Stead resorted to the desperate expedient already alluded to. He succeeded.

woman, or, as Stead would have put it, a womanly woman, is not only taken advantage of, but disliked as well for her pains. No man pretends that his soul finds its supreme satisfaction in self-sacrifice such an affectation would stamp him as coward and weakling: the manly man is he who takes the Bashkirtseff view of himself. But men are not the less loved on this account. No one ever feels help less by the side of the self-helper; whilst the self-sacrificer is always a drag, a responsibility, a reproach an everlasting and unnatural trouble with whom no really strong soul can live. Only those who have helped themselves know how to help others, and to respect their right to help themselves.

Although romantic idealists generally insist or self-surrender as an indispensable element in true womanly love, its repulsive effect is well known and feared in practice by both sexes. The extrement instance is the reckless self-abandonment seen in the infatuation of passionate sexual desire. Every one who becomes the object of that infatuation shrinks from it instinctively. Love loses its charm

¹ Shortly after the publication of this passage, a German lady told me the she knew "where I had got it from," evidently not meaning from Ibsen. She added "You have been reading Nietzsehe's Through Good and Evil and Out a the Other Side." That was the first I ever heard of Nietzsehe. I mention the fact, not with the ridiculous object of vindicating my "originality" in nineteent century fashion, but because I attach great importance to the evidence the the movement voiced by Schopenhauer, Wagner, Ibsen, Nietzsehe, and Strine berg, was a world movement, and would have found expression if every on of these writers had perished in his cradle. I have dealt with this question is the preface to my play Major Barbara. The movement is alive today in the philosophy of Bergson and the plays of Gorki, Tchekoff, and the post-Ibse English drama. (1912.)

when it is not free; and whether the compulsion; is that of custom and law, or of infatuation, the effect is the same: it becomes valueless and even abhorrent, like the caresses of a maniac. The desire to give inspires no affection unless there is also the power to withhold; and the successful wooer, in both sexes alike, is the one who can stand out for honorable conditions, and, failing them, go without. Such conditions are evidently not offered to either sex by the legal marriage of to-day; for it is the intense repugnance inspired by the compulsory character of the legalized conjugal relation that leads, first to the idealization of marriage whilst it remains indispensable as a means of perpetuating society; then to its modification by divorce and by the abolition of penalties for refusal to comply with judicial orders for restitution of conjugal rights; and finally to its disuse and disappearance as the responsibility for the maintenance and education of the rising generation is shifted from the parent to the community.1

A dissertation on the anomalies and impossibilities of the marriage law at its present stage would be too far out of the main course of my argument to be introduced in the text above; but it may be well to point out in passing to those who regard marriage as an inviolable and inviolate institution, that necessity has already forced us to tamper with it to such an extent that at this moment (1891) the highest court in the kingdom is face to face with a husband and wife, the one demanding whether a woman may saddle him with all the responsibilities of a husband and then refuse to live with him, and the other asking whether the law allows her husband to commit abduction, imprisonment, and rape upon her. If the court says Yes to the husband, indissoluble marriage is made intolerable for men; if it says Yes to the wife, the position is made intolerable for women; and as this exhausts the possible alternatives, it is clear that provision must be made for the dissolution of such

Although the growing repugnance to face the Church of England marriage service has led many celebrants to omit those passages which frankly explain the object of the institution, we are not likely to dispense with legal ties and obligations, and trust wholly to the permanence of love, until the continuity of society no longer depends on the private nursery. Love, as a practical factor in society, is still a mere appetite. That higher development of it which Ibsen shews us occurring in the case of Rebecca West in Rosmersholm is only known to most of us by the descriptions of great poets, who themselves, as their biographies prove, have known it, not by sustained experience, but only by brief glimpses. Dante loved Beatrice with the higher love; but neither during her life nor after her death was he "faithful" to her or to the woman he actually married. And he would be a bold bourgeois who would pretend to a higher mind than Dante. Tannhäuser may die in the conviction that one moment of the emotion he felt with St. Elizabeth was fuller and happier than all the hours of passion he spent with Venus; but that does not alter the fact that love began for him

marriages if the institution is to be maintained at all, which it must be until its social function is otherwise provided for. Marriage is thus, by force of circumstances, compelled to buy extension of life by extension of divorce, much as if a fugitive should try to delay a pursuing wolf by throwing portions of his own heart to it. [The court decided against the man; but England still lags behind the rest of Protestant Europe in the necessary readjustment of the law of divorce. See the preface to my play Getting Married, which supplies the dissertation crowded out of the foregoing note. (1912).]

with Venus, and that its earlier tentatives towards the final goal were attended with relapses. Now Tannhäuser's passion for Venus is a development of the humdrum fondness of the bourgeois Jack for his Jill, a development at once higher and more dangerous, just as idealism is at once higher and more dangerous than Philistinism. The fondness is the germ of the passion: the passion is the germ of the more perfect love. When Blake told men that through excess they would learn moderation, he knew that the way for the present lay through the Venusberg, and that the race would assuredly not perish there as some individuals have, and as the Puritan fears we all shall unless we find a way round. Also he no doubt foresaw the time when our children would be born on the other side of it. and so be spared that fiery purgation.

But the very facts that Blake is still commonly regarded as a crazy visionary, and that the current criticism of Rosmersholm entirely fails even to notice the evolution of Rebecca's passion for Rosmer into her love for him, much more to credit the moral transfiguration which accompanies it, shew how absurd it would be to pretend, for the sake of edification, that the ordinary marriage of today is a union between a William Blake and a Rebecca West, or that it would be possible, even if it were enlightened policy, to deny the satisfaction of the sexual appetite to persons who have not reached that stage. An overwhelming majority

of such marriages as are not purely de convenance, are entered into for the gratification of that appetite either in its crudest form or veiled only by those idealistic illusions which the youthful imagination weaves so wonderfully under the stimulus of desire, and which older people in-

dulgently laugh at.

This being so, it is not surprising that our society, being directly dominated by men, comes to regard Woman, not as an end in herself like Man, but solely as a means of ministering to his appetite. The ideal wife is one who does everything that the ideal husband likes, and nothing else. Now to treat a person as a means instead of an end is to deny that person's right to live. And to be treated as a means to such an end as sexual intercourse with those who deny one's right to live is insufferable to any human being. Woman, if she dares face the fact that she is being so treated, must either loathe herself or else rebel. As a rule, when circumstances enable her to rebel successfully -for instance, when the accident of genius enables her to "lose her character" without losing her employment or cutting herself off from the society she values—she does rebel; but circumstances seldom do. Does she then loathe herself? By no means: she deceives herself in the idealist fashion by denying that the love which her suitor offers her is tainted with sexual appetite at all. It is, she declares, a beautiful, disinterested, pure, sublime

devotion to another by which a man's life is exalted and purified, and a woman's rendered blest. And of all the cynics, the filthiest to her mind is the one who sees, in the man making honorable proposals to his future wife, nothing but the human male seeking his female. The man himself keeps her confirmed in her illusion; for the truth is unbearable to him too: he wants to form an affectionate tie, and not to drive a degrading bargain. After all, the germ of the highest love is in them both; though as yet it is no more than the appetite they are disguising so carefully from themselves. Consequently every stockbroker who has just brought his business up to marrying point woos in terms of the romantic illusion; and it is agreed between the two that their marriage shall realize the romantic ideal. Then comes the breakdown of the plan. The young wife finds that her husband is neglecting her for his business; that his interests, his activities, his whole life except that one part of it to which only a cynic ever referred before her marriage, lies away from home; and that her business is to sit there and mope until she is wanted. Then what can she do? If she complains, he, the self-helper, can do without her; whilst she is dependent on him for her position, her livelihood, her place in society, her home, her name, her very bread.1 All this is brought home to her by the

¹ I should have warned my male readers to be very careful how they presume on this position. In actual practice marriage reduces the man to a

first burst of displeasure her complaints provoke. Fortunately, things do not remain for ever at this point: perhaps the most wretched in a woman's life. The self-respect she has lost as a wife she regains as a mother, in which capacity her use and importance to the community compare favorably with those of most men of business. She is wanted in the house, wanted in the market, wanted by the children; and now, instead of weeping because her husband is away in the city, thinking of stocks and shares instead of his ideal woman, she would regard his presence in the house all day as an intolerable nuisance. And so, though she is completely disillusioned on the subject of ideal love, yet, since it has not turned out so badly after all, she countenances the illusion still from the point of view that it is a useful and harmless means of getting boys and girls to marry and settle down. And this conviction is the stronger in her because she feels that if she had known as much about marriage the day before her wedding as she did six months after, it would have been extremely hard to induce her to get married at all.

This prosaic solution is satisfactory only within certain limits. It depends altogether upon the accident of the woman having some natural vocation

greater dependence on the woman than is good for either party. But the woman can tyrannize only by misconduct or threats of misconduct, whilst the man can tyrannize legally, though it must be added that a good deal of the makeshift law that has been set up to restrain this tyranny is very unfair to the man. The writings of Belfort Bax are instructive on this point. (1912.)

for domestic management and the care of children, as well as on the husband being fairly good-natured and livable-with. Hence arises the idealist illusion that a vocation for domestic management and the care of children is natural to women, and that women who lack them are not women at all, but members of the third, or Bashkirtseff sex. Even if this were true, it is obvious that if the Bashkirtseffs are to be allowed to live, they have a right to suitable institutions just as much as men and women. But it is not true. The domestic career is no more natural to all women than the military career is natural to all men; and although in a population emergency it might become necessary for everyablebodied woman to risk her life in childbed just as it might become necessary in a military emergency for every man to risk his life in the battlefield, yet even then it would by no means follow that the childbearing would endow the mother with domestic aptitudes and capacities as it would endow her with milk. It is of course quite true that the majority of women are kind to children and prefer their own to other people's. But exactly the same thing is true of the majority of men, who nevertheless do not consider that their proper sphere is the The case may be illustrated grotesquely by the fact that the majority of women who have dogs, are kind to them, and prefer their own dogs to other people's; yet it is not proposed that women should restrict their activities to the

rearing of puppies. If we have come to think that the nursery and the kitchen are the natural sphere of a woman, we have done so exactly as English children come to think that a cage is the natural sphere of a parrot: because they have never seen one anywhere else. No doubt there are Philistine parrots who agree with their owners that it is better to be in a cage than out, so long as there is plenty of hempseed and Indian corn there. There may even be idealist parrots who persuade themselves that the mission of a parrot is to minister to the happiness of a private family by whistling and saying Pretty Polly, and that it is in the sacrifice of its liberty to this altruistic pursuit that a true parrot finds the supreme satisfaction of its soul. I will not go so far as to affirm that there are theological parrots who are convinced that imprisonment is the will of God because it is unpleasant; but I am confident that there are rationalist parrots who can demonstrate that it would be a cruel kindness to let a parrot out to fall a prey to cats, or at least to forget its accomplishments and coarsen its naturally delicate fibres in an unprotected struggle for existence. Still, the only parrot a free-souled person can sympathize with is the one that insists on being let out as the first condition of making itself agreeable. A selfish bird, you may say: one that puts its own gratification before that of the family which is so fond of it—before even the greatest happiness of the greatest number: one

that, in aping the independent spirit of a man, has unparroted itself and become a creature that has neither the home-loving nature of a bird nor the strength and enterprise of a mastiff. All the same, you respect that parrot in spite of your conclusive reasoning; and if it persists, you will have either to let it out or kill it.

The sum of the matter is that unless Woman repudiates her womanliness, her duty to her husband, to her children, to society, to the law, and to everyone but herself, she cannot emancipate herself. But her duty to herself is no duty at all, since a debt is cancelled when the debtor and creditor are the same person. Its payment is simply a fulfilment of the individual will, upon which all duty is a restriction, founded on the conception of the will as naturally malign and devilish. Therefore Woman has to repudiate duty altogether. In that repudiation lies her freedom; for it is false to say that Woman is now directly the slave of Man: she is the immediate slave of duty; and as man's path to freedom is strewn with the wreckage of the duties and ideals he has trampled on, so must hers be. She may indeed mask her iconoclasm by proving in rationalist fashion, as Man has often done for the sake of a quiet life, that all these discarded idealist conceptions will be fortified instead of shattered by her emancipation. To a person with a turn for logic, such proofs are as easy as playing the piano is to Paderewski. But

it will not be true. A whole basketful of ideals of the most sacred quality will be smashed by the achievement of equality for women and men. Those who shrink from such a clatter and breakage may comfort themselves with the reflection that the replacement of the broken goods will be prompt and certain. It is always a case of "The ideal is dead: long live the ideal!" And the advantage of the work of destruction is that every new ideal is less of an illusion than the one it has supplanted; so that the destroyer of ideals, though denounced as an enemy of society, is in fact sweeping the world clear of lies.

My digression is now over. Having traversed my loop as I promised, and come back to Man's repudiation of duty by way of Woman's, I may at last proceed to give some more particular account of Ibsen's work without further preoccupation with Clement Scott's protest, or the many others of which it is the type. For we now see that the pioneer must necessarily provoke such outcry as he repudiates duties, tramples on ideals, profanes what was sacred, sanctifies what was infamous, always driving his plough through gardens of pretty weeds in spite of the laws made against trespassers for the protection of the worms which feed on the roots, always letting in light and air to hasten the putrefaction of decaying matter, and everywhere proclaiming that "the old beauty is no

The Womanly Woman 43 longer beautiful, the new truth no longer true. He can do no less; and what more and what else he does it is not given to all of his generation to understand. And if any man does not understand, and cannot foresee the harvest, what can he do but cry out in all sincerity against such destruction, until at last we come to know the cry of the blind like any other street cry, and to bear with it as an honest cry, albeit a false alarm?

THE PLAYS

Brand

1866

We are now prepared to learn without misgiving that(a typical Ibsen play is one in which the leading lady is an unwomanly woman, and the villain an idealist, It follows that the leading lady is not a heroine of the Drury Lane type; nor does the villain forge or assassinate, since he is a villain by virtue of his determination to do nothing wrong. Therefore readers of Ibsen-not playgoers have sometimes so far misconceived him as to suppose that his villains are examples rather than warnings, and that the mischief and ruin which attend their actions are but the tribulations from which the soul comes out purified as gold from the furnace. In fact, the beginning of Ibsen's European reputation was the edification with which the pious received his great dramatic poem Brand. Brand is not his first play: indeed it is his seventh; and

of its six forerunners all are notable and some splendid; but it is in Brand that he definitely, if not yet quite consciously, takes the field against idealism and, like another Luther, nails his thesis to the door of the Temple of Morality. With Brand therefore we must begin, lest we should be swept into an eddy of mere literary criticism, a matter altogether beside the purpose of this book, which is to distil the quintessence of Ibsen's message

to his age.

/Brand the priest is an idealist of heroic earnestness, strength, and courage. Conventional, comfortable, sentimental churchgoing withers into selfish snobbery and cowardly weakness before his terrible word? "Your God," he cries, "is an old man: mine is young"; and all Europe, hearing him, suddenly realizes that it has so far forgotten God as to worship an image of an elderly gentleman with a well-trimmed beard, an imposing forehead, and the expression of a headmaster. Brand, turning from such idolatrous follies with fierce scorn, declares himself the champion, not of things as they are, nor of things as they can be made, but of things as they ought to be. Things as they ought to be mean for him things as ordered by men conformed to his ideal of the perfect Adam, who, again, is not man as he is or can be, but man conformed to all the ideals: man as it is his duty to be. In insisting on this conformity, Brand spares neither himself nor anyone else. Life is nothing:

self is nothing: the perfect Adam is everything The imperfect Adam does not fall in with these views. A peasant whom he urges to cross a glacier in a fog because it is his duty to visit his dying daughter, not only flatly declines, but endeavors forcibly to prevent Brand from risking his own life. Brand knocks him down, and sermonizes him with fierce earnestness and scorn. Presently Brand has to cross a fiord in a storm to reach a dying man who, having committed a series of murders, wants "consolation" from a priest. Brand cannot go alone: someone must hold the rudder of his boat whilst he manages the sail. The fisher folk. in whom the old Adam is strong, do not adopt his estimate of the gravity of the situation, and refuse to go. A woman, fascinated by his heroism and idealism, goes. That ends in their marriage, and in the birth of a child to which they become deeply attached. Then Brand, aspiring from height to height of devotion to his ideal, plunges from depth to depth of murderous cruelty. First the child must die from the severity of the climate because Branc must not flinch from the post of duty and leave his congregation exposed to the peril of getting ar inferior preacher in his place. Then he forces his wife to give the clothes of the dead child to gipsy whose baby needs them. The bereaved mother does not grudge the gift; but she want to hold back only one little garment as a relic o her darling. But Brand sees in this reservation the

imperfection of the imperfect Eve. He forces her to regard the situation as a choice between the relic and his ideal. She sacrifices the relic to the ideal, and then dies, broken-hearted. Having killed her, and thereby placed himself beyond ever daring to doubt the idealism upon whose altar he has immolated her; having also refused to go to his. mother's death-bed because she compromises with his principles in disposing of her property, he is hailed by the people as a saint, and finds his newly built church too small for his congregation. So he calls upon them to follow him to worship God in His own temple, the mountains. After a brief practical experience of this arrangement, they change their minds, and stone him. The very mountains themselves stone him, indeed; for he is killed by an avalanche. 7

Peer Gynt

1867

Brand dies a saint, having caused more intense suffering by his saintliness than the most talented sinner could possibly have done with twice his opportunities. Ibsen does not leave this to be inferred. In another dramatic poem he gives us a rapscallion named Peer Gynt, an idealist who avoids Brand's errors by setting up as his ideal the realization of himself through the utter satisfaction of his own will. In this he would seem to be on

the path to which Ibsen himself points; and indeed all who know the two plays will agree that whether or no it was better to be Peer Gynt than Brand, it was beyond all question better to be the mother or the sweetheart of Peer, scapegrace and liar as he was, than mother or wife to the saintly Brand. Brand would force his ideal on all men and women. Peer Gynt keeps his ideal for himself alone: it is indeed implicit in the ideal itself that it should be unique—that he alone should have the force to realize it. For Peer's first boyish notion of the self-realized man is not the saint, but the demigod whose indomitable will is stronger than destiny, the fighter, the master, the man whom no woman can resist, the mighty hunter, the knight of a thousand adventures, the model, in short, of the lover in a lady's novel, or the hero in a boy's romance. Now, no such person exists, or ever did exist, or ever can exist. The man who cultivates an indomitable will and refuses to make way for anything or anybody, soon finds that he cannot hold a street crossing against a tram car, much less a world against the whole human race. Only by plunging into illusions to which every fact gives the lie can he persuade himself that his will is a force that can overcome all other forces, or that it is less conditioned by circumstances than a wheel-barrow is. However, Peer Gynt, being imaginative enough to conceive his ideal, is also imaginative enough to find illusions to hide its unreality, and

to persuade himself that Peer Gynt, the shabby countryside loafer, is Peer Gynt, Emperor of Himself, as he writes over the door of his hut in the mountains. His hunting feats are invented; his military genius has no solider foundation than a street fight with a smith; and his reputation as an adventurous daredevil he has to gain by the bravado of carrying off the bride from a wedding at which the guests snub him. Only in the mountains can he enjoy his illusions undisturbed by ridicule; yet even in the mountains he finds ' obstacles he cannot force his way through, obstacles which withstand him as spirits with voices, telling him that he must go round. But he will not: he will go forward: he will cut his path sword in hand, in spite of fate. All the same, he has to go round; for the world-will is outside Peer Gynt as well as inside him.

Then he tries the supernatural, only to find that it means nothing more than the transmogrifying of squalid realities by lies and pretences. Still, like our amateurs of thaumaturgy, he is willing to enter into a conspiracy of make-believe up to a certain point. When the Trold king's daughter appears as a repulsive ragged creature riding on a pig, he is ready to accept her as a beautiful princess on a noble steed, on condition that she accepts his mother's tumble-down farmhouse, with the broken window panes stopped up with old clouts, as a splendid castle. He will go

with her among the Trolds, and pretend that the gruesome ravine in which they hold their orgies is a glorious palace; he will partake of their filthy food and declare it nectar and ambrosia; he will applaud their obscene antics as exquisite dancing. and their discordant din as divine music; but when they finally propose to slit his eyes so that he may see and hear these things, not as they are, but as he has been pretending to see and hear them, he draws back, resolved to be himself even in selfdeception. He leaves the mountains and becomes a prosperous man of business in America, highly respectable and ready for any profitable speculation: slave trade, Bible trade, whisky trade, missionary trade, anything! His commercial success in this phase persuades him that he is under the special care of God; but he is shaken in his opinion by an adventure in which he is marooned on the African coast, and does not recover his faith until the treacherous friends who marooned him are destroyed before his eyes by the blowing-up of the steam yacht they have just stolen from him, when he utters his celebrated exclamation, "Ah, God is a Father to me after all; but economical he certainly is not." He finds a white horse in the desert, and is accepted on its account as the Messiah by an Arab tribe, a success which moves him to declare that now at last he is really worshipped for himself, whereas in America people only respected his breast-pin, the symbol of his money. In commerce, too, he reflects, his eminence was a mere matter of chance, whilst as a prophet he is eminent by pure natural fitness for the post. This is ended by his falling in love with a dancing-girl, who, after leading him into every sort of undignified and ludicrous extravagance, ranging from his hailing her as the Eternal-Feminine of Goethe to the more practical folly of giving her his white horse and all his prophetic finery, runs away with the spoil, and leaves him once more helpless and alone in the desert. He wanders until he comes to the Great Sphinx, beside which he finds a German gentleman in great perplexity as to who the Sphinx is. Peer Gynt, seeing in that impassive, immovable, majestic figure, a symbol of his own ideal, is able to tell the German gentleman at once that the Sphinx is itself. This explanation dazzles the German, who, after some further discussion of the philosophy of self-realization, invites Peer Gynt to accompany him to a club of learned men in Cairo, who are ripe for enlightenment on this very question. Peer, delighted, accompanies the German to the club, which turns out to be a madhouse in which the lunatics have broken loose and locked up their keepers. It is in this madhouse, and by these madmen, that Peer Gynt is at last crowned Emperor of Himself. He receives their homage as he lies in the dust fainting with terror.

As an old man, Peer Gynt, returning to thescenes of his early adventures, is troubled with the prospect

of meeting a certain button moulder who threatens to make short work of his realized self by melting it down in his crucible with a heap of other buttonmaterial. Immediately the old exaltation of the self realizer is changed into an unspeakable dread of the button moulder Death, to avoid whom Peer Gynt has already pushed a drowning man from the spar he is clinging to in a shipwreck lest it should not suffice to support two. At last he finds a deserted sweetheart of his youth still waiting for him and still believing in him. In the imagination of this old woman he finds the ideal Peer Gynt; whilst in himself, the loafer, the braggart, the confederate of sham magicians, the Charleston speculator, the false prophet, the dancing-girl's dupe, the bedlam emperor, the thruster of the drowning man into the waves, there is nothing heroic: nothing but commonplace self-seeking and shirking, cowardice and sensuality, veiled only by the romantic fancies of the born liar. With this crowningly unreal realization he is left to face the button moulder as best he can.1

¹ Miss Pagan, who has produced scenes from Peer Gynt in Edinburgh and London (which, to its shame, has not yet seen a complete public performance of Peer Gynt), regards the death of Peer as occurring in the scene where all the wasted possibilities of his life drift about him as withered leaves and fluffs of bog-cotton. He picks up an onion, and, playing with the idea that it is himself, and that its skins are the phases of his own career wrapped round the kernel of his real self, strips them off one after another only to discover that there is no kernel. "Nature is ironical," says Peer bitterly; and that discovery of his own nothingness is taken by Miss Pagan as his death, the subsequent adventures being those of his soul. It is impossible to demur to so poetic an interpretation; though it assumes, in spite of the onion.

Peer Gynt has puzzled a good many people by Ibsen's fantastic and subtle treatment of its metaphysical thesis. It is so far a difficult play, that the ideal of unconditional self-realization, however familiar its suggestions may be to the ambitious reader, is not understood by him. When it is stated to him by some one who does understand it, he unhesitatingly dismisses it as idiotic; and because he is perfectly right in doing so—because it is idiotic in the most accurate sense of the term—he does not easily recognize it as the common ideal of his own prototype, the pushing, competitive, success-craving man who is the hero of the modern world.

There is nothing novel in Ibsen's dramatic method of reducing these ideals to absurdity. Exactly as Cervantes took the old ideal of chivalry, and shewed what came of a man attempting to act as if it were real, so Ibsen takes the ideals of Brand and Peer Gynt, and subjects them to the same test. Don Quixote acts as if he were a perfect knight in a world of giants and distressed damsels instead of a country gentleman in a land of innkeepers and farm wenches; Brand acts as if he were the perfect Adam in a world where, by resolute rejection of all compromise with imperfection, it was immediately possible to change the rainbow "bridge between

that Peer had not wholly destroyed his soul. Still, as the button moulder (who might be Brand's ghost) does respite Peer "until the next cross roads," it cannot be said that Ibsen leaves Peer definitely scrapped. (1912).

flesh and spirit" into as enduring a structure as the tower of Babel was intended to be, thereby restoring man to the condition in which he walked with God in the garden; and Peer Gynt tries to act as if he had in him a special force that could be concentrated so as to prevail over all other forces. They ignore the real-ignore what they are and where they are, not only, like Nelson, shutting their eyes to the signals a brave man may disregard, but insanely steering straight on rocks no man's resolution can move or resist. Observe that neither Cervantes nor Ibsen is incredulous, in the Philistine way, as to the power of ideals over men. Don Quixote, Brand, and Peer Gynt are, all three, men of action seeking to realize their ideals in deeds. However ridiculous Don Quixote makes himself, you cannot dislike or despise him, much less think that it would have been better for him to have been a Philistine like Sancho; and Peer Gynt, selfish rascal as he is, is not unlovable. Brand, made terrible by the consequences of his idealism to others, is heroic. Their castles in the air are more beautiful than castles of brick and mortar; but one cannot live in them; and they seduce men into pretending that every hovel is such a castle, just as Peer Gynt pretended that the Trold king's den was a palace.

Emperor and Galilean

1873

When Ibsen, by merely giving the rein to the creative impulse of his poetic nature, had produced Brand and Peer Gynt, he was nearly forty. His will, in setting his imagination to work, had produced a tough puzzle for his intellect. In no case does the difference between the will and the intellect come out more clearly than in that of the poet, save only that of the lover. Had Ibsen died in 1867, he, like many another great poet, would have gone to his grave without having ever rationally understood his own meaning. Nay, if in that year an intellectual expert—a commentator, as we call him-having read Brand, had put forward the explanation which Ibsen himself must have arrived at before he constructed Ghosts and The Wild Duck, he would perhaps have repudiated it with as much disgust as a maiden would feel if anyone were prosaic enough to give her the physiological explanation of her dreams of meeting a fairy prince. Only simpletons go to the creative artist presuming that he must be able to answer their "What does this obscure passage mean?" That is the very question the poet's own intellect, which had no part in the conception of the poem, may be asking him. And this curiosity of the intellect, this restless life in it which differentiates it from

dead machinery, and troubles our lesser artists but little, is one of the marks of the greater sort. Shakespear, in Hamlet, made a drama of the selfquestioning that came upon him when his intellect rose up in alarm, as well it might, against the vulgar optimism of his Henry V., and yet could mend it to no better purpose than by the equally vulgar pessimism of Troilus and Cressida. Dante took pains to understand himself: so did Goethe. Richard Wagner, one of the greatest poets of our own day, has left us as many volumes of criticism of art and life as he has left musical scores; and he has expressly described how the keen intellectual activity he brought to the analysis of his music dramas was in abeyance during their creation. Just so do we find Ibsen, after composing his two great dramatic poems, entering on a struggle to become intellectually conscious of what he had done.

We have seen that with Shakespear such an effort became itself creative and produced a drama of questioning. With Ibsen the same thing occurred: he harked back to an abandoned project of his, and wrote two huge dramas on the subject of the apostasy of the Emperor Julian. In this work we find him at first preoccupied with a piece of old-fashioned freethinking: the dilemma that moral responsibility presupposes free-will, and that free-will sets man above God. Cain, who slew because he willed, willed because he must, and must have

willed to slay because he was himself, comes upon the stage to claim that murder is fertile, and death the ground of life, though, not having read Weismann on death as a method of evolution, he cannot say what is the ground of death. Judas asks whether, when the Master chose him, he chose foreknowingly. This part of the drama has no very deep significance. It is easy to invent conundrums which dogmatic evangelicalism cannot answer; and no doubt, whilst it was still a nine days' wonder that evangelicalism could not solve all enigmas, such invention seemed something much deeper than the mere intellectual chess-play which it is seen to be now that the nine days are past. In his occasional weakness for such conundrums, and later on in his harping on the hereditary transmission of disease, we see Ibsen's active intellect busy, not only with the problems peculiar to his own plays, but with the fatalism and pessimism of the middle of the nineteenth century, when the typical advanced culture was attainable by reading Strauss's Leben Jesu, the popularizations of Helmholtz and Darwin by Tyndall and Huxley, and George Eliot's novels, vainly protested against by Ruskin as peopled with "the sweepings of a Pentonville omnibus." The traces of this period in Ibsen's writings shew how well he knew the crushing weight with which the sordid cares of the ordinary struggle for money and respectability fell on the world when the romance of the creeds was discredited, and progress seemed

for the moment to mean, not the growth of the spirit of man, but an effect of the survival of the fittest brought about by the destruction of the unfit, all the most frightful examples of this systematic destruction being thrust into the utmost prominence by those who were fighting the Church with Mill's favorite dialectical weapon, the incompatibility of divine omnipotence with divine benevolence. His plays are full of an overwhelming sense of the necessity for rousing ourselves into self-assertion against this numbing fatalism; and yet he certainly had not at this time freed his intellect from an acceptance of its scientific validity as our Samuel Butler did, though Butler was more like Ibsen than any man in Europe, having the same grim hoaxing humor, the same grip of spiritual realities behind material facts, the same toughness of character holding him unshaken against the world.

Butler revelled in Darwinism for six weeks, and then, grasping the whole scope and the whole horror of it, warned us (we did not listen until we had revelled for half a century) that Darwin had "banished mind from the universe," meaning from Evolution. Ibsen, belonging to an earlier generation, and intellectually nursed on northern romance and mysticism rather than on the merely industrious and prosaic science of the interval between the discovery of Evolution at the end of the eighteenth century and the discovery and overrating of Natural Selection as a method of evolution in the middle

of the nineteenth, was, when Darwin arrived, past the age at which Natural Selection could have swept him away as it swept Butler and his contemporaries. But, like them, he seems to have welcomed it for the mortal blow it dealt to the current travesties of Christianity, which were really only reductions of the relations between man and God to the basis of the prevalent Commercialism, shewing how God may be cheated, and how salvation can be got for nothing through the blood of Christ by sweaters, adulterators, quacks, sharks, and hypocrites; also how God, though the most dangerously capricious and short-tempered of Anarchists, is also the most sentimental of dupes. It is against this conception of God as a sentimental dupe that Brand rages. Ibsen evidently regarded the brimstone conception, "the Almighty Fiend" of Shelley, as not worth his powder and shot, partly, no doubt, because he knew that the Almighty Fiend's votaries would never read or understand his works, and partly because the class he addressed, the cultured class, had thrown off that superstition, and were busy with the sentimental religion of love in which we are still wallowing, and which only substitutes twaddle for terror.

At first sight this may seem an improvement; but it is no defence against that fear of man which is so much more mischievous than the fear of God. The cruelty of Natural Selection was a powerful antidote to such sentimentalism; and Ibsen, who

was perhaps no expert in recent theories of evolution, was quite ready to rub it in uncritically for the sake of its value as a tonic. Indeed, as a fearless observer of the cruelty of Nature, he was quite independent of Darwin: what we find in his works is an unmistakable Darwinian atmosphere, but not the actual Darwinian discoveries and technical theory. If Natural Selection, the gloomiest and most formidable of the castles of Giant Despair, had stopped him, he would no doubt, like Butler, have set himself deliberately to play Greatheart and reduce it; but his genius pushed him past it and left it to be demolished philosophically by Butler, and practically by the mere march of the working class. which, by its freedom from the economic bias of the middle classes, has escaped their characteristic illusions, and solved many of the enigmas they found insoluble because they did not wish to have them solved. For instance, according to the theory of Natural Selection, progress can take place only through an increase in the severity of the material conditions of existence; and as the working classes were quite determined that progress should consist of just the opposite, they had no difficulty in seeing that it generally does occur in that way, whereas the middle class wished, on the contrary, to be convinced that the poverty of the working classes and all the hideous evils attending it were inevitable conditions of progress, and that every penny in the pound on the rates spent in social amelioration, and

every attempt on the part of the workers to raise their wages by Trade Unionism or otherwise, were vain defiances of biologic and economic science.

How far Ibsen was definitely conscious of all this is doubtful; but one of his most famous utterances pointed to the working class and the . women as the great emancipators. His prophetic belief in the spontaneous growth of the will made him a meliorist without reference to the operation of Natural Selection; but his impression of the light thrown by physical and biological science on the facts of life seems to have been the gloomy one of the middle of the nineteenth century. External nature often plays her most ruthless and destructive part in his works, which have an extraordinary fascination for the pessimists of that period, in spite of the incompatibility of his individualism with that mechanical utilitarian ethic of theirs which treats Man as the sport of every circumstance, and ignores his will altogether.

Another inessential but very prominent feature in Ibsen's dramas will be understood easily by anyone who has observed how a change of religious faith intensifies our concern about our own salvation. An ideal, pious or secular, is practically used as a standard of conduct; and whilst it remains unquestioned, the simple rule of right is to conform to it. In the theological stage, when the Bible is accepted as the revelation of God's will, the pious man, when in doubt as to whether he is acting

rightly or wrongly, quiets his misgivings by searching the Scripture until he finds a text which endorses his action.1 The rationalist, for whom the Bible has no authority, brings his conduct to such tests as asking himself, after Kant, how it would be if everyone did as he proposes to do; or by calculating the effect of his action on the greatest happiness of the greatest number; or by judging whether the liberty of action he is claiming infringes the equal liberty of others, &c. &c. Most men are ingenious enough to pass examinations of this kind successfully in respect to everything they really want to do. But in periods of transition, as, for instance, when faith in the infallibility of the Bible is shattered, and faith in that of reason not yet perfected, men's uncertainty as to the rightness and wrongness of their actions keeps them in a continual perplexity, amid which casuistry seems the most important branch of in-tellectual activity. Life, as depicted by Ibsen, is very full of it. We find the great double drama of Emperor and Galilean occupied at first with Julian's case regarded as a case of conscience. It is compared, in the manner already described, with the cases of Cain and Judas, the three men being introduced as "corner stones under the wrath of necessity," "great freedmen under necessity," and so forth. The qualms of Julian are theatrically

As such misgivings seldom arise except when the conscience revolts against the contemplated action, an appeal to Scripture to justify a point of conduct is generally found in practice to be an attempt to excuse a crime.

effective in producing the most exciting suspense as to whether he will dare to choose between Christ and the imperial purple; but the mere exhibition of a man struggling between his ambition and his creed belongs to a phase of intellectual interest which Ibsen had passed even before the production of Brand, when he wrote his Kongs Emnerne (The Pretenders). Emperor and Galilean might have been appropriately, if prosaically, named The Mistake of Maximus the Mystic. It is Maximus who forces the choice on Julian, not as between ambition and principle; between Paganism and Christianity; between "the old beauty that is no longer beautiful and the new truth that is no longer true," but between Christ and Julian himself. Maximus knows that there is no going back to "the first empire" of pagan sensualism. "The second empire," Christian or self-abnegatory idealism, is already rotten at heart. "The third empire" is what he looks for: the empire of Man asserting the eternal validity of his own will. He who can see that not on Olympus, not nailed to the cross, but in himself is God: he is the man to build Brand's bridge between the flesh and the spirit, establishing this third empire in which the spirit shall not be unknown, nor the flesh starved, nor the will tortured and baffled. Thus throughout the first part of the double drama we have Julian prompted step by step to the stupendous conviction that he no less than the Galilean is God. His final

resolution to seize the throne is expressed in his interruption of the Lord's prayer, which he hears intoned by worshippers in church as he wrestles in the gloom of the catacombs with his own fears and the entreaties and threats of his soldiers urging him to take the final decisive step. At the cue "Lead us not into temptation; but deliver us from evil" he rushes to the church with his soldiers, exclaiming "For mine is the kingdom." Yet he halts on the threshold, dazzled by the light, as his follower Sallust points the declaration by adding, "and the

power, and the glory."

Once on the throne Julian becomes a mere pedant-tyrant, trying to revive Paganism mechanically by cruel enforcement of external conformity to its rites. In his moments of exaltation he half grasps the meaning of Maximus, only to relapse presently and pervert it into a grotesque mixture of superstition and monstrous vanity. We have him making such speeches as this, worthy of Peer Gynt at his most ludicrous: "Has not Plato long ago enunciated the truth that only a god can rule over men? What did he mean by that saying? Answer me: what did he mean? Far be it from me to assert that Plato, incomparable sage though he was, had any individual, even the greatest, in his prophetic eye," &c. In this frame of mind Christ appears to him, not as the prototype of himself, as Maximus would have him feel, but as a rival god over whom he must prevail at all costs. It galls

him to think that the Galilean still reigns in the hearts of men whilst the emperor can only extort lip honor from them by brute force; for in his wildest excesses of egotism he never so loses his saving sense of the realities of things as to mistake the trophies of persecution for the fruits of faith. "Tell me who shall conquer," he demands of Maximus: "the emperor or the Galilean?"

"Both the emperor and the Galilean shall succumb," says Maximus. "Whether in our time or in hundreds of years I know not; but so it shall be when the right man comes."

"Who is the right man?" says Julian.

"He who shall swallow up both emperor and Galilean," replies the seer. "Both shall succumb; but you shall not therefore perish. Does not the child succumb in the youth and the youth in the man: yet neither child nor youth perishes. You know I have never approved of your policy as emperor. You have tried to make the youth a child again. The empire of the flesh is fallen a prey to the empire of the spirit. But the empire of the spirit is not final, any more than the youth is. You have tried to hinder the youth from growing: from becoming a man. Oh fool, who have drawn your sword against that which is to be: against the third empire, in which the twinnatured shall reign. For him the Jews have a name. They call him Messiah, and are waiting for him."

¹ Or, as we should now say, the Superman. (1912).

Still Julian stumbles on the threshold of the idea without entering into it. He is galled out of all comprehension by the rivalry of the Galilean, and asks despairingly who shall break his power. Then Maximus drives the lesson home.

MAXIMUS. Is it not written, "Thou shalt have none other gods but me"?

JULIAN. Yes—yes—yes.

MAXIMUS. The seer of Nazareth did not preach this

god or that: he said "God is I: I am God."

JULIAN. And that is what makes the emperor powerless? The third empire? The Messiah? Not the Jews' Messiah, but the Messiah of the two empires, the spirit and the world?

MAXIMUS. The God-Emperor. JULIAN. The Emperor-God. MAXIMUS. Logos in Pan, Pan in Logos.

JULIAN. How is he begotten?

MAXIMUS. He is self-begotten in the man who wills.

But it is of no use. Maximus's idea is a synthesis of relations in which not only is Christ God in exactly the same sense as that in which Julian is God, but Julian is Christ as well. The persistence of Julian's jealousy of the Galilean shews that he has not comprehended the synthesis at all, but only seized on that part of it which flatters his own egotism. And since this part is only valid as a constituent of the synthesis, and has no reality when isolated from it, it cannot by itself convince Julian. In vain does Maximus repeat his lesson in every sort of parable, and in such pregnant questions as "How do you know, Julian, that you were not in him whom you now persecute?" He can only wreak him to utter commands to the winds, and to exclaim, in the excitement of burning his fleet on the borders of Persia, "The third empire is here, Maximus. I feel that the Messiah of the earth lives within me. The spirit has become flesh and the flesh spirit. All creation lies within my will and power. More than the fleet is burning. In that glowing, swirling pyre the crucified Galilean is burning to ashes; and the earthly emperor is burning with the Galilean. But from the ashes shall arise, phœnix-like, the God of earth and the Emperor of the spirit in one, in one, in one." At which point he is informed that a Persian refugee, whose information has emboldened him to burn his ships, has fled from the camp and is a manifest spy. From that moment he is a broken man. In his next and last emergency, when the Persians fall upon his camp, his first desperate exclamation is a vow to sacrifice to the gods. "To what gods, oh fool?" cries Maximus. "Where are they; and what are they?" "I will sacrifice to this god and that god: I will sacrifice to many," he answers desperately. "One or other must surely hear me. I must call on something without me and above me." A flash of lightning seems to him a response from above; and with this encouragement he throws himself into the fight, clinging, like Macbeth, to an ambiguous oracle which leads him to suppose

that only in the Phrygian regions need he fear defeat. He imagines he sees the Nazarene in the ranks of the enemy; and in fighting madly to reach him he is struck down, in the name of Christ, by one of his own soldiers. Then his one Christian general, Jovian, calls on his "believing brethren" to give Cæsar what is Cæsar's. Declaring that the heavens are open and the angels coming to the rescue with their swords of fire, he rallies the Galileans of whom Julian has made slave-soldiers. The pagan free legions, crying out that the god of the Galileans is on the Roman side, and that he is the strongest, follow Jovian as he charges the enemy, who fly in all directions whilst Julian, sinking back from a vain effort to rise, exclaims, "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean."

Julian dies quietly in his tent, averring, in reply

Julian dies quietly in his tent, averring, in reply to a Christian friend's inquiry, that he has nothing to repent of. "The power which circumstances placed in my hands," he says, "and which is an emanation of divinity, I am conscious of having used to the best of my skill. I have never wittingly wronged anyone. If some should think that I have not fulfilled all expectations, they should in justice reflect that there is a mysterious power outside us, which in a great measure governs the issue of human undertakings." He still does not see eye to eye with Maximus, though there is a flash of insight in his remark to him, when he learns that the village where he fell is called the Phrygian region, that

"the world-will has laid an ambush for him." It was something for Julian to have seen that the power which he found stronger than his individual will was itself will; but inasmuch as he conceived it, not as the whole of which his will was but a part, but as a rival will, he was not the man to found the third empire. He had felt the godhead in himself, but not in others. Being only able to say, with half conviction, "The kingdom of heaven is within ME," he had been utterly vanquished by the Galilean who had been able to say, "The kingdom of heaven is within you." But he was on the way to that full truth. A man cannot believe in others until he believes in himself; for his conviction of the equal worth of his fellows must be filled by the overflow of his conviction of his own worth. Against the spurious Christianity of asceticism, starving that indispensable prior conviction, Julian rightly rebelled; and Maximus rightly incited him to rebel. But Maximus could not fill the prior conviction even to fulness, much less to overflowing; for the third empire was not yet, and is not yet.

However, the tyrant dies with a peaceful conscience; and Maximus is able to tell the priest at the bedside that the world-will will answer for Julian's soul. What troubles the mystic is his having misled Julian by encouraging him to bring upon himself the fate of Cain and Judas. As water can be boiled by fire, man can be prompted and stimulated from without to assert his individuality; but

just as no boiling can fill a half-empty well, no external stimulus can enlarge the spirit of man to the point at which he can self-beget the Emperor-God in himself by willing. At that point "to will is to have to will"; and it is with these words on his lips that Maximus leaves the stage, still sure that the third empire is to come.

It is not necessary to translate the scheme of Emperor and Galilean into terms of the antithesis between idealism and realism. Julian, in this respect, is a reincarnation of Peer Gynt. All the difference is that the subject which was instinctively projected in the earlier poem, is intellectually constructed in the later history, Julian plus Maximus the Mystic being Peer plus one who understands him better than Ibsen did when he created him.

The interest for us of Ibsen's interpretation of original Christianity is obvious. The deepest sayings recorded in the gospels are nownothing but eccentric paradoxes to most of those who reject the supernatural view of Christ's divinity. Those who accept that view often consider that such acceptance absolves them from attaching any sensible meaning to his words at all, and so might as well pin their faith to a stock or stone. Of these attitudes the first is superficial, and the second stupid. Ibsen's interpretation, whatever may be its validity, will certainly hold the field long after the current "Crosstianity," as it has been aptly called, becomes unthinkable.

THE OBJECTIVE ANTI-IDEALIST PLAYS

IBSEN had now written three immense dramas, all dealing with the effect of idealism on individual egotists of exceptional imaginative excitability. This he was able to do whilst his intellectual consciousness of his theme was yet incomplete, by simply portraying sides of himself LHe has put himself into the skin of Brand and Peer Gynt. He has divided himself between Maximus and Julian. These figures have accordingly a certain direct vitality which we shall find in none of his later male figures until it reappears under the shadow of death, less as vitality than as mortality putting on immortality, in the four great plays with which he closed and crowned his life's work. There are flashes of it in Relling, in Lövborg, in Ellida's stranger from the sea; but they are only flashes: henceforth for many years, indeed until his warfare against vulgar idealism is accomplished and a new phase entered upon in The Master Builder, all his really vivid and solar figures are women. For, having at last completed his intel-

lectual analysis of idealism, he could now construct methodical illustrations of its social working, instead of, as before, blindly projecting imaginary personal experiences which he himself had not yet succeeded in interpreting. Further, now that he understood the matter, he could see plainly the effect of idealism as a social force on people quite unlike himself: that is to say, on everyday people in everyday life: on shipbuilders, bank managers, parsons, and doctors, as well as on saints, romantic

adventurers, and emperors.

With his eyes thus opened, instances of the mischief of idealism crowded upon him so rapidly that he began deliberately to inculcate their lesson by writing realistic prose plays of modern life, abandoning all production of art for art's sake. His skill as a playwright and his genius as an artist were thenceforth used only to secure attention and effectiveness for his detailed attack on idealism. No more verse, no more tragedy for the sake of tears or comedy for the sake of laughter, no more seeking to produce specimens of art forms in order that literary critics might fill the public belly with the east wind. The critics, it is true, soon declared that he had ceased to be an artist; but he, having something else to do with his talent than to fulfil critics' definitions, took no notice of them, not thinking their ideal sufficiently important to write a play about.

The League of Youth

1869

The first of the series of realistic prose plays is called Pillars of Society; but before describing this, a word must be said about a previous work which ' seems to have determined the form the later series took. Between Peer Gynt and Emperor and Galilean. Ibsen had let fall an amusing comedy called The League of Youth (De Unges Forbund) in which the imaginative egotist reappears farcically as an ambitious young lawyer-politician who, smarting under a snub from a local landowner and county magnate, relieves his feelings with such a passionate explosion of Radical eloquence that he is cheered to the echo by the progressive party. Intoxicated with this success, he imagines himself a great leader of the people and a wielder of the mighty engine of democracy. He narrates to a friend a dream in which he saw kings swept helplessly over the surface of the earth by a mighty wind. He has hardly achieved this impromptu when he receives an invitation to dine with the local magnate, whose friends, to spare his feelings, have misled him as to the person aimed at in the new demagogue's speech. The invitation sets the egotist's imagination on the opposite tack: he is presently pouring forth his soul in the magnate's drawing-room to the very friend to whom he related the great dream.

"My goal is this: in the course of time I shall get into Parliament, perhaps into the Ministry, and marry happily into a rich and honorable family. I intend to reach it by my own exertions. I must and shall reach it without help from anyone. Meanwhile I shall enjoy life here, drinking in beauty and sunshine. Here there are fine manners: life moves gracefully here: the very floors seem laid to be trodden only by lacquered shoes: the arm chairs are deep; and the ladies sink exquisitely into them. Here the conversation goes lightly and elegantly, like a game at battledore; and no blunders come plumping in to make an awkward silence. Here I feel for the first time what distinction means. Yes: we have indeed an aristocracy of culture; and to it I will belong. Dont you yourself feel the refining influence of the place," &c. &c.

For the rest, the play is an ingenious comedy of intrigue, clever enough in its mechanical construction to entitle the French to claim that Ibsen owes something to his technical education as a playwright in the school of Scribe. One or two episodes are germs of later plays; and the suitability of the realistic prose comedy form to these episodes no doubt confirmed Ibsen in his choice of it.

Pillars of Society

1877

Pillars of Society is the history of one Karsten Bernick, a "pillar of society" who, in pursuance of the duty of maintaining the respectability of his

father's firm of shipbuilders, has averted a disgraceful exposure by allowing another man to bear the discredit not only of a love affair in which he himself had been the sinner, but of a theft which was never committed at all, having been merely alleged as an excuse for the firm being out of funds at a critical period. Bernick is an abject slave to the idealizings of one Rörlund, a schoolmaster, about respectability, duty to society, good example, social influence, health of the community, and so on. When Bernick falls in love with a married actress, he feels that no man has a right to shock the feelings of Rörlund and the community for his own selfish gratification. However, a clandestine intrigue will shock nobody, since nobody need know of it. He accordingly adopts this method of satisfying himself and preserving the moral tone of the community at the same time. Unluckily, the intrigue is all but discovered; and Bernick has either to see the moral security of the community shaken to its foundations by the terrible scandal of his exposure, or else to deny what he did and put it on another man. As the other man happens to be going to America, where he can easily conceal his imputed shame, Bernick's conscience tells him that it would be little short of a crime against society to neglect such an opportunity; and he accordingly lies his way back into the good opinion of Rörlund and Company at the emigrant's expense.

There are three women in the play for whom the schoolmaster's ideals have no attractions. First, there is the actress's daughter, who wants to get to America because she hears that people there are not good; for she is heartily tired of good people, since it is part of their goodness to look down on her because of her mother's disgrace. The schoolmaster, to whom she is engaged, condescends to her for the same reason. The second has already sacrificed her happiness and wasted her life in conforming to the Rörlund ideal of womanliness; and she earnestly advises the younger woman not to commit that folly, but to break her engagement with the schoolmaster, and elope promptly with the man she loves. The third is a naturally free . woman who has snapped her fingers at the current ideals all her life; and it is her presence that at last encourages the liar to break with the ideals by publicly telling the truth about himself.

The comic personage of the piece is a useless hypochondriac whose function in life, as described by himself, is "to hold up the banner of the ideal." This he does by sneering at everything and everybody for not resembling the heroic incidents and characters he reads about in novels and tales of adventure. But his obvious peevishness and folly make him much less dangerous than the pious idealist, the earnest and respectable Rörlund. The play concludes with Bernick's admission that the spirits of Truth and Freedom are the true pillars

of society, a phrase which sounds so like an idealistic commonplace that it is necessary to add that Truth in this passage does not mean the nursery convention of truth-telling satirized by Ibsen himself in a later play, as well as by Labiche and other comic dramatists. It means the unflinching recognition of facts, and the abandonment of the conspiracy to ignore such of them as do not bolster up the ideals. The idealist rule as to truth dictates the recognition only of those facts or idealistic masks of facts which have a respectable air, and the mentioning of these on all occasions and at all hazards. Ibsen urges the recognition of all facts; but as to mentioning them, he wrote a whole play, as we shall see presently, to shew that you must do that at your own peril, and that a truth-teller who cannot hold his tongue on occasion may do as much mischief as a whole universityful of trained liars. The word Freedom means freedom from the tyranny of the Rörlund ideals.

A Doll's House

1879

Unfortunately, Pillars of Society, as a propagandist play, is disabled by the circumstance that the hero, being a fraudulent hypocrite in the ordinary police-court sense of the phrase, would hardly be accepted as a typical pillar of society by the class he represents. Accordingly, Ibsen took care

next time to make his idealist irreproachable from the standpoint of the ordinary idealist morality. In the famous Doll's House, the pillar of society who owns the doll is a model husband, father, and citizen. In his little household, with the three darling children and the affectionate little wife, all on the most loving terms with one another, we have the sweet home, the womanly woman, the happy family life of the idealist's dream. Mrs. Nora Helmer is happy in the belief that she has attained a valid realization of all these illusions; that she is an ideal wife and mother; and that Helmer is an ideal husband who would, if the necessity arose, give his life to save her reputation. A few simply contrived incidents disabuse her effectually on all these points. One of her earliest acts of devotion to her husband has been the secret raising of a sum of money to enable him to make a tour which was necessary to restore his health. As he would have broken down sooner than go into debt, she has had to persuade him that the money was a gift from her father. It was really obtained from a moneylender, who refused to make her the loan unless she induced her father to endorse the promissory note. This being impossible, as her father was dying at the time, she took the shortest way out of the difficulty by writing the name herself, to the entire satisfaction of the moneylender, who, though not at all duped, knew that forged bills are often the surest to be paid. Since then she has slaved in secret at scrivener's work until she has nearly paid off the debt.

At this point Helmer is made manager of the bank in which he is employed; and the money-lender, wishing to obtain a post there, uses the forged bill to force Nora to exert her influence with Helmer on his behalf. But she, having a hearty contempt for the man, cannot be persuaded by him that there was any harm in putting her father's name on the bill, and ridicules the suggestion that the law would not recognize that she was right under the circumstances. It is her husband's own contemptuous denunciation of a forgery formerly committed by the moneylender himself that destroys her self-satisfaction and opens her eyes to her ignorance of the serious business of the world to which her husband belongs: the world outside the home he shares with her. When he goes on to tell her that commercial dishonesty is generally to be traced to the influence of bad mothers, she begins to perceive that the happy way in which she plays with the children, and the care she takes to dress them nicely, are not sufficient to constitute her a fit person to train them. To redeem the forged bill, she resolves to borrow the balance due upon it from an intimate friend of the family. She has learnt to coax her husband into giving her what she asks by appealing to his affection for her: that is, by playing all sorts of pretty tricks until he is wheedled into an amorous humor. This plan she

has adopted without thinking about it, instinctively taking the line of least resistance with him. And now she naturally takes the same line with her husband's friend. An unexpected declaration of love from him is the result; and it at once explains to her the real nature of the domestic influence she has been so proud of.

All her illusions about herself are now shattered. She sees herself as an ignorant and silly woman, a dangerous mother, and a wife kept for her husband's pleasure merely; but she clings all the harder to her illusion about him: he is still the ideal husband who would make any sacrifice to rescue her from ruin. She resolves to kill herself rather than allow him to destroy his own career by taking the forgery on himself to save her reputation. The final disillusion comes when he, instead of at once proposing to pursue this ideal line of conduct when he hears of the forgery, naturally enough flies into a vulgar rage and heaps invective on her for disgracing him. Then she sees that their whole family life has been a fiction: their home a mere doll's house in which they have been playing at ideal husband and father, wife and mother. So she leaves him then and there and goes out into the real world to find out its reality for herself, and to gain some position not fundamentally false, refusing to see her children again until she is fit to be in charge of them, or to live with him until she and he become capable of a more honorable relation to one another.

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He at first cannot understand what has happened, and flourishes the shattered ideals over her as if they were as potent as ever. He presents the course most agreeable to him—that of her staying at home, and avoiding a scandal—as her duty to her husband, to her children, and to her religion; but the magic of these disguises is gone; and at last even he understands what has really happened, and sits down alone to wonder whether that more honorable relation can ever come to pass between them.

Ghosts

1881

In his next play, Ibsen returned to the charge with such an uncompromising and outspoken attack on marriage as a useless sacrifice of human beings to an ideal, that his meaning was obscured by its very obviousness. Ghosts, as it is called, is the story of a woman who has faithfully acted as a model wife and mother, sacrificing herself at every point with selfless thoroughness. Her husband is a man with a huge capacity and appetite for sensuous enjoyment. Society, prescribing ideal duties and not enjoyment for him, drives him to enjoy himself in underhand and illicit ways. When he marries his model wife, her devotion to duty only makes life harder for him; and he at last takes refuge in the caresses of an undutiful but pleasure-loving house-

maid, and leaves his wife to satisfy her conscience by managing his business affairs whilst he satisfies his cravings as best he can by reading novels, drinking, and flirting, as aforesaid, with the servants. At this point even those who are most indignant with Nora Helmer for walking out of the doll's house, must admit that Mrs. Alving would be justified in walking out of her house. But Ibsen is determined to shew you what comes of the scrupulous line of conduct you were so angry with Nora for not pursuing. Mrs. Alving feels that her place is by her husband for better for worse, and by her child. Now the ideal of wifely and womanly duty which demands this from her also demands that she shall regard herself as an outraged wife, and her husband as a scoundrel. And the family ideal calls upon her to suffer in silence lest she shatter her innocent son's faith in the purity of home life by letting him know the disreputable truth about his father. It is her duty to conceal that truth from the world and from him. In this she falters for one moment only. Her marriage has not been a love match: she has, in pursuance of her duty as a daughter, contracted it for the sake of her family, although her heart inclined to a highly respectable clergyman, a professor of her own idealism, named Manders. In the humiliation of her first discovery of her husband's infidelity, she leaves the house and takes refuge with Manders; but he at once leads her back to the path of duty,

from which she does not again swerve. With the utmost devotion she now carries out an elaborate. scheme of lying and imposture. She so manages her husband's affairs and so shields his good name that everybody believes him to be a public-spirited citizen of the strictest conformity to current ideals of respectability and family life. She sits up of nights listening to his lewd and silly conversation, and even drinking with him, to keep him from going into the streets and being detected by the neighbors in what she considers his vices. She provides for the servant he has seduced, and brings up his illegitimate daughter as a maid in her own household. And, as a crowning sacrifice, she sends her son away to Paris to be educated there, knowing that if he stays at home the shattering of his ideals must come sooner or later.

Her work is crowned with success. She gains the esteem of her old love the clergyman, who is never tired of holding up her household as a beautiful realization of the Christian ideal of marriage. Her own martyrdom is brought to an end at last by the death of her husband in the odor of a most sanctified reputation, leaving her free to recall her son from Paris and enjoy his society, and his love and gratitude, in the flower of his early manhood.

But when her son comes home, the facts refuse as obstinately as ever to correspond to her ideals. Oswald has inherited his father's love of enjoyment; and when, in dull rainy weather, he returns from

Paris to the solemn strictly ordered house where virtue and duty have had their temple for so many years, his mother sees him shew the unmistakable signs of boredom with which she is so miserably familiar from of old; then sit after dinner killing time over the bottle; and finally—the climax of anguish-begin to flirt with the maid who, as his mother alone knows, is his own father's daughter. But there is this worldwide difference in her insight to the cases of the father and the son. She did not love the father: she loves the son with the intensity of a heart-starved woman who has nothing else left to love. Instead of recoiling from him with pious disgust and Pharisaical consciousness of moral superiority, she sees at once that he has a right to be happy in his own way, and that she has no right to force him to be dutiful and wretched in hers. She sees, too, her injustice to the unfortunate father. and the cowardice of the monstrous fabric of lies and false appearances she has wasted her life in manufacturing. She resolves that the son's life shall not be sacrificed to ideals which are to him joyless and unnatural. But she finds that the work of the ideals is not to be undone quite so easily. In driving the father to steal his pleasures in secrecy and squalor, they had brought upon him the diseases bred by such conditions; and her son now tells her that those diseases have left their mark on him, and that he carries poison in his pocket against the time, foretold to him by a Parisian surgeon, when general paralysis of the insane may destroy his faculties. In desperation she undertakes to rescue him from this horrible apprehension by making his life happy. The house shall be made as bright as Paris for him: he shall have as much champagne as he wishes until he is no longer driven to that dangerous resource by the dulness of his life with her: if he loves the girl he shall marry her if she were fifty times his half-sister. But the half-sister, on learning the state of his health, leaves the house; for she, too, is her father's daughter, and is not going to sacrifice her life in devotion to an invalid. When the mother and son are left alone in their dreary home, with the rain still falling outside, all she can do for him is to promise that if his doom overtakes him before he can poison himself, she will make a final sacrifice of her natural feelings by performing that dreadful duty, the first of all her duties that has any real basis. Then the weather clears up at last; and the sun, which the young man has so longed to see, appears. He asks her to give it to him to play with; and a glance at him shews her that the ideals have claimed their victim, and that the time has come for her to save him from a real horror by sending him from her out of the world, just as she saved him from an imaginary one years before by sending him out of Norway.

This last scene of Ghosts is so appallingly tragic that the emotions it excites prevent the meaning of the play from being seized and discussed like that

of A Doll's House. In England nobody, as far as I know, seems to have perceived that Ghosts is to A Doll's House what the late Sir Walter Besant intended his own sequel 1 to that play to be. Besant attempted to shew what might come of Nora's repudiation of that idealism of which he was one of the most popular professors. But the effect made on Besant by A Doll's House was very faint compared to that produced on the English critics by the first performance of Ghosts in this country. In the earlier part of this essay I have shewn that since Mrs. Alving's early conceptions of duty are as valid to ordinary critics as to Pastor Manders, who must appear to them as an admirable man, endowed with Helmer's good sense without Helmer's selfishness, a pretty general disapproval of the moral of the play was inevitable. Fortunately, the newspaper press went to such bedlamite lengths on this occasion that Mr. William Archer, the well-known dramatic critic and translator of

A forgotten production, published in the English Illustrated Magazine for January 1890. Besant makes the moneylender, as a reformed man, and a pattern of all the virtues, hold a forged bill in terrorem over Nora's grown-up daughter, engaged to his son. The bill has been forged by her brother, who has inherited a tendency to forge from his mother. Helmer having taken to drink after the departure of his wife, and forfeited his social position, the moneylender tells the girl that if she persists in disgracing him by marrying his son, he will send her brother to gaol. She evades the dilemma by drowning herself. The moral is that if Nora had never run away from her husband her daughter would never have drowned herself. Note that the moneylender does over again what he did in Ibsen's play, with the difference that, having become eminently respectable, he has also become a remorseless scoundrel. Ibsen shews him as a good-natured fellow at bottom. I wrote a sequel to this sequel. Another sequel was written by Eleanor, the youngest daughter of Karl Marx. I forget where they appeared.

Ibsen, was able to put the whole body of hostile criticism out of court by simply quoting its excesses in an article entitled Ghosts and Gibberings, which appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette of the 8th of April 1891. Mr. Archer's extracts, which he offers as a nucleus for a Dictionary of Abuse modelled upon the Wagner Schimpf-Lexicon, are worth reprinting here as samples of contemporary idealist criticism of the drama.

Descriptions of the Play

"Ibsen's positively abominable play entitled Ghosts. . . This disgusting representation. . . Reprobation due to such as aim at infecting the modern theatre with poison after desperately inoculating themselves and others. . . An open drain; a loathsome sore unbandaged; a dirty act done publicly; a lazar-house with all its doors and windows open. . . Candid foulness. . . Kotzebue turned bestial and cynical. Offensive cynicism. . . Ibsen's melancholy and malodorous world. . . Absolutely loathsome and fetid. . . Gross, almost putrid indecorum. . . Literary carrion. . . Crapulous stuff. . . Novel and perilous nuisance." Daily Telegraph [leading article]. "This mass of vulgarity, egotism, coarseness, and absurdity." Daily Telegraph [criticism]. "Unutterably offensive. . . Prosecution under Lord Campbell's Act. Abominable piece. . . Scandalous." Standard.

"Naked loathsomeness. . . Most dismal and repulsive production." Daily News. "Revoltingly suggestive and blasphemous. . . Characters either contradictory in themselves, uninteresting or abhorrent." Daily Chronicle. "A repulsive and degrading work." Queen. "Morbid, unhealthy, unwholesome and disgusting story. . . A piece to bring the stage into disrepute and dishonour with every right-thinking man and woman." Lloyd's. "Merely dull dirt long drawn out." Hawk. "Morbid horrors of the hideous tale. . . Ponderous dulness of the didactic talk. . . If any repetition of this outrage be attempted, the authorities will doubtless wake from their lethargy." Sporting and Dramatic News. "Just a wicked nightmare." The Gentlewoman. "Lugubrious diagnosis of sordid impropriety. . . Characters are prigs, pedants, and profligates. . . Morbid caricatures. . . Maunderings of nookshotten Norwegians. . . It is no more of a play than an average Gaiety burlesque." Black and White. "Most loathsome of all Ibsen's plays. . . Garbage and offal." Truth. "Ibsen's putrid play called Ghosts. . . So loathsome an enterprise." Academy. "As foul and filthy a concoction as has ever been allowed to disgrace the boards of an English theatre. . . Dull and disgusting. . . Nastiness and malodorousness laid on thickly as with a trowel." Era. "Noisome corruption." Stage.

Descriptions of Ibsen

"An egotist and a bungler." Daily Telegraph.
"A crazy fanatic. . . A crazy, cranky being. . .
Not only consistently dirty but deplorably dull."
Truth. "The Norwegian pessimist in petto" [sic].
Black and White. "Ugly, nasty, discordant, and downright dull. . . A gloomy sort of ghoul, bent on groping for horrors by night, and blinking like a stupid old owl when the warm sunlight of the best of life dances into his wrinkled eyes." Gentlewoman. "A teacher of the æstheticism of the Lock Hospital." Saturday Review.

Descriptions of Ibsen's Admirers

"Lovers of prurience and dabblers in impropriety who are eager to gratify their illicit tastes under the pretence of art." Evening Standard. "Ninety-seven per cent. of the people who go to see Ghosts are nasty-minded people who find the discussion of nasty subjects to their taste in exact proportion to their nastiness." Sporting and Dramatic News. "The sexless. . . The unwomanly woman, the unsexed females, the whole army of unprepossessing cranks in petticoats. . . Educated and muck-ferreting dogs. . . Effeminate men and male women. . . They all of them—men and women alike—know that they are doing not only a nasty but an illegal thing. . . The Lord Chamberlain

left them alone to wallow in Ghosts. . . Outside a silly clique, there is not the slightest interest in the Scandinavian humbug or all his works. . . A wave of human folly." *Truth*.¹

An Enemy of the People

1882

After this, the reader will understand the temper in which Ibsen set about his next play, An Enemy of the People, in which, having done sufficient execution among the ordinary middle-class domestic

1 Outrageous as the above extracts now seem, I could make them appear quite moderate by setting beside them the hue and cry raised in New York in 1905 against a play of my own entitled Mrs. Warren's Profession. But there was a commercial reason for that. My play exposed what has since become known as the White Slave Traffic: that is, the organization of prostitution as a regular commercial industry yielding huge profits to capital invested in it, directly or indirectly, by "pillars of society." The attack on the play was so corrupt that the newspaper that took the lead in it was heavily fined shortly afterwards for trading in advertisements of the traffic. But the attack on Ghosts was, I believe, really disinterested and sincere on its moral side. No doubt Ibsen was virulently hated by some of the writers quoted, as all great and original artists are hated by contemporary mediocrity, which needs must hate the highest when it sees it. Our own mediocrities would abuse Ibsen as heartily as their fathers did if they were not young enough to have started with an entirely inculcated and unintelligent assumption that he is a classic, like Shakspear and Goethe, and therefore must not be abused and need not be understood. But we have only to compare the frantic and indecent vituperation quoted above with the mere disparagement and dislike expressed towards Ibsen's other plays at the same period to perceive that here Ibsen struck at something much deeper than the fancies of critics as to the proper way to write plays. An ordinary farcical comedy ridiculing Pastor Manders and making Alving out to be a good fellow would have enlisted their sympathy at once, as their tradition was distinctly "Bohemian." Their horror at Ghosts is a striking proof of the worthlessness of mere Bohemianism, which has all the idle sentimentality and idolatry of conventionality without any of its backbone of contract and law. (1912).

and social ideals, he puts his finger for a moment on commercial political ideals. The play deals with a local majority of middle-class people who are pecuniarily interested in concealing the fact that the famous baths which attract visitors to their town and customers to their shops and hotels are contaminated by sewage. When an honest doctor insists on exposing this danger, the townspeople immediately disguise themselves ideally. Feeling the disadvantage of appearing in their true character as a conspiracy of interested rogues against an honest man, they pose as Society, as The People, as Democracy, as the solid Liberal Majority, and other imposing abstractions, the doctor, in attacking them, of course being thereby made an enemy of The People, a danger to Society, a traitor to Democracy, an apostate from the great Liberal party, and so on. Only those who take an active part in politics can appreciate the grim fun of the situation, which, though it has an intensely local Norwegian air, will be at once recognized as typical in England, not, perhaps, by the professional literary critics, who are for the most part faineants as far as political life is concerned, but certainly by everyone who has got as far as a seat on the committee of the most obscure Ratepayers' Association.

As An Enemy of the People contains one or two references to Democracy which are anything but respectful, it is necessary to examine Ibsen's criticism of it with precision. Democracy is really only an

arrangement by which the governed are allowed to choose (as far as any choice is possible, which in capitalistic society is not saying much) the members of the representative bodies which control the executive. It has never been proved that this is the best arrangement; and it has been made effective only to the very limited extent short of which the dissatisfaction which it appeases might take the form of actual violence. Now when men had to submit to kings, they consoled themselves by making it an article of faith that the king was always right, idealizing him as a Pope, in fact. In the same way we who have to submit to majorities set up Voltaire's pope, Monsieur Tout-le-monde, and make it blasphemy against Democracy to deny that the majority is always right, although that, as Ibsen says, is a lie. It is a scientific fact that the majority, however eager it may be for the reform of old abuses, is always wrong in its opinion of new developments, or rather is always unfit for them (for it can hardly be said to be wrong in opposing developments for which it is not yet fit). The pioneer is a tiny minority of the force he heads; and so, though it is easy to be in a minority and yet be wrong, it is absolutely impossible to be in the majority and yet be right as to the newest social prospects. We should never progress at all if it were possible for each of us to stand still on democratic principles until we saw whither all the rest were moving, as our statesmen declare themselves bound to do when they are called upon to lead. Whatever clatter we may make for a time with our filing through feudal serf collars and kicking off old mercantilist fetters, we shall never march a step forward except at the heels of "the strongest man, he who is able to stand alone" and to turn his back on "the damned compact Liberal majority." All of which is no disparagement of parliaments and adult suffrage, but simply a wholesome reduction of them to their real place in the social economy as pure machinery: machinery which has absolutely no principles except the principles of mechanics, and no motive power in itself whatsoever. The idealization of public organizations is as dangerous as that of kings or priests. We need to be reminded that though there is in the world a vast number of buildings in which a certain ritual is conducted before crowds called congregations by a functionary called a priest, who is subject to a central council controlling all such functionaries on a few points, there is not therefore any such thing in the concrete as the ideal Catholic Church, nor ever was, nor ever will be. There may, too, be a highly elaborate organization of public affairs; but there is no such thing as the ideal State. There may be a combination of persons living by the practice of medicine, surgery, or physical or biological research; or by drawing up wills and leases, and preparing, pleading, or judging cases at law; or by painting pictures, writing books, and acting plays;

or by serving in regiments and battle ships; or by manual labor or industrial service. But when any of these combinations, through its organizers or leaders, claims to deliver the Verdict of Science, or to act with the Authority of the Law, or to be as sacred as the Mission of Art, or to revenge criticisms of themselves as outrages on the Honor of His Majesty's Services, or to utter the Voice of Labor, there is urgent need for the guillotine, or whatever may be the mode in vogue of putting presumptuous persons in their proper place. All abstractions invested with collective consciousness or collective authority, set above the individual, and exacting duty from him on pretence of acting or thinking with greater validity than he, are maneating idols red with human sacrifices.

This position must not be confounded with Anarchism, or the idealization of the repudiation of Governments. Ibsen did not refuse to pay the tax collector, but may be supposed to have regarded him, not as the vicar of an abstraction called THE STATE, but simply as the man sent round by a committee of citizens (mostly fools as far as Maximus the Mystic's Third Empire is concerned) to collect the money for the police or the paving and lighting of the streets.

The Wild Duck

1884

After An Enemy of the People, Ibsen, as I have said, left the vulgar ideals for dead, and set about the exposure of those of the choicer spirits, beginning with the incorrigible idealists who had idealized his very self, and were becoming known as Ibsenites. His first move in this direction was such a tragi-comic slaughtering of sham Ibsenism that his astonished victims plaintively declared that The Wild Duck, as the new play was called, was a satire on his former works; whilst the pious, whom he had disappointed so severely by his interpretation of Brand, began to hope that he was coming back repentant to the fold. The household to which we are introduced in The Wild Duck is not, like Mrs. Alving's, a handsome one made miserable by superstitious illusions, but a shabby one made happy by romantic illusions. The only member of it who sees it as it really is is the wife, a good-natured Philistine who desires nothing better. The husband, a vain, petted, spoilt dawdler, believes that he is a delicate and high-souled man, devoting his life to redeeming his old father's name from the disgrace brought on it by imprisonment for breach of the forest laws. This redemption he proposes to effect by making himself famous as a great inventor some day when he has the necessary inspiration. Their

daughter, a girl in her teens, believes intensely in her father and in the promised invention. The disgraced grandfather cheers himself by drink when-ever he can get it; but his chief resource is a wonderful garret full of rabbits and pigeons. The old man has procured a number of second-hand Christmas trees; and with these he has turned the garret into a sort of toy forest, in which he can play at bear hunting, which was one of the sports of his youth and prosperity. The weapons employed in the hunting expeditions are a gun which will not go off, and a pistol which occasionally brings down a rabbit or a pigeon. A crowning touch is given to the illusion by a wild duck, which, however, must not be shot, as it is the special property of the girl, who reads and dreams whilst her mother cooks, washes, sweeps and carries on the photographic work which is supposed to be the business of her husband. Mrs. Ekdal does not appreciate Hjalmar's highly strung sensitiveness of character, which is constantly suffering agonizing jars from her vulgarity; but then she does not appreciate that other fact that he is a lazy and idle impostor. Downstairs there is a disgraceful clergyman named Molvik, a hopeless drunkard; but even he respects himself and is tolerated because of a special illusion invented for him by another lodger, Dr. Relling, upon whom the lesson of the household above has not been thrown away. Molvik, says the doctor, must break out into drinking fits because he is

daimonic, an imposing explanation which completely relieves the reverend gentleman from the

imputation of vulgar tippling.

Into this domestic circle there comes a new lodger, an idealist of the most advanced type. He greedily swallows the daimonic theory of the clergyman's drunkenness, and enthusiastically accepts the photographer as the high-souled hero he supposes himself to be; but he is troubled because the relations of the man and his wife do not constitute an ideal marriage. He happens to know that the woman, before her marriage, was the cast-off mistress of his own father; and because she has not told her husband this, he conceives her life as founded on a lie, like that of Bernick in Pillars of Society. He accordingly sets himself to work out the woman's salvation for her, and establish ideally frank relations between the pair, by simply blurting out the truth, and then asking them, with fatuous self-satisfaction, whether they do not feel much the better for it. This wanton piece of mischief has more serious results than a mere domestic scene. The husband is too weak to act on his bluster about outraged honor and the impossibility of his ever living with his wife again; and the woman is merely annoyed with the idealist for telling on her; but the girl takes the matter to heart and shoots herself. The doubt cast on her parentage, with her father's theatrical repudiation of her, destroy her ideal place in the home, and

make her a source of discord there; so she sacrifices herself, thereby carrying out the teaching of the idealist mischief-maker, who has talked a good deal to her about the duty and beauty of selfsacrifice, without foreseeing that he might be taken in mortal earnest. The busybody thus finds that people cannot be freed from their failings from without. They must free themselves. When Nora is strong enough to live out of the doll's house, she will go out of it of her own accord if the door stands open; but if before that period you take her by the scruff of the neck and thrust her out, she will only take refuge in the next establishment of the kind that offers to receive her. Woman has thus two enemies to deal with: the old-fashioned one who wants to keep the door locked, and the new-fashioned one who wants to thrust her into the street before she is ready to go. In the cognate case of a hypocrite and liar like Bernick, exposing him is a mere police measure: he is none the less a liar and hypocrite when you have exposed him. If you want to make a sincere and truthful man of him, all you can wisely do is to remove what you can of the external obstacles to his exposing himself, and then wait for the operation of his internal impulse to confess. If he has no such impulse, then you must put up with him as he is. It is useless to make claims on him which he is not yet prepared to meet. Whether, like Brand, we make such claims because to refrain would be to compromise

with evil, or, like Gregers Werle, because we think their moral beauty must recommend them at sight to every one, we shall alike incur Relling's impatient assurance that "life would be quite tolerable if we could only get rid of the confounded duns that keep on pestering us in our poverty with the claims of the ideal."

Rosmersholm

1886

Ibsen did not in The Wild Duck exhaust the subject of the danger of forming ideals for other people, and interfering in their lives with a view to enabling them to realize those ideals. Cases far more typical than that of the meddlesome lodger are those of the priest who regards the ennobling of mankind as a sort of trade process of which his cloth gives him a monopoly, and the clever woman who pictures a noble career for the man she loves, and devotes herself to helping him to achieve it. In Rosmersholm, the play with which Ibsen followed up The Wild Duck, there is an unpractical country parson, a gentleman of ancient stock, whose family has been for many years a centre of social influence. The tradition of that influence reinforces his priestly tendency to regard the ennoblement of the world as an external operation to be performed by himself; and the need of such ennoblement is very evident to him; for his nature

is a fine one: he looks at the world with some dim prevision of "the third empire." He is married to a woman of passionately affectionate nature, who is very fond of him, but does not regard him as a regenerator of the human race. Indeed she does not share any of his dreams, and only acts as an extinguisher on the sacred fire of his idealism. He, she, her brother Kroll the headmaster, Kroll's wife, and their set, form a select circle of the best people in the place, comfortably orbited in our social system, and quite planetary in ascertained position and unimpeachable respectability. Into the orbit comes presently a wandering star, one Rebecca Gamvik, an unpropertied orphan, who has been allowed to read advanced books, and is a Freethinker and a Radical: things that disqualify a poor woman for admission to the Rosmer world. However, one must live somewhere; and as the Rosmer world is the only one in which an ambitious and cultivated woman can find powerful allies and educated companions, Rebecca, being both ambitious and cultivated, makes herself agreeable to the Rosmer circle with such success that the affectionate and impulsive but unintelligent Mrs. Rosmer becomes wildly fond of her, and is not content until she has persuaded her to come and live with them. Rebecca, then a mere adventuress fighting for a foothold in polite society (which has hitherto shewn itself highly indignant at her thrusting herself in where nobody has thought of

providing room for her), accepts the offer all the more readily because she has taken the measure of Parson Rosmer, and formed the idea of playing upon his aspirations, and making herself a leader in politics and society by using him as a figurehead.

But now two difficulties arise. First, there is Mrs. Rosmer's extinguishing effect on her husband: an effect which convinces Rebecca that nothing can be done with him whilst his wife is in the way. Second—a contingency quite unallowed for in her provident calculations—she finds herself passionately enamored of him. The poor parson, too, falls in love with her; but he does not know it. He turns to the woman who understands him like a sunflower to the sun, and makes her his real friend and companion. The wife feels this soon enough; and he, quite unconscious of it, begins to think that her mind must be affected, since she has become so intensely miserable and hysterical about nothing—nothing that he can see. The truth is that she has come under the curse of Rebecca's ideal: she sees herself standing, a useless obstacle, between her husband and the woman he really loves, the woman who can help him to a glorious career. She cannot even be the mother in the household; for she is childless. Then comes Rebecca, fortified with a finely reasoned theory that Rosmer's future is staked against his wife's life, and says that it is better for all their sakes that she should quit Rosmersholm. She even hints

that she must go at once if a grave scandal is to be avoided. Mrs. Rosmer, regarding a scandal in Rosmersholm as the most terrible thing that can happen, and seeing that it could be averted by the marriage of Rebecca and Rosmer if she were out of the way, writes a letter secretly to Rosmer's bitterest enemy, the editor of the local Radical paper, a man who has forfeited his moral reputation by an intrigue which Rosmer has pitilessly denounced. In this letter she implores him not to believe or publish any stories that he may hear about Rosmer, to the effect that he is in any way to blame for anything that may happen to her. Then she sets Rosmer free to marry Rebecca, and to realize his ideals, by going out into the garden and throwing herself into the millstream that runs there.

Now follows a period of quiet mourning at Rosmersholm. Everybody except Rosmer suspects that Mrs. Rosmer was not mad, and guesses why she committed suicide. Only it would not do to compromise the aristocratic party by treating Rosmer as the Radical editor was treated. So the neighbors shut their eyes and condole with the bereaved clergyman; and the Radical editor holds his tongue because Radicalism is growing respectable, and he hopes, with Rebecca's help, to get Rosmer over to his side presently. Meanwhile the unexpected has again happened to Rebecca. Her passion is worn out; but in the long days of mourning she has found the higher love; and it

is now for Rosmer's own sake that she urges him to become a man of action, and brood no more over the dead. When his friends start a Conservative paper and ask him to become editor, she induces him to reply by declaring himself a Radical and Freethinker. To his utter amazement, the result is, not an animated discussion of his views, but just such an attack on his home life and private conduct as he had formerly made on those of the Radical editor. His friends tell him plainly that the compact of silence is broken by his defection, and that there will be no mercy for the traitor to the party. Even the Radical editor not only refuses to publish the fact that his new ally is a Freethinker (which would destroy all his social weight as a Radical recruit), but brings up the dead woman's letter as a proof that the attack is sufficiently well-founded to make it unwise to go too far. Rosmer, who at first had been simply shocked that men whom he had always honored as gentlemen should descend to such hideous calumny, now sees that he really did love Rebecca, and is indeed guilty of his wife's death. His first impulse is to shake off the spectre of the dead woman by marrying Rebecca; but she, knowing that the guilt is hers, puts that temptation behind her and refuses. Then, as he thinks it all over, his dream of ennobling the world slips away from him: such work can only be done by a man conscious of his own innocence. To save him from despair, Rebecca

makes a great sacrifice. She "gives him back his innocence" by confessing how she drove his wife to kill herself; and, as the confession is made in the presence of Kroll, she ascribes the whole plot to her ambition, and says not a word of her passion. Rosmer, confounded as he realizes what helpless puppets they have all been in the hands of this clever woman, for the moment misses the point that unscrupulous ambition, though it explains her crime, does not account for her confession. He turns his back on her and leaves the house with Kroll. She quietly packs up her trunk, and is about to vanish from Rosmersholm without another word when he comes back alone to ask why she confessed. She tells him why, offering him her selfsacrifice as a proof that his power of ennobling others was no vain dream, since it is his companionship that has changed her from the selfish adventuress she was to the devoted woman she has just proved herself to be. But he has lost his faith in himself, and cannot believe her. The proof seems to him subtle, artful: he cannot forget that she duped him by flattering this very weakness of his before. Besides, he knows now that it is not true: people are not ennobled from without. She has no more to say; for she can think of no further proof. But he has thought of an unanswerable one. Dare she make all doubt impossible by sacrificing her share in his future in the only absolutely final way: that is, by doing for his sake what his wife did?

She asks what would happen if she had the heart and the will to do it. "Then," he replies, "I should have to believe in you. I should recover my faith in my mission. Faith in my power to ennoble human souls. Faith in the human soul's power to attain. nobility." "You shall have your faith again," she answers. At this pass the inner truth of the situation comes out; and the thin veil of a demand for proof, with its monstrous sequel of asking the woman to kill herself in order to restore the man's good opinion of himself, falls away. What is really driving Rosmer is the superstition of expiation by sacrifice. He sees that when Rebecca goes into the millstream he must go too. And he speaks his real mind in the words, "There is no judge over us: therefore we must do justice upon ourselves." But the woman's soul is free of this to the end; for when she says, "I am under the power of the Rosmersholm view of life now. What I have sinned it is fit I should expiate," we feel in that speech a protest against the Rosmersholm view of life: the view that denied her right to live and be happy from the first, and now at the end, even in denying its God, exacts her life as a vain bloodoffering for its own blindness. The woman has the higher light: she goes to her death out of fellowship with the man who is driven thither by the superstition which has destroyed his will. The story ends with his taking her solemnly as his wife, and casting himself with her into the millstream.

It is unnecessary to repeat here what is said on page 34 as to the vital part played in this drama by the evolution of the lower into the higher love. Peer Gynt, during the prophetic episode in his career, shocks the dancing girl Anitra into a remonstrance by comparing himself to a cat. He replies, with his wisest air, that from the standpoint of love there is perhaps not so much difference between a tomcat and a prophet as she may imagine. The number of critics who have entirely missed the point of Rebecca's transfiguration seems to indicate that the majority of men, even among critics of dramatic poetry, have not got beyond Peer Gynt's opinion in this matter. No doubt they would not endorse it as a definitely stated proposition, aware, as they are, that there is a poetic convention to the contrary. But if they fail to recognize the only possible alternative proposition when it is not only stated in so many words by Rebecca West, but when without it her conduct dramatically contradicts her character-when they even complain of the contradiction as a blemish on the play, I am afraid there can be no further doubt that the extreme perplexity into which the first performance of Rosmersholm in England plunged the Press was due entirely to the prevalence of Peer Gynt's view of love among the dramatic critics.

The Lady from the Sea

1888

Ibsen's next play, though it deals with the old theme, does not insist on the power of ideals to kill, as the two previous plays do. It rather deals with the origin of ideals in unhappiness, in dissatisfaction with the real. The subject of The Lady from the Sea is the most poetic fancy imaginable. A young woman, brought up on the sea-coast, marries a respectable doctor, a widower, who idolizes her and places her in his household with nothing to do but dream and be made much of by everybody. Even the housekeeping is done by her stepdaughter: she has no responsibility, no care, and no trouble. In other words, she is an idle, helpless, utterly dependent article of luxury. A man turns red at the thought of being such a thing; but he thoughtlessly accepts a pretty and fragile-looking woman in the same position as a charming natural picture. The lady from the sea feels an indefinite want in her life. She reads her want into all other lives, and comes to the conclusion that man once had to choose whether he would be a land animal or a creature of the sea; and that having chosen the land, he has carried about with him ever since a secret sorrow for the element he has forsaken. The dissatisfaction that gnaws her is, as she interprets it, this desperate longing for the sea. When

her only child dies and leaves her without the work of a mother to give her a valid place in the world, she yields wholly to her longing, and no longer cares for her husband, who, like Rosmer, begins to fear that she is going mad.

At last a seaman appears and claims her as his wife on the ground that they went years before through a rite which consisted of their marrying the sea by throwing their rings into it. This man, who had to fly from her in the old time because he killed his captain, and who fills her with a sense of dread and mystery, seems to her to embody the mystic attraction the sea has for her. She tells her husband that she must go away with the seaman. Naturally the doctor expostulates—declares that he cannot for her own sake let her do so mad a thing. She replies that he can only prevent her by locking her up, and asks him what satisfaction it will be to him to have her body under lock and key whilst her heart is with the other man. In vain he urges that he will only keep her under restraint until the seaman goes-that he must not, dare not, allow her to ruin herself. Her argument remains unanswerable. The seaman openly declares that she will come; so that the distracted husband asks him does he suppose he can force her from her home. To this the seaman replies that, on the contrary, unless she comes of her own free will there is no satisfaction to him in her coming at all: the unanswerable argument again. She echoes it by

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demanding her freedom to choose. Her husband must cry off his law-made and Church-made bargain; renounce his claim to the fulfilment of her vows; and leave her free to go back to the sea with her old lover. Then the doctor, with a heavy heart, drops his prate about his heavy responsibility for her actions, and throws the responsibility on her by crying off as she demands. The moment she feels herself a free and responsible woman, all her childish fancies vanish: the seaman becomes simply an old acquaintance whom she no longer cares for; and the doctor's affection produces its natural effect. In short, she says No to the seaman, and takes over the housekeeping keys from her stepdaughter without any further maunderings over that secret sorrow for the abandoned sea.

It should be noted here that Ellida [call her Eleeda], the Lady from the Sea, seems more fantastic to English readers than to Norwegian ones. The same thing is true of many other characters drawn by Ibsen, notably Peer Gynt, who, if born in England, would certainly not have been a poet and metaphysician as well as a blackguard and a speculator. The extreme type of Norwegian, as depicted by Ibsen, imagines himself doing wonderful things, but does nothing. He dreams as no Englishman dreams, and drinks to make himself dream the more, until his effective will is destroyed, and he becomes a broken-down, disreputable sot, carrying about the tradition that he is a hero, and discussing himself on

that assumption. Although the number of persons who dawdle their life away over fiction in England must be frightful, and is probably increasing, yet their talk is not the talk of Ulric Brendel, Rosmer, Ellida, or Peer Gynt; and it is for this reason that Rosmersholm and The Lady from the Sea strike English audiences as more fantastic and less literal than A Doll's House and the plays in which the leading figures are men and women of action, though to a Norwegian there is probably no difference in this respect.

Hedda Gabler

1890

Hedda Gabler has no ethical ideals at all, only romantic ones. She is a typical nineteenth-century figure, falling into the abyss between the ideals which do not impose on her and the realities she has not yet discovered. The result is that though she has imagination, and an intense appetite for beauty, she has no conscience, no conviction: with plenty of cleverness, energy, and personal fascination she remains mean, envious, insolent, cruel in protest against others' happiness, fiendish in her dislike of inartistic people and things, a bully in reaction from her own cowardice. Hedda's father, a general, is a widower. She has the traditions of the military caste about her; and these narrow her activities to the customary hunt for a socially and pecuniarily

eligible husband. She makes the acquaintance of a young man of genius who, prohibited by an idealridden society from taking his pleasures except where there is nothing to restrain him from excess, is going to the bad in search of his good, with the usual consequences. Hedda is intensely curious about the side of life which is forbidden to her, and in which powerful instincts, absolutely ignored and condemned in her circle, steal their satisfaction. An odd intimacy springs up between the inquisitive girl and the rake. Whilst the general reads the paper in the afternoon, Lövborg and Hedda have long conversations in which he describes to her all his disreputable adventures. Although she is the questioner, she never dares to trust him: all the questions are indirect; and the responsibility for his interpretations rests on him alone. Hedda has no conviction whatever that these conversations are disgraceful; but she will not risk a fight with society on the point: it is easier to practise hypocrisy, the homage that truth pays to falsehood, than to endure ostracism. When he proceeds to make advances to her, Hedda has again no conviction that it would be wrong for her to gratify his instinct and her own; so that she is confronted with the alternative of sinning against herself and him, or sinning against social ideals in which she has no faith. Making the coward's choice, she carries it out with the utmost bravado, threatening Lövborg with one of her father's pistols, and driving

him out of the house with all that ostentation of outraged purity which is the instinctive defence of women to whom chastity is not natural, much as libel actions are mostly brought by persons concerning whom libels are virtually, if not technically, justifiable.

Hedda, deprived of her lover, now finds that a life of conformity without faith involves something more terrible than the utmost ostracism: to wit, boredom. This scourge, unknown among revolutionists, is the curse which makes the security of respectability as dust in the balance against the unflagging interest of rebellion, and which forces society to eke out its harmless resources for killing time by licensing gambling, gluttony, hunting, shooting, coursing, and other vicious distractions for which even idealism has no disguise. These licenses, being expensive, are available only for people who have more than enough money to keep up appearances; and as Hedda's father, being in the army instead of in commerce, is too poor to leave her much more than the pistols, her boredom is only mitigated by dancing, at which she gains much admiration, but no substantial offers of marriage.

At last she has to find somebody to support her. A good-natured mediocrity of a professor is the best that is to be had; and though she regards him as a member of an inferior class, and despises almost to loathing his family circle of two affectionate old aunts and the inevitable general servant who has helped to bring him up, she marries him faute de mieux, and immediately proceeds to wreck this prudent provision for her livelihood by accommodating his income to her expenditure instead of accommodating her expenditure to his income. Her nature so rebels against the whole sordid transaction that the prospect of bearing a child to her husband drives her almost frantic, since it will not only expose her to the intimate solicitude of his aunts in the course of a derangement of her health in which she can see nothing that is not repulsive and humiliating, but will make her one of his family in earnest.

To amuse herself in these galling circumstances, she forms an underhand alliance with a visitor who belongs to her old set, an elderly gallant who quite understands how little she cares for her husband, and proposes a ménage à trois to her. She consents to his coming there and talking to her as he pleases behind her husband's back; but she keeps her pistols in reserve in case he becomes seriously importunate. He, on the other hand, tries to get some hold over her by placing her husband under pecuniary obligations, as far as he can do it without being out of pocket.

Meanwhile Lovborg is drifting to disgrace by the nearest way: drink. In due time he descends from lecturing at the university on the history of civilization to taking a job in an out-of-the-way place as tutor to the little children of Sheriff Elvsted.

This functionary, on being left a widower with a number of children, marries their governess, finding that she will cost him less and be bound to do more for him as his wife. As for her, she is too poor to dream of refusing such a settlement in life. When Lövborg comes, his society is heaven to her. He does not dare to tell her about his dissipations; but he tells her about his unwritten books, which he never discussed with Hedda. She does not dare to remonstrate with him for drinking; but he gives it up as soon as he sees that it shocks her. Just as Mr. Fearing, in Bunyan's story, was in a way the bravest of the pilgrims, so this timid and unfortunate Mrs. Elvsted trembles her way to a point at which Lövborg, quite reformed, publishes one book which makes him celebrated for the moment, and completes another, fair-copied in her handwriting, to which he looks for a solid position as an original thinker. But he cannot now stay tutoring Elvsted's children; so off he goes to town with his pockets full of the money the published book has brought him. Left once more in her old lonely plight, knowing that without her Lövborg will probably relapse into dissipation, and that without him her life will not be worth living, Mrs. Elvsted must either sin against herself and him or against the institution of marriage under which Elvsted purchased his housekeeper. It never occurs to her that she has any choice. She knows that her action will count as "a dreadful thing"; but she sees that she must go; and accordingly Elvsted finds himself without a wife and his children without a governess, and so disappears unpitied from the

story.

Now it happens that Hedda's husband, Jörgen Tesman, is an old friend and competitor (for academic honors) of Lövborg, and also that Hedda was a schoolfellow of Mrs. Elvsted, or Thea, as she had better now be called. Thea's first business is to find out where Lövborg is; for hers is no preconcerted elopement: she has hurried to town to keep Lövborg away from the bottle, a design she dare not hint at to himself. Accordingly, the first thing she does in town is to call on the Tesmans, who have just returned from their honeymoon, to beg them to invite Lövborg to their house so as to keep him in good company. They consent, with the result that the two pairs are brought together under the same roof, and the tragedy begins to work itself out.

Hedda's attitude now demands a careful analysis. Lövborg's experience with Thea has enlightened his judgment of Hedda; and as he is, in his gifted way, an arrant poseur and male coquet, he immediately tries to get on romantic terms with her (for have they not "a past"?) by impressing her with the penetrating criticism that she is and always was a coward. She admits that the virtuous heroics with the pistol were pure cowardice; but she is still so void of any other standard of conduct than

conformity to the conventional ideals, that she thinks her cowardice consisted in not daring to be wicked. That is, she thinks that what she actually did was the right thing; and since she despises herself for doing it, and feels that he also rightly despises her for doing it, she gets a passionate feeling that what is wanted is the courage to do wrong. This unlooked-for reaction of idealism, this monstrous but very common setting-up of wrong-doing as an ideal, and of the wrongdoer as hero or heroine qua wrongdoer, leads Hedda to conceive that when Lövborg tried to seduce her he was a hero, and that in allowing Thea to reform him he has played the recreant. In acting on this misconception she is restrained by no consideration for any of the rest. Like all people whose lives are valueless, she has no more sense of the value of Lövborg's or Tesman's or Thea's lives than a railway shareholder has of the value of a shunter's. She gratifies her intense jealousy of Thea by deliberately taunting Lövborg into breaking loose from her influence by joining a carouse at which he not only loses his manuscript, but finally gets into the hands of the police through behaving outrageously in the house of a disreputable woman whom he accuses of stealing it, not knowing that it has been picked up by Tesman and handed to Hedda for safe keeping. Now Hedda's jealousy of Thea is not jealousy of her bodily fascination: at that Hedda can beat her. It

is jealousy of her power of making a man of Löv-borg, of her part in his life as a man of genius. The manuscript which Tesman gives to Hedda to lock up safely is in Thea's handwriting. It is the fruit of Lövborg's union with Thea: he himself speaks of it as "their child." So when he turns his despair to romantic account by coming to the two women and making a tragic scene, telling Thea that he has cast the manuscript, torn into a thousand pieces, out upon the fiord; and then, when she is gone, telling Hedda that he has brought "the child" to a house of ill-fame and lost it there, she, deceived by his posing, and thirsting to gain faith in the beauty of her own influence over him from a heroic deed of some sort, makes him a present of one of her pistols, only begging him to "do it beautifully," by which she means that he is to kill himself in some manner that will make his suicide a romantic memory and an imaginative luxury to her for ever. He takes it unblushingly, and leaves her with the air of a man who is looking his last on earth. But the moment he is out of sight of his audience, he goes back to the house where he still supposes the manuscript to lie stolen, and there renews the wrangle of the night before, using the pistol to threaten the woman, with the result that he gets shot in the abdomen, leaving the weapon to fall into the hands of the police. Meanwhile Hedda deliberately burns "the child." Then comes her elderly gallant to disgust her with the unromantic-

ally ugly details of the deed which Lövborg promised her to do so beautifully, and to make her understand that he himself has now got her into his power by his ability to identify the pistol. She must either be the slave of this man, or else face the scandal of the connection of her name at the inquest with a squalid debauch ending in a murder. Thea, too, is not crushed by Lövborg's death. Ten minutes after she has received the news with a cry of heartfelt loss, she sits down with Tesman to reconstruct "the child" from the old notes she has piously preserved. Over the congenial task of collecting and arranging another man's ideas Tesman is perfectly happy, and forgets his beautiful Hedda for the first time. Thea the trembler is still mistress of the situation, holding the dead Lövborg, gaining Tesman, and leaving Hedda to her elderly admirer, who smoothly remarks that he will answer for Mrs. Tesman not being bored whilst her husband is occupied with Thea in putting the pieces of the book together. However, he has again reckoned without General Gabler's second pistol. She shoots herself then and there; and so the story ends.

THE LAST FOUR PLAYS

Down among the Dead Men

IBSEN now lays down the completed task of warning the world against its idols and anti-idols, and passes into the shadow of death, or rather into the splendor of his sunset glory; for his magic is extraordinarily potent in these four plays, and his purpose more powerful. And yet the shadow of death is here; for all four, except Little Eyolf, are tragedies of the dead, deserted and mocked by the young who are still full of life. The Master Builder is a dead man before the curtain rises: the breaking of his body to pieces in the last act by its fall from the tower is rather the impatient destruction of a ghost of whose delirious whisperings Nature is tired than of one who still counts among the living. Borkman and the two women, his wife and her sister, are not merely dead: they are buried; and the creatures we hear and see are only their spirits in torment. "Never dream of life again," says Mrs. Borkman to her husband: "lie quiet where you

are." And the last play of all is frankly called When We Dead Awaken. Here the quintessence of Ibsenism reaches its final distillation: morality and reformation give place to mortality and resurrection; and the next event is the death of Ibsen himself: he, too, creeping ghost-like through the blackening mental darkness until he reaches his actual grave, and can no longer make Europe cry with pity by sitting at a copybook, like a child, trying to learn again how to write, only to find that divine power gone for ever from his dead hand. He, the crustiest, grimmest hero since Beethoven could not die like him, shaking his fist at the thunder and alive to the last: he must follow the path he had traced for Solness and Borkman, and survive himself. But as these two were dreamers to the last, and never so luminous in their dreams as when they could no longer put the least of them into action; so we may believe that when Ibsen could no longer remember the alphabet, or use a dictionary, his soul may have been fuller than ever before of the unspeakable. Do not snivel, reader, over the contrast he himself drew between the man who was once the greatest writer in the world, and the child of seventy-six trying to begin again at pothooks and hangers. Depend on it, whilst there was anything left of him at all there was enough of his iron humor to grin as widely as the skeleton with the hour-glass who was touching him on the shoulder.

The Master Builder

1892

Halvard Solness is a dead man who has been a brilliantly successful builder, and, like the greatest builders, his own architect. He is sometimes in the sublime delirium that precedes bodily death, and sometimes in the horror that varies the splendors of delirium. He is mortally afraid of young rivals; of the younger generation knocking at the door. He has built churches with high towers (much as Ibsen built great historical dramas in verse). He has come to the end of that and built "homes for human beings" (much as Ibsen took to writing prose plays of modern life). He has come to the end of that too, as men do at the end of their lives; and now he must take to dead men's architecture, the building of castles in the air. Castles in the air are the residences not only of those who have finished their lives, but of those who have not yet begun them. Another peculiarity of castles in the air is that they are so beautiful and so wonderful that human beings are not good enough to live in them: therefore when you look round you for somebody to live with you in your castle in the air, you find nobody glorious enough for that sanctuary. So you resort to the most dangerous of all the varieties of idolization: the idolization of the person you are most in love with; and you take him or her to

live with you in your castle. And as imaginative young people, because they are young, have no iullsions about youth, whilst old people, because they are old, have no illusions about age, elderly gentlemen very often idolize adolescent girls, and adolescent girls idolize elderly gentlemen. When the idolization is not reciprocal, the idolizer runs terrible risks if the idol is selfish and unscrupulous. Cases of girls enslaved by elderly gentlemen whose scrupulous respect for their maiden purity is nothing but an excuse for getting a quantity of secretarial or domestic service out of them that is limited only by their physical endurance, without giving them anything in return, are not at all so rare as they would be if the theft of a woman's youth and devotion were as severely condemned by public opinion as the comparatively amiable and negligible theft of a few silver spoons and forks. On the other hand doting old gentlemen are duped and ruined by designing young women who care no more for them than a Cornish fisherman cares for a conger eel. But sometimes, when the two natures are poetic, we have scenes of Bettina and Goethe, which are perhaps wholesome as well as pleasant for both parties when they are good enough and sensible enough to face the inexorable on the side of age and to recognize the impossible on the side of youth. On these conditions, old gentlemen are indulged in fancies for poetic little girls; and the poetic little girls have their emotions and imaginations satisfied harmlessly until they find a suitable mate.

But the master builder, though he gets into just such a situation, does not get out of it so cheaply, because he is not outwardly an old, or even a very elderly gentleman. "He is a man no longer young, but healthy and vigorous, with closely cut curly hair, dark moustache, and dark thick eyebrows." Also he is daimonic, not sham daimonic like Molvik in The Wild Duck, but really daimonic, with luck, a star, and mystic "helpers and servers" who find the way through the maze of life for him. In short, a very fascinating man, whom nobody, himself least of all, could suspect of having shot his bolt and being already dead. Therefore a man for whom a girl's castle in the air is a very dangerous place, as she may easily thrust upon him adventures that would tax the prime of an unexhausted man, and are mere delirious madness for a spent one.

Grasp this situation and you will be able to follow a performance of The Master Builder without being puzzled; though to the unprepared theatregoer it is a bewildering business. You see Solness in his office, ruthlessly exploiting the devotion of the girl secretary Kaia, who idolizes him, and giving her nothing in return but a mesmerizing word occasionally. You see him with equal ruthlessness apparently, but really with the secret terror of "the priest who slew the slayer and shall himself be slain," trying to suppress a young rival who is

as yet only a draughtsman in his employment. To keep the door shut against the younger generation already knocking at it: that is all he can do now, except build castles in the air; for, as I have said, the effective part of the man is dead. Then there is his wife, who, knowing that he is failing in body and mind, can do nothing but look on in helpless terror. She cannot make a happy home for Solness, because her own happiness has been sacrificed to his genius. Or rather, her own genius, which is for "building up the souls of little children," has been sacrificed to his. For they began their family life in an old house that was part of her property: the sort of house that may be hallowed by old family associations and memories of childhood, but that it pays the speculative builder to pull down and replace by rows of villas. Now the ambitious Solness knows this but dares not propose such a thing to his wife, who cherishes all the hallowing associations, and even keeps her dolls: nine lovely dolls feeling them "under her heart, like little unborr children." Everything in the house is precious to her: the old silk dresses, the lace, the portraits Solness knows that to touch these would be tearing her heart up by the roots. So he says nothing; does nothing; only notes a crack in the old chimney which should be repaired if the house is to be safe against fire, and does not repair it. Instead, he pictures to himself a fire, with his wife out in the sledge with his two children, and nothing but charred

ruins facing her when she returns; but what matter, since the children have escaped and are still with her? He even calls upon his helpers and servers to consider whether this vision might not become a reality. And it does. The house is burnt; the villas rise on its site and cover the park; and Halvard Solness becomes rich and successful.

But the helpers and servers have not stuck to the program for all that. The fire did not come from the crack in the chimney when all the domestic fires were blazing. It came at night when the fires were low, and began in a cupboard quite away from the chimney. It came when Mrs. Solness and the children were in bed. It shattered the mother's health; it killed the children she was nursing; it devoured the portraits and the silk dresses and the old lace; it burnt the nine lovely dolls; and it broke the heart under which the dolls had lain like little unborn children. That was the price of the master builder's success. He is married to a dead woman; and he is trying to atone by building her a new villa: a new tomb to replace the old home; for he is gnawed with remorse.

But the fire was not only a good building speculation: it also led to his obtaining commissions to build churches. And one triumphant day, when he was celebrating the completion of the giant tower he had added to the old church at Lysanger, it suddenly flashed on him that his house had been burnt, his wife's life laid waste, and his

own happiness destroyed, so that he might become a builder of churches. Now it happens that one of his difficulties as a builder is that he has a bad head for heights, and cannot venture even on a second floor balcony. Yet in the fury of that thought he mounts to the pinnacle of his tower, and there, face to face with God, who has, he feels, wasted the wife's gift of building up the souls of little children to make the husband a builder of steeples, he declares that he will never set hand to churchbuilding again, and will henceforth build nothing but homes for happier men than he. Which vow he keeps, only to find that the home, too, is a devouring idol, and that men and women have no longer any use for it.

In spite of his excitement, he very nearly breaks his neck after all; for among the crowd below there is a little devil of a girl who waves a white scarf and makes his head swim. This tiny animal is no other than the younger stepdaughter of Ellida, The Lady from the Sea, Hilda Wangel, of whose taste for "thrilling" sensations we had a glimpse in that play. On the same evening Solness is entertained at a club banquet, in consequence of which he is not in the most responsible condition when he returns to sup at the house of Dr. Wangel, who is putting him up for the night. He meets the imp there; thinks her like a little princess in her white dress; kisses her; and promises her to come back in ten years and carry her off to the kingdom of Orangia.

Perhaps it is only just to mention that he stoutly denies these indiscretions afterwards; though he admits that when he wishes something to happen between himself and somebody else, the somebody else always imagines it actually has happened.

The play begins ten years after the climbing of the tower. The younger generation knocks at the door with a vengeance. Hilda, now a vigorous young woman, and a great builder of castles in the air, bursts in on him and demands her kingdom; and very soon she sends him up a tower again (the tower of the new house) and waves her scarf to him as madly as ever. This time he really does break his neck; and so the story ends.

Little Eyolf

1894

Though the most mischievous ideals are social ideals which have become institutions, laws, and creeds, yet their evil must come to a personal point before they can strike down the individual. Jones is not struck down by an ideal in the abstract, but by Smith making monstrous claims or inflicting monstrous injuries on him in the name of an ideal. And it is fair to add that the ideals are sometimes beneficent, and their repudiation sometimes cruel. For ideals are in practice not so much matters of conscience as excuses for doing what we like; and thus it happens that of two people

worshipping the same ideals, one will be a detestable tyrant and the other a kindly and helpful friend of mankind. What makes the bad side of idealism so dangerous is that wicked people are allowed to commit crimes in the name of the ideal that would not be tolerated for a moment as open devilment. Perhaps the worst, because the commonest and most intimate cases, are to be found in family life. Even during the Reign of Terror, the chances of any particular Frenchman or Frenchwoman being guillotined were so small as to be negligible. Under Nero a Christian was far safer from being smeared with pitch and set on fire than he was from domestic trouble. If the private lives that have been wasted by idealistic persecution could be recorded and set against the public martyrdoms and slaughterings and torturings and imprisonments, our millions of private Neros and Torquemadas and Calvins, Bloody Maries and Cleopatras and Semiramises, would eclipse the few who have come to the surface of history by the accident of political or ecclesiastical conspicuousness.

Thus Ibsen, at the beginning of his greatness, shewed us Brand sacrificing his wife; and this was only the first of a series of similar exhibitions, ending, so far, in Solness sacrificing his wife and being himself sacrificed to a girl's enthusiasm. And he brings Solness to the point of rebelling furiously against the tyranny of his wife's ideal of home, and

declaring that "building homes for happy human beings is not worth a rap: men are not happy in these homes: I should not have been happy in such a home if I had had one." It is not surprising to find that Little Eyolf is about such a home.

This home clearly cannot be a working-class home. And here let it be said that the comparative indifference of the working class to Ibsen's plays is neither Ibsen's fault nor that of the working class. To the man who works for his living in modern society home is not the place where he lives, nor his wife the woman he lives with. Home is the roof under which he sleeps and eats; and his wife is the woman who makes his bed, cooks his meals, and looks after their children when they are neither in school nor in the streets, or who at least sees that the servants do these things. The man's work keeps him from home from eight to twelve hours a day. He is unconscious through sleep for another eight hours. Then there is the public house and the club. There is eating, washing, dressing, playing with the children or the dog, entertaining or visiting friends, reading, and pursuing hobbies such as gardening and the like. Obviously the home ideal cannot be tested fully under these conditions, which enable a married pair to see less and know less of one another than they do of those who work side by side with them. It is in the propertied class only that two people can really live together and devote themselves to one another if they want to. There are

certain businesses which men and women can conduct jointly, and certain professions which men can pursue at home; and in these the strain of idealism on marriage is more severe than when the two work separately. But the full strain comes on with the modern unearned income from investments, which does not involve even the management of an estate. And it is under this full strain that Ibsen tests it in Little Eyolf.

Shakespear, in a flash of insight which has puzzled many commentators, and even set them proposing alterations of a passage which they found unthinkable, has described one of his characters as "a fellow almost damned in a fair wife." There is no difficulty or obscurity about this phrase at all: you have only to look round at the men who have ventured to marry very fascinating women to see that most of them are not merely "almost damned" but wholly damned. Allmers, in Little Eyolf, is a fellow almost damned in a fair wife. She, Rita Allmers, has brought him "gold and green forests" (a reminiscence from an early play called The Feast at Solhoug), and not only troubles and uncentres him as only a woman can trouble and uncentre a man who is susceptible to her bodily attraction, but is herself furiously and jealously in love with him. In short, they form the ideal home of romance; and it would be hard to find a compacter or more effective formula for a small private hell. The "almost damned" are commonly saved by the fact that the devotion is usually on one side only, and that the lovely lady (or gentleman; for a woman almost damned in a fair husband is also a common object in domestic civilization), if she has only one husband, relieves the boredom of his devotion by having fifty courtiers. But Rita will neither share Allmers with anyone else nor be shared. He must be wholly and exclusively hers; and she must be wholly and exclusively his. By her gold and green forests she snatches him from his work as a schoolmaster and imprisons him in their house, where the poor wretch pretends to occupy himself by writing a book on Human Responsibility, and forming the character of their son, little Eyolf. For your male sultana takes himself very seriously indeed, as do most sultanas and others who are so closely shut up with their own vanities and appetites that they think the world a little thing to be moulded and arranged at their silly pleasure like a lump of plasticine. Rita is jealous of the book, and hates it not only because Allmers occupies himself with it instead of with her, but talks about it to his half-sister Asta, of whom she is of course also jealous. She is jealous of little Eyolf; and hates him too, because he comes between her and her prey.

One day, when the baby child is lying on the table, they have an amorous fit and forget all about him. He falls off the table and is crippled for life. He and his crutch become thenceforth a standing

reproach to them. They hate themselves; they hate each other; they hate him; their atmosphere of ideal conjugal love breeds hate at every turn: hatred masquerading as a loving bond that has been drawn closer and sanctified by their common misfortune. After ten years of this hideous slavery the man breaks loose: actually insists on going for a short trip into the mountains by himself. It is true that he reassures Rita by coming back before his time; but her conclusion that this was because he could not abstain from her society is rudely shattered by his conduct on his return. She dresses herself beautifully to receive him, and makes the seraglio as delightful as possible for their reunion; but he purposely arrives tired out, and takes refuge in the sleep of exhaustion, without a caress. As she says, quoting a popular poem when reproaching him for this afterwards, "There stood your champagne and you tasted it not." It soon appears that he has come to loathe his champagne, and that the escape into the mountains has helped him to loathe his situation to some extent, even to discovering the absurdity of his book on Human Responsibility, and the cruelty of his educational experiments on Eyolf. In future he is going to make Eyolf "an open air little boy," which of course involves being a good deal in the open air with him, and out of the seraglio. Then the woman's hatred of the child unveils itself; and she openly declares what she really feels as to this

little creature, with its "evil eyes," that has come between them.

At this point, very opportunely, comes the Rat Wife, who, like the Pied Piper, clears away rats for a consideration. Has Rita any little gnawing things she wants to get rid of? Here, it seems, is a helper and server for Rita. The Rat Wife's method is to bewitch the rats so that when she rows out to sea they follow her and are drowned. She describes this with a heart-breaking poetry that frightens Rita, who makes Allmers send her away. But a helper and server is not so easily exorcized. Rita's little gnawing thing, Eyolf, has come under the spell; and when the Rat Wife rows out to sea, he follows her and is drowned.

The family takes the event in a very proper spirit. Horror, lamentation, shrieks and tears, and all the customary homages to death and attestations of bereavement are duly and even sincerely gone through; for the shock of such an accident makes us all human for a moment. But next morning Allmers finds some difficulty in keeping it up, miserable as he is. He finds himself forgetting about Eyolf for several minutes, and thinking about other things, even about his breakfast; and in his idealistic self-devotion to artificial attitudes he reproaches himself and tries to force himself to keep thinking of Eyolf and being overwhelmed with grief about him. Besides, it is an excuse for avoiding his wife. The revulsion against his slavery to her has made

her presence unbearable to him. He can bear nobody but his half-sister Asta, whose relation to him is a most blessed comfort and relief because their blood kinship excludes from it all the torment and slavery of his relation to Rita. But this consolation is presently withdrawn; for Asta has just discovered, in some old correspondence, convincing proofs that she is not related to him at all; and the effect of the discovery has been to remove the inhibition which has hitherto limited her strong affection for him; so that she now perceives that she must leave him. Hitherto, she has refused, for his sake, the offers of Borgheim, an engineer who wants to marry her, but who, like Rita, wants to take her away and make her exclusively his own; for he, too, cannot share with anyone. And though both Allmers and Rita implore her to stay, dreading now nothing so much as being left alone with one another, she knows that she cannot stay innocently, and accepts the engineer and vanishes lest a worse thing should hefall

And now Rita has her man all to herself. Eyolf dead, Asta gone, the book on Human Responsibility thrown into the waste paper basket: there are no more rivals now, no more distractions: the field is clear for the ideal union of "two souls with but a single thought, two hearts that beat as one." The result may be imagined.

The situation is insufferable from the beginning. Allmers' attempts to avoid seeing or speaking to Rita are of course impracticable. Equally impracticable are their efforts to behave kindly to one another. They are presently at it hammer and tongs, each tearing the mask from the other's grief for the child, and leaving it exposed as their remorse: hers for having jealously hated Eyolf: his for having sacrificed him to his passion for Rita, and to the schoolmasterly vanity and folly which sees in the child nothing more than the vivisector sees in a guinea pig: something to experiment on with a view to rearranging the world to suit his own little ideas. If ever two cultivated souls of the propertied middle class were stripped naked and left bankrupt, these two are. They cannot bear to live; and yet they are forced to confess that they dare not kill themselves.

The solution of their problem, as far as it is solved, is, as coming from Ibsen, very remarkable. It is not, as might have been expected after his long propaganda of Individualism, that they should break up the seraglio and go out into the world until they have learnt to stand alone, and through that to accept companionship on honorable conditions only. Ibsen here explicitly insists for the first time that "we are members one of another," and that though the strongest man is he who stands alone, the man who is standing alone for his own sake solely is literally an idiot. It is indeed a staring fact in history and contemporary life that nothing is so gregarious as selfishness, and nothing so solitary

as the selflessness that loathes the word Altruism because to it there are no "others": it sees and feels in every man's case the image of its own. "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren ye have done it unto me" is not Altruism or Othersism. It is an explicit repudiation of the patronizing notion that "the least of these" is another to whom you are invited to be very nice and kind: in short, it accepts entire identification of "me" with "the least of these." The fashionably sentimental version, which runs, in effect, "If you subscribe eighteenpence to give this little dear a day in the country I shall regard it as a loan of one-and-sixpence to myself" is really more conceitedly remote from the spirit of the famous Christian saying than even the sham political economy that took in Mr. Gradgrind. Accordingly, if you would see industrial sweating at its vilest, you must go, not to the sempstresses who work for commercial firms, but to the victims of pious Altruistic Ladies' Work Guilds and the like, in which ladies with gold and green forests offer to "others" their blouses to be stitched at prices that the most sordid East End slave-driver would recoil from offering.

Thus we see that in Ibsen's mind, as in the actual history of the nineteenth century, the way to Communism lies through the most resolute and uncompromising Individualism. James Mill, with an inhuman conceit and pedantry which leaves the

fable of Allmers and Eyolf far behind, educated John Stuart Mill to be the arch Individualist of his time, with the result that John Stuart Mill became a Socialist quarter of a century before the rest of his set moved in that direction. Herbert Spencer lived to write despairing pamphlets against the Socialism of his ablest pupils. There is no hope in Individualism for egotism. When a man is at last brought face to face with himself by a brave Individualism, he finds himself face to face, not with an individual, but with a species, and knows that to save himself, he must save the race. He can have no life except a share in the life of the community; and if that life is unhappy and squalid, nothing that he can do to paint and paper and upholster and shut off his little corner of it can really rescue him from it.

It happens so to that bold Individualist Mrs. Rita Allmers. The Allmers are, of course, snobs, and have always been very determined that the common little children down at the pier should be taught their place as Eyolf's inferiors. They even go the length of discussing whether these dirty little wretches should not be punished for their cowardice in not rescuing Eyolf. Thereby they raise the terrible question whether they themselves, who are afraid to commit suicide in their misery, would have been any braver. There is nobody to comfort them; for the income from the gold and green forests, by enabling them to cut themselves

off from all the industry of the place, has led them into something like total isolation. They hate their neighbors as themselves. They are alone together with nothing to do but wear each other out and drive each other mad to an extent impossible under any other conditions. And Rita's plight is the more desperate of the two, because as she has been the more unscrupulous, the more exacting, she has left him something to look forward to: freedom from her. He is bent on that, at least: he will not live with her on any terms, not stay anywhere within reach of her: the one thing he craves is that he may never see her or speak to her again. That is the end of the "two souls with but a single thought," &c. But to her his release is only a supreme privation, the end of everything that gave life any meaning for her. She has not even egotism to fall back on.

At this pass, an annoyance of which she has often complained occurs again. The children down at the pier make a noise, playing and yelling as if Eyolf had never existed. It suddenly occurs to her that these are children too, just like Eyolf, and that they are suffering a good deal from neglect. After all, they too are little Eyolfs. Inasmuch as she can do it unto one of the least of these his brethren she can do it unto him. She determines to take the dirty little wretches in hand and look after them. It is at all events a more respectable plan than that of the day before, which was to throw herself away on

the first man she met if Allmers dared to think of anybody but her. And it has the domestic advantage that Allmers has nothing to fear from a woman who has something else to do than torment him with passions that devour and jealousies that enslave him. The world and the home suddenly take on their natural aspect. Allmers offers to stay and help her. And so they are delivered from their evil dream, and, let us hope, live happily ever after.

John Gabriel Borkman

1896

In Little Eyolf the shadow of death lifted for a moment; but now we enter it again. Here the persons of the drama are not only dead but buried. Borkman is a Napoleon of finance. He has the root of finance in him in a born love of money in its final reality: a love, that is, of precious metals. He does not dream of beautiful ladies calling to him for knightly rescue from dragons and tyrants, but of metals imprisoned in undiscovered mines, calling to him to release them and send them out into all lands fertilizing, encouraging, creating. Music to him means the ring of the miner's pick and hammer: the eternal night underground is as magical to him as the moonlit starlit night of the upper air to the romantic poet. This love of metal is common

enough: no man feels towards a cheque for £20 as he does towards twenty gold sovereigns: he will part from the paper with less of a pang than from the coins. There are misers whose fingers tremble when they touch gold, but close steadily on banknotes. True love of money is, in fact, a passion based on a physical appetite for precious metals. It is not greed: you cannot call a man who starves himself sooner than part with one sovereign from his sack of sovereigns, greedy. If he did the same for the love of God, you would call him a saint: if for the love of a woman, a perfect gentle knight. Men grow rich according to the strength of their obsession by this passion: its great libertines become Napoleons of finance: its narrow debauchees become misers, petty moneylenders, and the like. It must not be looked for in all our millionaires, because most of these are rich by pure accident (our abandonment of industry to the haphazard scrambles of private adventurers necessarily produces occasional windfalls which enrich the man who happens to be on the spot), as may be seen when the lucky ones are invited to display their supposed Napoleonic powers in spending their windfalls, when they reveal themselves as quite ordinary mortals, if not indeed sometimes as exceptionally resourceless ones. Besides, finance is one business, and industrial organization another: the man with a passion for altering the map by digging isthmuses never thinks of money save as a means to his

end. But those who as financiers have passionately "made" money instead of merely holding their hats under an accidental shower of it, will be found to have a genuine disinterested love of it. It is not easy to say how common this passion is. Poverty is general, which would seem to indicate a general lack of it; but poverty is mainly the result of organized robbery and oppression (politely called Capitalism) starving the passion for gold as it starves all the passions. The evidence is further confused by the decorative instinct: some men will load their fingers and shirt-fronts with rings and studs, whilst others of equal means are ringless and fasten their shirts with sixpennorth of mother of pearl. But it is significant that Plato, and, following him, Sir Thomas More, saw with Ibsen, and made complete indifference to the precious metals, minted or not, a necessary qualification for aristocracy. This indifference is, as a matter of fact, so characteristic of our greatest non-industrial men that when they do not happen to inherit property they are generally poor and in difficulties. Therefore we who have never cared for money enough to do more than keep our heads above water, and are therefore tempted to regard ourselves as others regard us (that is, as failures, or, at best, as persons of no account) may console ourselves with the reflection that money-hunger is no more respectable than gluttony, and that unless its absence or feebleness is only a symptom of a general want of power to care

for anything at all, it usually means that the soul has risen above it to higher concerns.

All this is necessary to the appreciation of Ibsen's presentment of the Napoleon of finance. Ibsen does not take him superficially: he goes to the poetic basis of the type: the love of gold—actual metallic gold—and the idealization of gold through that love.

Borkman meets the Misses Rentheim: two sisters: the elder richer than the younger. He falls in love with the younger; and she falls in love with him; but the love of gold is the master passion: he marries the elder. Yet he respects his secondary passion in the younger. When he speculates with other people's securities he spares hers. On the point of bringing off a great stroke of finance, the other securities are missed; and he is imprisoned for embezzlement. That is the end of him. He comes out of prison a ruined man and a dead man, and would not have even a tomb to sleep in but for the charity of Ella Rentheim, whose securities he spared when he broke her heart. She maintains his old home for him.

He now enters on the grimmest lying in state ever exposed to public view by mortal dramatist. His wife, a proud woman, must live in the same house with the convicted thief who has disgraced her, because she has nowhere else to lay her head; but she will not see him nor speak to him. She sits downstairs in the drawing-room eating the bitter bread of her sister's charity, and listening with

loathing to her husband's steps as he paces to and fro in the long gallery upstairs "like a sick wolf." She listens not for days but for years. And her one hope is that her son Erhart will rehabilitate the family name; repay the embezzled money; and lead her from her tomb up again into honor and prosperity. To this task she has devoted his life.

Borkman has quite another plan. He is still Napoleon, and will return from his Elba to scatter his enemies and complete the stroke that ill-luck and the meddlesomeness of the law frustrated. But he is proud: prouder than Napoleon. He will not come back to the financial world until it finds out that it cannot do without him, and comes to ask him to resume his place at the head of the board. He keeps himself in readiness for that deputation. He is always dressed for it; and when he hears steps on the threshold, he stands up by the table; puts one hand into the breast of his coat; and assumes the attitude of a conqueror receiving suppliants. And this also goes on not for days but for years, long after the world has forgotten him, and there is nobody likely to come for him except Peer Gynt's button moulder.

Borkman, like all madmen, cannot nourish his delusion without some response from without. One of the victims of his downfall is a clerk who once wrote a tragedy, and has lived ever since in his own imagination as a poet. His family ridicules his tragedy and his pretensions; and as he is a poor

ineffectual little creature who has never lived enough to feel dignified among the dead, like Borkman, he too finds it hard to keep his illusion alive without help. Fortunately he has admired Borkman, the great financier; and Borkman, when he has ruined him and ruined himself, is quite willing to be admired by this humble victim, and even to reward him by a pretence of believing in his poetic genius. Thus the two form one of those Mutual Admiration Societies on which the world so largely subsists, and make the years in the long gallery tolerable by flattering each other. There are even moments when Borkman is nerved to the point of starting for his second advent as a great financial redeemer. On such occasions the woman downstairs hears the footsteps of the sick wolf on the stairs approaching the hatstand where his hat and stick have waited unused all the years of his entombment; but they never reach that first stage of the journey. They always turn back into the gallery again.

This melancholy household of the dead crumbles to dust at the knock of the younger generation at the door. Erhart, dedicated by his mother to the task of paying his father's debts and retrieving his ruin, and by his aunt to the task of sweetening her last days with his grateful love, has dedicated himself to his own affairs—for the moment mostly love affairs—and has not the faintest intention of concerning himself with the bygone career of the crazy ex-felon upstairs or the sentimentalities of the old

maid downstairs. He detests the house and the atmosphere, and associates his aunt's broken heart with nothing more important than the scent of stale lavender, which he dislikes. He spends his time happily in the house of a pretty lady in the neighborhood, who has been married and divorced, and knows how to form an adolescent youth. And as to the unpardonable enemy of the family, one Hinkel, who betrayed Borkman to the police and rose on his ruins, Erhart cares so little for that old story that he goes to Hinkel's parties and enjoys himself there very much. And when at last the pretty lady raises his standard of happiness to a point at which the old house and the old people become impossible, unthinkable, unbearable, he goes off with her to Italy and leaves the dead to bury their dead.

The details of this catastrophe make the play. The fresh air and the light of day break into the tomb; and its inhabitants crumble into dust. Foldal, the poet clerk, lets slip the fact that he has not the slightest belief in Borkman's triumphant return to the world; and Borkman retorts by telling him he is no poet. After this comedy comes the tragedy of the son's defection; and amid the recriminations of the broken heart, the baffled pride, and the shattered dreams, the castles in the air vanish and reveal the open grave they have hidden. Poor Foldal, limping home after being run over by a sledge in which his daughter is running

away to act as "second string" and chaperone for Erhart and the pretty lady, is the only one who is wanted in the world, since he must still work for his derisive family. But Borkman returns to his dream, and ventures out of doors at last, not this time to resume his place as governor of the bank, but to release the imprisoned metal that rings and sings to him from the earth. In other words, to die in the open, mad but happy, whilst the two sisters, "we two shadows," end their strife over his body.

When We Dead Awaken

1900

This play, the last work of Ibsen, and at first the least esteemed, has had its prophecy so startlingly fulfilled in England that nobody will now question the intensity of its inspiration. With us the dead have awakened in the very manner prefigured in the play. The simplicity and brevity of the story is so obvious, and the enormous scope of the conception so difficult to comprehend, that many of Ibsen's most devoted admirers failed to do it justice. They knew that he was a man of seventy, and were prepossessed with the belief that at such an age his powers must be falling off. It certainly was easier at that time to give the play up as a bad job than to explain it. Now that the

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great awakening of women which we call the Militant Suffrage Movement is upon us, and you may hear our women publicly and passionately paraphrasing Ibsen's heroine without having read a word of the play, the matter is simpler. There is no falling-off here in Ibsen. It may be said that this is physically impossible; but those who say so forget that the natural decay of a writer's powers may shew itself in two ways. The inferiority of the work produced is only one way. The other is the production of equally good or even better work with much greater effort than it would have cost its author ten years earlier. Ibsen produced this play with great difficulty in twice as long a period as had before sufficed; and even at that the struggle left his mind a wreck; for he not only never wrote another play, but, like an overstrained athlete, lost even the normal mental capacity of an ordinary man. Yet it would be hard to say that the play was not worth the sacrifice. It shews no decay of Ibsen's highest qualities: his magic is nowhere more potent. It is shorter than usual: that is all. The extraordinarily elaborate private history, family and individual, of the personages, which lies behind the action of the other plays, is replaced by a much simpler history of a few people in their general human relations without any family history at all. And the characteristically conscientious fitting of the play to the mechanical conditions of oldfashioned stages has given way to demands that

even the best equipped and largest modern stages cannot easily comply with; for the second act takes place in a valley; and though it is easy to represent a valley by a painted scene when the action is confined to one spot in the foreground, it is a different matter when the whole valley has to be practicable, and the movements of the figures cover distances which do not exist on the stage, and cannot, as far as my experience goes, be satisfactorily simulated by the stage carpenter, though they are easy enough for the painter. I should attach no importance at all to this in a writer less mindful of technical limitations, and less ingenious in circumventing them than Ibsen, who was for some years a professional stage manager; but in his case it is clear that in calling on the theatre to expand to his requirements instead of, as his custom was, limiting his scene of action to the possibilities of a modest provincial theatre, he knew quite well what he was doing. Here, then, we have three differences from the earlier plays. None of them are inferiorities. They are proper to the difference of subject, and in fact increased the difficulty of the playwright's task by throwing him back on sheer dramatic power, unaided by the cheaper interest that can be gained on the stage by mere ingenuity of construction. Ibsen, who has always before played on the spectator by a most elaborate gradual development which would have satisfied Dumas, here throws all his cards on the table as

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rapidly as possible, and proceeds to deal intensively with a situation that never alters.

This situation is simple enough in its general statement, though it is so complex in its content that it raises the whole question of domestic civilization. Take a man and a woman at the highest pitch of natural ability and charm yet attained, and enjoying all the culture that modern art and literature can offer them; and what does it all come to? Contrast them with an essentially uncivilized pair, with a man who lives for hunting and eating and ravishing, and whose morals are those of the bully with the strong hand: in short, a man from the stone age as we conceive it (such men are still common enough in the classes that can afford the huntsman's life); and couple him with a woman who has no interest or ambition in life except to be captured by such a man (and of these we have certainly no lack). Then face this question. What is there to choose between these two pairs? Is the cultured gifted man less hardened, less selfish towards the woman, than the paleolithic man? Is the woman less sacrificed, less enslaved, less dead spiritually in the one case than in the other? Modern culture, except when it has rotted into mere cynicism, shrieks that the question is an insult. The stone age, anticipating Ibsen's reply, guffaws heartily and says, "Bravo, Ibsen!" Ibsen's reply is that the sacrifice of the woman of the stone age to fruitful passions which she herself

shares is as nothing compared to the wasting of the modern woman's soul to gratify the imagination and stimulate the genius of the modern artist, poet, and philosopher. He shews us that no degradation ever devized or permitted is as disastrous as this degradation; that through it women die into luxuries for men, and yet can kill them; that men and women are becoming conscious of this; and that what remains to be seen as perhaps the most interesting of all imminent social developments is what will happen "when we dead awaken."

Ibsen's greatest contemporary outside his own art was Rodin the French sculptor. Whether Ibsen knew this, or whether he was inspired to make his hero a sculptor just as Dickens was inspired to make Pecksniff an architect, is not known. At all events, having to take a type of the highest and ablest masculine genius, he made him a sculptor, and called his name, not Rodin, but Rubeck: a curious assonance, if it was not intentional. Rubeck is as able an individual as our civilization can produce. The difficulty of presenting such an individual in fiction is that it can be done only by a writer who occupies that position himself; for a dramatist cannot conceive anything higher than himself. No doubt he can invest an imaginary figure with all sorts of imaginary gifts. A drunken author may make his hero sober; an ugly, weak, puny, timid one may make him a Hyperion or a Hercules; a deaf mute may write novels in

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which the lover is an orator and his mistress a prima donna; but whatever ornaments and accomplishments he may pile up on his personages, he cannot give them greater souls than his own. Defoe could invent wilder adventures for Robinson Crusoe than Shakespear for Hamlet; but he could not make that mean adventurer, with his dull eulogies of the virtues of "the middle station of life," anything even remotely like Shakespear's

prince.

For Ibsen this difficulty did not exist. He knew quite well that he was one of the greatest men living; so he simply said "Suppose ME to be a sculptor instead of a playwright," and the thing was done. Thus he came forward himself to plead to his own worst indictment of modern culture. One of the touches by which he identifies himself has all the irony of his earliest work. Rubeck has to make money out of human vanity, as all sculptors must nowadays, by portrait busts; but he revenges himself by studying and bringing out in his sitters "the respectable pompous horse faces, and selfopinionated donkey-muzzles, and lop-eared lowbrowed dog-skulls, and fatted swine-snouts, and dull brutal bull fronts" that lurk in so many human faces. All artists who deal with humanity do this, more or less. Leonardo da Vinci ruled his notebook in columns headed fox, wolf, etc., and made notes of faces by ticking them off in these columns, finding this, apparently, as satisfactory a

memorandum as a drawing. Domestic animals, terriers, pugs, poultry, parrots, and cockatoos, are specially valuable to the caricaturist, as giving the original types which explain many faces. Ibsen must have classified his acquaintances a good deal in this way, not without an occasional chuckle; and his attribution of the practice to Rubeck is a confession of it.

Rubeck makes his reputation, as sculptors often do, by a statue of a woman. Not, be it observed, of a dress and a pair of boots, with a head protruding from them, but of a woman from the hand of Nature. It is worth noting here that we have hardly any portraits, either painted or carved, of our famous men and women or even of our nearest and dearest friends. Charles Dickens is known to us as a guy with a human head and face on top. Shakespear is a laundry advertisement of a huge starched collar with his head sticking out of it. Dr. Johnson is a face looking through a wig perched on a snuffy suit of old clothes. All the great women of history are fashion plates of their period. Bereaved parents, orphans, and widows weep fondly over photographs of uniforms, frock coats, gowns, and hats, for the sake of the little scrap of humanity that is allowed to peep through these trappings. Women with noble figures and plain or elderly faces are outdressed and outfaced by rivals who, if revealed as they really are, would be hardly human. Carlyle staggers humanity by

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inviting the House of Commons to sit unclothed, so that we, and they themselves, shall know them

for what they really are.

Hence it is that the artist who adores mankind as his highest subject, always comes back to the reality beneath the clothes. His claim to be allowed to do this is so irresistible that in every considerable city in England you will find, supported by the rates of prudish chapel goers, and even managed and inspected by committees of them, an art school where, in the "life class" (significant term!) young women posed in ridiculous and painful attitudes by a drawing master, and mostly under the ugliest circumstances of light, color, and surroundings, earn a laborious wage by allowing a crowd of art students to draw their undraped figures. It is a joylessly grotesque spectacle: one wonders whether anything can really be learnt from it; for never have I seen one of these school models in an attitude which any human being would, unless the alternative were starvation, voluntarily sustain for thirty seconds, or assume on any natural occasion or provocation whatever. Male models are somewhat less slavish: and the stalwart laborer or oliveskinned young Italian who poses before a crowd of easels with ludicrously earnest young ladies in blue or vermilion gowns and embroidered pinafores, drawing away at him for dear life, is usually much more comfortably and possibly posed. But Life will not yield up her more intimate secrets for eighteen-

pence an hour; and these earnest young ladies and artsome young men, when they have filled portfolios with such sordid life studies, know less about living humanity than they did before, and very much less about even the mechanism of the body and the shape of its muscles than they could learn less inhumanly from a series of modern kinemato-

graphs of figures in motion.

Rubeck does not make his statues in a class at a municipal art school by looking at a weary girl in a tortured attitude with a background of matchboarding, under a roof of girders, and with the ghastly light of a foggy, smoky manufacturing town making the light side of her flesh dirty yellow and the shadowed side putrid purple. He knows better than that. He finds a beautiful woman, and tells her his vision of a statue of The Resurrection Day in the form of a woman "filled with a sacred joy at finding herself unchanged in the higher, freer, happier region after the long dreamless sleep of death." And the woman, immediately seizing his inspiration and sharing it, devotes herself to the work, not merely as his model, but as his friend, his helper, fellow worker, comrade, all things, save one, that may be humanly natural and necessary between them for an unreserved co-operation in the great work. The one exception is that they are not lovers; for the sculptor's ideal is a virgin, or, as he calls it, a pure woman.

And her reward is that when the work is finished

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and the statue achieved, he says "Thank you for a priceless EPISODE," at which significant word, revealing as it does that she has, after all, been nothing to him but a means to his end, she leaves him and drops out of his life. To earn her living she must then pose, not to him, but before crowds in Variety Theatres in living pictures, gaining much money by her beauty, winning rich husbands, and driving them all to madness or to death by "a fine sharp dagger which she always has with her in bed," much as Rita Allmers nearly killed her husband. And she calls the statue her child and Rubeck's, as the book in Hedda Gabler was the child of Thea and Eilert Lövberg. But finally she too goes mad under the strain.

Rubeck presently meets a pretty Stone Age woman, and marries her. And as he is not a Stone Age man, and she is bored to distraction by his cultured interests, he disappoints her as thoroughly as she disgusts and wearies him: the symptoms being that though he builds her a splendid villa, full of works of art and so forth, neither he nor she can settle down quietly; and they take trips here, trips there, trips anywhere to escape being alone and at

home together.

But the retribution for his egotism takes a much subtler form, and strikes at a much more vital place in him: namely, his artistic inspiration. Working with Irene, the lost model, he had achieved a perfect work of art; and, having achieved it, had supposed

that he was done with her. But art is not so simple as that. The moment she forsakes him and leaves him to the Stone Age woman and to his egotism, he no longer sees the perfection of his work. He becomes dissatisfied with it. He sees that it can be improved: for instance, why should it consist of a figure of Irene alone? Why should he not be in it himself? Is he not a far more important factor in the conception? He changes the single figure design to a group. He adds a figure of himself. He finds that the woman's figure, with its wonderful expression of gladness, puts his own image out of countenance. He rearranges the group so as to give himself more prominence. Even so the gladness outshines him; and at last he "tones it down," striking the gladness out with his chisel, and making his own expression the main interest of the group. But he cannot stop there. Having destroyed the thing that was superior to him, he now wants to introduce things that are inferior. He carves clefts in the earth at the feet of his figure, and from these clefts he makes emerge the folk with the horse faces and the swine snouts that are nearer the beast than his own fine face. Then he is satisfied with his work; and it is in this form that it makes him famous and is finally placed in a public museum. In his days with Irene, they used to call these museums the prisons of works of art. Precisely what the Futurist painters of today are calling them.

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And now the play begins. Irene comes from her madhouse to a "health resort." Thither also comes Rubeck, wandering about with the Stone Age woman to avoid being left at home with her. Thither also comes the man of the Stone Age with his dogs and guns, and carries off the Stone Age woman, to her husband's great relief. Rubeck and Irene meet; and as they talk over old times, she learns, bit by bit, what has happened to the statue, and is about to kill him when she realizes, also bit by bit, that the history of its destruction is the history of his own, and that as he used her up and left her dead, so with her death the life went out of him. But, like Nora in A Doll's House, she sees the possibility of a miracle. The dead may awaken if only they can find an honest and natural relation in which they shall no longer sacrifice and slay one another. She asks him to climb to the top of a mountain with her and see that promised land. Half way up, they meet the Stone Age pair hunting. There is a storm coming. It is death to go up and danger to climb down. The Stone Age man faces the danger and carries his willing prey down. The others are beyond the fear of death, and go up. And that is the end of them and of the plays of Henrik Ibsen.

The end, too, let us hope, of the idols, domestic, moral, religious, and political, in whose name we have been twaddled into misery and confusion and hypocrisy unspeakable. For Ibsen's dead hand still

keeps the grip he laid on their masks when he first tore them off; and whilst that grip holds, all the King's horses and all the King's men will find it hard to set those Humpty-Dumpties up again.

THE LESSON OF THE PLAYS

In following this sketch of the plays written by Ibsen to illustrate his thesis that the real slavery of today is slavery to ideals of goodness, it may be that readers who have conned Ibsen through idealist spectacles have wondered that I could so pervert the utterances of a great poet. Indeed I know already that many of those who are most fascinated by the poetry of the plays will plead for any explanation of them rather than that given by Ibsen himself in the plainest terms through the mouths of Mrs. Alving, Relling, and the rest. No great writer uses his skill to conceal his meaning. There is a tale by a famous Scotch story-teller which would have suited Ibsen exactly if he had hit on it first. Jeanie Deans sacrificing her sister's life on the scaffold to ideal truthfulness is far more horrible than the sacrifice in Rosmersholm; and the deus ex machina expedient by which Scott makes the end of his story agreeable is no solution of the ethical problem raised, but only a puerile evasion of it. He dared not, when it came to the point, allow

Effie to be hanged for the sake of Jeanie's ideals.1 Nevertheless, if I were to pretend that Scott wrote The Heart of Midlothian to shew that people are led to do as mischievous, as unnatural, as murderous things by their religious and moral ideals as by their envy and ambition, it would be easy to confute me from the pages of the book itself. And Ibsen, like Scott, has made his opinion plain. If any one attempts to maintain that Ghosts is a polemic in favor of indissoluble monogamic marriage, or that The Wild Duck was written to inculcate that truth should be told for its own sake, they must burn the text of the plays if their contention is to stand. The reason that Scott's story is tolerated by those who shrink from Ghosts is not that it is less terrible, but that Scott's views are familiar to all well-brought-up ladies and gentlemen, whereas Ibsen's are for the moment so strange to them as to be unthinkable. He is so great a poet that the idealist finds himself in the dilemma of being unable to conceive that such a genius should have an ignoble meaning, and yet equally unable to conceive his real meaning otherwise than as ignoble. Consequently he misses the meaning altogether in spite of Ibsen's

¹ The common-sense solution of the ethical problem has often been delivered by acclamation in the theatre. Many years ago I witnessed a performance of a melodrama founded on this story. After the painful trial scene, in which Jeanie Deans condemns her sister to death by refusing to swear to a perfectly innocent fiction, came a scene in the prison. "If it had been me," said the jailor, "I wad ha sworn a hole through an iron pot." The roar of applause which burst from the pit and gallery was thoroughly Ibsenist in sentiment. The speech, by the way, must have been a gag of the actor's: at all events I cannot find it in the acting edition of the play.

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explicit and circumstantial insistence on it, and proceeds to substitute a meaning congenial to his

own ideal of nobility.

Ibsen's deep sympathy with his idealist figures seems to countenance this confusion. Since it is on the weaknesses of the higher types of character that idealism seizes, his most tragic examples of vanity. selfishness, folly, and failure are not vulgar villains, but men who in an ordinary novel or melodrama would be heroes. Brand and Rosmer, who drive those they love to death, do so with all the fine airs of the Sophoclean or Shakespearean good man persecuted by Destiny. Hilda Wangel, who kills the Master Builder literally to amuse herself, is the most fascinating of sympathetic girl-heroines. The ordinary Philistine commits no such atrocities: he marries the woman he likes and lives with her more or less happily ever after; but that is not because he is greater than Brand or Rosmer: he is less. The idealist is a more dangerous animal than the Philistine just as a man is a more dangerous animal than a sheep. Though Brand virtually murdered his wife, I can understand many a woman, comfortably married to an amiable Philistine, reading the play and envying the victim her husband. For when Brand's wife, having made the sacrifice he has exacted, tells him that he was right; that she is happy now; that she sees God face to face; and then reminds him that "whoso sees Jehovah dies," he instinctively clasps his hands over her

eyes; and that action raises him at once far above the criticism that sneers at idealism from beneath, instead of surveying it from the clear ether above, which can only be reached through its mists.

If, in my account of the plays, I have myself suggested false judgments by describing the errors of the idealists in the terms of the life they have risen above rather than in those of the life they fall short of, I can only plead, with but moderate disrespect for the general reader, that if I had done otherwise I should have failed wholly to make my exposition intelligible. Indeed accurate terms for realist morality, though they are to be found in the Bible, are so out of fashion and forgotten that in this very distinction between idealism and realism, I am forced to insist on a sense of the words which, had not Ibsen forced my hand, I should perhaps have conveyed otherwise, to avoid the conflict of many of its applications with the vernacular use of the words.

This, however, was a trifle compared to the difficulty which arose from our inveterate habit of labelling men with the abstract names of their qualities without the slightest reference to the underlying will which sets these qualities in action. At an anniversary celebration of the Paris Commune of 1871, I was struck by the fact that no speaker could find a eulogy for the Federals which would not have been equally appropriate to the peasants of La Vendée who fought for their tyrants against

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the French revolutionists, or to the Irishmen and Highlanders who fought for the Stuarts at the Boyne or Culloden. The statements that the slain members of the Commune were heroes who died for a noble ideal would have left a stranger quite as much in the dark about them as the counter statements, once common enough in our newspapers, that they were incendiaries and assassins. Our obituary notices are examples of the same ambiguity. Of all the public men lately deceased when Ibsenism was first discussed in England, none was made more interesting by strongly marked personal characteristics than the famous atheist orator Charles Bradlaugh. He was not in the least like any other notable member of the House of Commons. Yet when the obituary notices appeared, with the usual string of qualities: eloquence, determination, integrity, strong common-sense, and so on, it would have been possible, by merely expunging all names and other external details from these notices, to leave the reader entirely unable to say whether the subject of them was Gladstone, Lord Morley, William Stead, or any one else no more like Bradlaugh than Garibaldi or the late Cardinal Newman, whose obituary certificates of morality might nevertheless have been reprinted almost verbatim for the occasion without any gross incongruity. Bradlaugh had been the subject of many sorts of newspaper notices in his time. Thirty years ago, when the middle classes supposed him

to be a revolutionist, the string of qualities which the press hung upon him were all evil ones, great stress being laid on the fact that as he was an atheist it would be an insult to God to admit him to Parliament. When it became apparent that he was an anti-socialist force in politics, he, without any recantation of his atheism, at once had the string of evil qualities exchanged for a rosary of good ones; but it is hardly necessary to add that neither the old badge nor the new could ever give any inquirer the least clue to the sort of man he actually was: he might have been Oliver Cromwell or Wat Tyler or Jack Cade, Penn or Wilberforce or Wellington, the late Mr. Hampden of flat-earth-theory notoriety or Proudhon or the Archbishop of Canterbury, for all the distinction such labels could give him one way or the other. The worthlessness of these abstract descriptions is recognized in practice every day. Tax a stranger before a crowd with being a thief, a coward, and a liar; and the crowd will suspend its judgment until you answer the question, "What's he done?" Attempt to take up a collection for him on the ground that he is an upright, fearless, high-principled hero; and the same question must be answered before a penny goes into the hat.

The reader must therefore discount those partialities which I have permitted myself to express in telling the stories of the plays. They are as much beside the mark as any other example of the sort

of criticism which seeks to create an impression favorable or otherwise to Ibsen by simply pasting his characters all over with good or bad conduct marks. If any person cares to describe Hedda Gabler as a modern Lucretia who preferred death to dishonor, and Thea Elvsted as an abandoned, perjured strumpet who deserted the man she had sworn before her God to love, honor, and obey until her death, the play contains conclusive evidence establishing both points. If the critic goes on to argue that as Ibsen manifestly means to recommend Thea's conduct above Hedda's by making the end happier for her, the moral of the play is a vicious one, that, again, cannot be gainsaid. If, on the other hand, Ghosts be defended, as the dramatic critic of Piccadilly did defend it, because it throws into divine relief the beautiful figure of the simple and pious Pastor Manders, the fatal compliment cannot be parried. When you have called Mrs. Alving an emancipated woman or an unprincipled one, Alving a debauchee or a victim of society, Nora a fearless and noble-hearted woman or a shocking little liar and an unnatural mother, Helmer a selfish hound or a model husband and father. according to your bias, you have said something which is at once true and false, and in both cases perfectly idle.

The statement that Ibsen's plays have animmoral tendency, is, in the sense in which it is used, quite true. Immorality does not necessarily imply mis-

chievous conduct: it implies conduct, mischievous or not, which does not conform to current ideals. All religions begin with a revolt against morality. and perish when morality conquers them and stamps out such words as grace and sin, substituting for them morality and immorality. Bunyan places the town of Morality, with its respectable leading citizens Mr. Legality and Mr. Civility, close to the City of Destruction. In the United States today he would be imprisoned for this. Born as I was in the seventeenth century atmosphere of mid-nineteenth century Ireland, I can remember when men who talked about morality were suspected of reading Tom Paine, if not of being downright atheists. Ibsen's attack on morality is a symptom of the revival of religion, not of its extinction. He is on the side of the prophets in having devoted himself to shewing that the spirit or will of Man is constantly outgrowing the ideals, and that therefore thoughtless conformity to them is constantly producing results no less tragic than those which follow thoughtless violation of them. Thus the main effect of his plays is to keep before the public the importance of being always prepared to act immorally. He reminds men that they ought to be as careful how they yield to a temptation to tell the truth as to a temptation to hold their tongues, and he urges upon women who either cannot or will not marry that the inducements held out to them by society to preserve their virginity and

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refrain from motherhood, may be called temptations as logically as the inducements to the contrary held out by individuals and by their own temperaments, the practical decision depending on circumstances just as much as a decision between walking and taking a cab, however less trivial both the action and the circumstances may be. He protests against the ordinary assumption that there are certain moral institutions which justify all means used to maintain them, and insists that the supreme end shall be the inspired, eternal, ever growing one, not the external unchanging, artificial one; not the letter but the spirit; not the contract but the object of the contract; not the abstract law but the living will. And because the will to change our habits and thus defy morality arises before the intellect can reason out any racially beneficent purpose in the change, there is always an interval during which the individual can say no more than that he wants to behave immorally because he likes, and because he will feel constrained and unhappy if he acts otherwise. For this reason it is enormously important that we should "mind our own business" and let other people do as they like unless we can prove some damage beyond the shock to our feelings and prejudices. It is easy to put revolutionary cases in which it is so impossible to draw the line that they will always be decided in practice more or less by physical force; but for all ordinary purposes of government and social conduct the distinction is a

commonsense one. The plain working truth is that it is not only good for people to be shocked occasionally, but absolutely necessary to the progress of society that they should be shocked pretty often. But it is not good for people to be garotted occasionally, or at all. That is why it is a mistake to treat an atheist as you treat a garotter, or to put "bad taste" on the footing of theft and murder. The need for freedom of evolution is the sole basis of toleration, the sole valid argument against Inquisitions and Censorships, the sole reason for not burning heretics and sending every eccentric person to the madhouse.)

In short, our ideals, like the gods of old, are constantly demanding human sacrifices. Let none of them, says Ibsen, be placed above the obligation to prove itself worth the sacrifices it demands; and let everyone religiously refuse to sacrifice himself and others from the moment he loses his faith in the validity of the ideal. Of course it will be said here by incorrigibly slipshod readers that this, far from being immoral, is the highest morality; but I really will not waste further definition on those who will neither mean one thing or another by a word nor allow me to do so. Suffice it that among those who are not ridden by current ideals no question as to the ethical soundness of Ibsen's plays will ever arise; and among those who are so ridden his plays will be denounced as immoral, and cannot be defended against the accusation.

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There can be no question as to the effect likely to be produced on an individual by his conversion from the ordinary acceptance of current ideals as safe standards of conduct, to the vigilant openmindedness of Ibsen. It must at once greatly deepen the sense of moral responsibility. Before conversion the individual anticipates nothing worse in the way of examination at the judgment bar of his conscience than such questions as, Have you kept the commandments? Have you obeyed the law? Have you attended church regularly? paid your rates and taxes to Cæsar? and contributed, in reason, to charitable institutions? It may be hard to do all these things; but it is still harder not to do them, as our ninety-nine moral cowards in the hundred well know. And even a scoundrel can do them all and yet live a worse life than the smuggler or prostitute who must answer No all through the catechism. Substitute for such a technical examination one in which the whole point to be settled is, Guilty or Not Guilty? one in which there is no more and no less respect for virginity than for incontinence, for subordination than for rebellion, for legality than for illegality, for piety than for blasphemy: in short, for the standard qualities than for the standard faults, and immediately, instead of lowering the ethical standard by relaxing the tests of worth, you raise it by increasing their stringency to a point at which no mere Pharisaism or moral cowardice can pass them.

Naturally this does not please the Pharisee. The respectable lady of the strictest Church principles, who has brought up her children with such relentless regard to their ideal morality that if they have any spirit left in them by the time they arrive at years of independence they use their liberty to rush deliriously to the devil: this unimpeachable woman has always felt it unjust that the respect she wins should be accompanied by deep-seated detestation, whilst the latest spiritual heiress of Nell Gwynne, whom no respectable person dare bow to in the street, is a popular idol. The reason is—though the idealist lady does not know it—that Nell Gwynne is a better woman than she; and the abolition of the idealist test which brings her out a worse one, and its replacement by the realist test which would shew the true relation between them, would be a most desirable step forward in public morals, especially as it would act impartially, and set the good side of the Pharisee above the bad side of the Bohemian as ruthlessly as it would set the good side of the Bohemian above the bad side of the Pharisee.1 For as long as convention goes counter to reality in these matters, people will be led into Hedda Gabler's error of making an ideal of vice.

¹ The warning implied in this sentence is less needed now than it was twenty years ago. The association of Bohemianism with the artistic professions and with revolutionary political views has been weakened by the revolt of the children of the Bohemians against its domestic squalor and social outlawty. Bohemianism is now rather one of the stigmata of the highly conservative "smart sets" of the idle rich than of the studio, the stage, and the Socialist organizations. (1912).

If we maintain the convention that the distinction between Catherine of Russia and Queen Victoria. between Nell Gwynne and Mrs. Proudie, is the distinction between a bad woman and a good woman, we need not be surprised when those who sympathize with Catherine and Nell conclude that it is better to be a loose woman than a strict one, and go on recklessly to conceive a prejudice against teetotalism and monogamy, and a prepossession in favour of alcoholic excitement and promiscuous amours. Ibsen himself is kinder to the man who has gone his own way as a rake and a drunkard than to the man who is respectable because he dare not be otherwise We find that the franker and healthier a boy is, the more certain is he to prefer pirates and highwaymen, or Dumas musketeers, to "pillars of society" as his favorite heroes of romance. We have already seen both Ibsenites and anti-Ibsenites who seem to think that the cases of Nora and Mrs. Elysted are meant to establish a golden rule for women who wish to be 'emancipated': the said golden rule being simply, Run away from your husband. But in Ibsen's view of life, that would come under the same condemnation as the ecclesiastical rule, Cleave to your husband until death do you part. Most people know of a case or two in which it would be wise for a wife to follow the example of Nora or even of Mrs. Elvsted. But they must also know cases in which the results of such a course would be as

tragi-comic as those of Gregers Werle's attempt in The Wild Duck to do for the Ekdal household what Lona Hessel did for the Bernick household. What Ibsen insists on is that there is no golden rule; that conduct must justify itself by its effect upon life and not by its conformity to any rule or ideal. And since life consists in the fulfilment of the will, which is constantly growing, and cannot be fulfilled today under the conditions which secured its fulfilment yesterday, he claims afresh the old Protestant right of private judgment in questions of conduct as against all institutions, the so-called Protestant Churches themselves included.

Here I must leave the matter, merely reminding those who may think that I have forgotten to reduce Ibsenism to a formula for them, that its quintessence is that there is no formula.

WHAT IS THE NEW ELEMENT IN THE NORWEGIAN SCHOOL?

I now come to the question: Why, since neither human nature nor the specific talent of the playwright has changed since the days of Charles Dickens and Dumas père, are the works of Ibsen, of Strindberg, of Tolstoy, of Gorki, of Tchekov, of Brieux, so different from those of the great fictionists of the first half of the nineteenth century? Tolstoy actually imitated Dickens. Ibsen was not Dickens's superior as an observer, nor is Strindberg, nor Gorki, nor Tchekov, nor Brieux. Tolstoy and Ibsen together, gifted as they were, were not otherwise gifted or more gifted than Shakespear and Molière. Yet a generation which could read all Shakespear and Molière, Dickens and Dumas, from end to end without the smallest intellectual or ethical perturbation, was/unable to get through a play by Ibsen or a novel by Tolstoy without having its intellectual and moral complacency upset, its religious faith shattered, and its notions of right and wrong conduct thrown into confusion and

sometimes even reversed. It is as if these modern men had a spiritual force that was lacking in even the greatest of their forerunners. And yet, what evidence is there in the lives of Wagner, Ibsen, Tolstoy, Strindberg, Gorki, Tchekov, and Brieux, that they were or are better men in any sense than Shakespear, Molière, Dickens and Dumas?

I myself have been told by people that the reading of a single book of mine or the witnessing of a single play has changed their whole lives; and among these are some who tell me that they cannot read Dickens at all, whilst all of them have read books and seen plays by authors obviously quite as gifted as I am, without finding anything

more in them than pastime.

The explanation is to be found in what I believe to be a general law of the evolution of ideas. "Every jest is an earnest in the womb of time" says Peter Keegan in John Bull's Other Island. "There's many a true word spoken in jest" says the first villager you engage in philosophic discussion. All very serious revolutionary propositions begin as huge jokes. Otherwise they would be stamped out by the lynching of their first exponents. Even these exponents themselves have their revelations broken to them mysteriously through their sense of humor. Two friends of mine, travelling in remote parts of Spain, were asked by the shepherds what their religion was. "Our religion," replied one of them, a very highly cultivated author and

traveller with a sardonic turn, "is that there is no God." This reckless remark, taken seriously, might have provided nineteenth century scepticism with a martyr. As it was, the countryside rang with laughter for days afterwards as the stupendous joke was handed round. But it was just by tolerating the blasphemy as a joke that the shepherds began to build it into the fabric of their minds. Being now safely lodged there, it will in due time develop its earnestness; and at last travellers will come who will be taken quite seriously when they say that the imaginary hidalgo in the sky whom the shepherds call God, does indeed not exist. And they will remain godless, and call their streets Avenue Paul Bert and so forth, until in due time another joker will arrive with sidesplitting intimations that Shakespear's "There's a divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will" was a strictly scientific statement of fact, and that "neo-Darwinism" consists for the most part of grossly unscientific statements of superstitious nonsense. Which jest will in its due time come to its own as very solid earnest.

The same phenomenon may be noticed in our attitude towards matters of fact so obvious that no dispute can arise as to their existence. And here the power of laughter is astonishing. It is not enough to say merely that men enable themselves to endure the unbearablest nuisances and the deadliest scourges by setting up a merey convention

that they are amusing. We must go further and face the fact that they actually are amused by them—that they are not laughing with the wrong side of the mouth. If you doubt it, read the popular fiction of the pre-Dickensian age, from the novels of Smollett to Tom Cringle's Log. Poverty in rags is a joke, yellow fever is a joke, drunkenness is a joke, dysentery is a joke, kickings, floggings, falls, frights, humiliations and painful accidents of all sorts are jokes. Henpecked husbandsand termagant mothers-in-law are prime jokes. The infirmities of age and the inexperience and shyness of youth are jokes; and it is first-rate fun to insult and torment those that suffer from them.

We take some of these jokes seriously enough now. Humphrey Clinker may not have become absolutely unreadable (I have not tried him for more than forty years); but there is certainly a good deal in the book that is now simply disgusting to the class of reader that in its own day found it uproariously amusing. Much of Tom Cringle has become mere savagery: its humors are those of a donkey race. Also, the fun is forced: one sees beneath the determination of the old sea dog to put a hearty smiling English face on pain and discomfort, that he has not merely looked on at it, and that he did not really like it. The mask of laughter wears slowly off the shames and the evils; but men finally see them as they really are.

Sometimes the change occurs, not between two

generations, but actually in the course of a single work by one author. Don Quixote and Mr. Pickwick are recognized examples of characters introduced in pure ridicule, and presently gaining the affection, and finally the respect of their authors. To them may be added Shakespear's Falstaff. Falstaff is introduced as a subordinate stage figure with no other function than to be robbed by the Prince and Poins, who was originally meant to be the raisonneur of the piece, and the chief figure among the prince's dissolute associates. But Poins soon fades into nothing, like several characters in Dickens's early works; whilst Falstaff develops into an enormous joke and an exquisitely mimicked human type. Only in the end the joke withers. The question comes to Shakespear: Is this really a laughing matter? Of course there can be only one answer; and Shakespear gives it as best he can by the mouth of the prince become king, who might, one thinks, have the decency to wait until he has redeemed his own character before assuming the right to lecture his boon companion. Falstaff, rebuked and humiliated, dies miserably. His followers are hanged, except Pistol, whose exclamation "Old do I wax; and from my weary limbs honor is cudgelled" is a melancholy exordium to an old age of beggary and imposture.

But suppose Shakespear had begun where he left off! Suppose he had been born at a time when, as the result of a long propaganda of health and temper-

ance, sack had come to be called alcohol, alcohol had come to be called poison, corpulence had come to be regarded as either a disease or a breach of good manners, and a conviction had spread throughout society that the practice of consuming "a halfpennyworth of bread to an intolerable deal of sack" was the cause of so much misery, crime, and racial degeneration that whole States prohibited the sale of potable spirits altogether, and even moderate drinking was more and more regarded as a regrettable weakness! Suppose (to drive the change well home) the women in the great theatrical centres had completely lost that amused indulgence for the drunken man which still exists in some out-of-theway places, and felt nothing but disgust and anger at the conduct and habits of Falstaff and Sir Toby Belch! Instead of Henry IV. and The Merry Wives of Windsor, we should have had something like Zola's L'Assommoir. Indeed, we actually have Cassio, the last of Shakespear's gentleman-drunkards, talking like a temperance reformer, a fact which suggests that Shakespear had been roundly lectured for the offensive vulgarity of Sir Toby by some woman of refinement who refused to see the smallest fun in giving a knight such a name as Belch, with characteristics to correspond to it. Suppose, again, that the first performance of The Taming of the Shrew had led to a modern Feminist demonstration in the theatre, and forced upon Shakespear's consideration a whole century of agitatresses, from Mary Wollstonecraft to Mrs. Fawcett and Mrs. Pankhurst, is it not likely that the jest of Katharine and Petruchio would have become the earnest of Nora and Torvald Helmer?

In this light the difference between Dickens and Strindberg becomes intelligible. Strindberg simply refuses to regard the cases of Mrs. Raddle and Mrs. Macstinger and Mrs. Jo Gargery as laughing matters. He insists on taking them seriously as cases of a tyranny which effects more degradation and causes more misery than all the political and sectarian oppressions known to history. Yet it cannot be said that Strindberg, even at his fiercest, is harder on women than Dickens. No doubt his case against them is far more complete, because he does not shirk the specifically sexual factors in it. But this really softens it. If Dickens had allowed us, were it but for an instant, to see Jo Gargery and Mrs. To as husband and wife, he would perhaps have been accused by fools of immodesty; but we should have at least some more human impression than the one left by an unredeemed shrew married to a grown-up terrified child. It was George Gissing, a modern realist, who first pointed out the power and truth to nature of Dickens's women, and the fact that, funny as they are, they are mostly detestable. Even the amiable ones are silly and sometimes disastrous. When the few good ones are agreeable they are not specifically feminine: they are the Dickensian good man in

petticoats; yet they lack that strength which they would have had if Dickens had seen clearly that there is no such species in creation as "Woman, lovely woman," the woman being simply the female of the human species, and that to have one conception of humanity for the woman and another for the man, or one law for the woman and another for the man, or one artistic convention for woman and another for man, or, for the matter of that, a skirt for the woman and a pair of breeches for the man, is as unnatural, and in the long run as unworkable, as one law for the mare and another for the horse. Roughly it may be said that all Dickens's studies from life of the differentiated creatures our artificial sex institutions have made of women are, for all their truth, either vile or ridiculous or both. Betsy Trotwood is a dear because she is an old bachelor in petticoats: a manly woman, like all good women: good men being equally all womanly men. Miss Havisham, an insanely womanly woman, is a horror, a monster, though a Chinese monster: that is, not a natural one, but one produced by deliberate perversion of her humanity. In comparison, Strindberg's women are positively amiable and attractive. The general impression that Strindberg's women are the revenge of a furious woman-hater for his domestic failures, whilst Dickens is a genial idealist (he had little better luck domestically, by the way), is produced solely by Dickens either making fun of the

affair or believing that women are born so and must be admitted to the fellowship of the Holy Ghost on a feminine instead of a human basis; whilst Strindberg takes womanliness with deadly seriousness as an evil not to be submitted to for a moment without vehement protest and demand for quite' practicable reform. The nurse in his play who wheedles her old nursling and then slips a strait waistcoat on him revolts us; but she is really ten times more lovable and sympathetic than Sairey Gamp, an abominable creature whose very soul is putrid, and who is yet true to life. It is very noteworthy that none of the modern writers who take life as seriously as Ibsen have ever been able to bring themselves to depict depraved people so pitilessly as Dickens and Thackeray and even the genial Dumas père. Ibsen was grim enough in all conscience: no man has said more terrible things both privately and publicly; and yet there is not one of Ibsen's characters who is not, in the old phrase, the temple of the Holy Ghost, and who does not move you at moments by the sense of that mystery. The Dickens-Thackeray spirit is, in comparison, that of a Punch and Judy showman, who is never restrained from whacking his little figures unmercifully by the sense that they, too, are images of God, and, "but for the grace of God," very like himself. Dickens does deepen very markedly towards this as he grows older, though it is impossible to pretend that Mrs. Wilfer is treated

with less levity than Mrs. Nickleby; but to Ibsen, from beginning to end, every human being is a sacrifice, whilst to Dickens he is a farce. And there you have the whole difference. No character drawn by Dickens is more ridiculous than Hjalmar Ekdal in The Wild Duck, or more eccentric than old Ekdal, whose toy game-preserve in the garret is more fantastic than the house of Miss Havisham; and yet these Ekdals wring the heart whilst Micawber and Chivery (who sits between the lines of clothes hung out to dry because "it reminds him of groves" as Hjalmar's garret reminds old Ekdal of bear forests) only shake the sides.

It may be that if Dickens could read these lines he would say that the defect was not in him but in his readers; and that if we will return to his books now that Ibsen has opened our eyes we will have to admit that he also saw more in the soul of Micawber than mere laughing gas. And indeed one cannot forget the touches of kindliness and gallantry which ennoble his mirth. Still, between the man who occasionally remembered and the man who never forgot, between Dick Swiveller and Ulrik Brendel, there is a mighty difference. The most that can be said to minimize it is that some of the difference is certainly due to the difference in the attitude of the reader. When an author's works produce violent controversy, and are new, people are apt to read them with that sort of seriousness which is very appropriately called deadly: that is,

with a sort of solemn paralysis of every sense except a quite abstract and baseless momentousness which has no more to do with the contents of the author's works than the horrors of a man in delirium tremens have to do with real rats and snakes. The Bible is a sealed literature to most of us because we cannot. read it naturally and unsophisticatedly: we are like the old lady who was edified by the word Mesopotamia, or Samuel Butler's Chowbok, who was converted to Christianity by the effect on his imagination of the prayer for Queen Adelaide. Many years elapsed before those who were impressed with Beethoven's music ventured to enjoy it sufficiently to discover what a large part of it is a riot of whimsical fun. As to Ibsen, I remember a performance of The Wild Duck, at which the late Clement Scott pointed out triumphantly that the play was so absurd that even the champions of Ibsen could not help laughing at it. It had not occurred to him that Ibsen could laugh like other men. Not until an author has become so familiar that we are quite at our ease with him, and are up to his tricks of manner, do we cease to imagine that he is, relatively to older writers, terribly serious.

Still, the utmost allowance we can make for this difference does not persuade us that Dickens took the improvidence and futility of Micawber as Ibsen took the improvidence and futility of Hjalmar Ekdal. The difference is plain in the works of

Dickens himself; for the Dickens of the second half of the nineteenth century (the Ibsen half) is a different man from the Dickens of the first half. From Hard Times and Little Dorrit to Our Mutual Friend every one of Dickens's books lays a heavy burden on our conscience without flattering us with any hopes of a happy ending. But from The Pickwick Papers to Bleak House you can read and laugh and cry and go happy to bed after forgetting yourself in a jolly book. I have pointed out elsewhere how Charles Lever, after producing a series of books in which the old manner of rollicking through life as if all its follies and failures were splendid jokes, and all its conventional enjoyments and attachments delightful and sincere, suddenly supplied the highly appreciative Dickens (as editor of All the Year Round) with a quite new sort of novel, called A Day's Ride: A Life's Romance, which affected both Dickens and the public very unpleasantly by the bitter but tonic flavor we now know as Ibsenism; for the hero began as that uproarious old joke, the boaster who, being a coward, is led into all sorts of dangerous situations, like Bob Acres and Mr. Winkle, and then unexpectedly made them laugh very much on the wrong side of their mouths, exactly as if he were a hero by Ibsen, Strindberg, Turgenieff, Tolstoy, Gorki, Tchekov, or Brieux. And here there was no question of the author being taken too gloomily. His readers, full of Charles O'Malley and Mickey

Free, were approaching the work with the most unsuspicious confidence in its entire jollity. The shock to the security of their senseless laughter caught them utterly unprepared; and they resented it accordingly.

Now that a reaction against realism has set in, and the old jolly ways are coming into fashion again, it is perhaps not so easy as it once was to conceive the extraordinary fascination of this mirthless comedy, this tragedy that stripped the soul naked instead of bedizening it in heroic trappings. But if you have not experienced this fascination yourself, and cannot conceive it, you may take my word for it that it exists, and operates with such power that it puts Shakespear himself out of countenance. And even for those who are in full reaction against it, it can hardly be possible to go back from the death of Hedwig Ekdal to the death of Little Nell otherwise than as a grown man goes down on all fours and pretends to be a bear for the amusement of his children. Nor need we regret this: there are noble compensations for our increase of wisdom and sorrow. After Hedwig you may not be able to cry over Little Nell, but at least you can read Little Dorrit without calling it twaddle, as some of its first critics did. The jests do not become poorer as they mature into earnest. It was not through joyless poverty of soul that Shelley never laughed, but through an enormous apprehension and realization of the gravity of

things that seemed mere fun to other men. If there is no Swiveller and no Trabbs's boy in The Pilgrim's Progress, and if Mr. Badman is drawn as Ibsen would have drawn him and not as Sheridan would have seen him, it does not follow that there is less strength (and joy is a quality of strength) in Bunyan than in Sheridan and Dickens. After all, the salvation of the world depends on the men who will not take evil good-humoredly, and whose laughter destroys the fool instead of encouraging him. "Rightly to be great," said Shakespear when he had come to the end of mere buffoonery, "is greatly to find quarrel in a straw." (The English cry of "Amuse us: take things easily: dress up the world prettily for us" seems mere cowardice to the strong souls that dare look facts in the face; and just so far as people cast off levity and idolatry they find themselves able to bear the company of Bunyan and Shelley, of Ibsen and Strindberg and the great Russian realists, 7 and unable to tolerate the sort of laughter that African tribes cannot restrain when a man is flogged or an animal trapped and wounded. They are gaining strength and wisdom: gaining, in short, that sort of life which we call the life everlasting, a sense of which is worth, for pure well-being alone, all the brutish jollities of Tom Cringle and Humphrey Clinker, and even of Falstaff, Pecksniff, and Micawber.

THE TECHNICAL NOVELTY IN IBSEN'S PLAYS

It is a striking and melancholy example of the preoccupation of critics with phrases and formulas to which they have given life by taking them into the tissue of their own living minds, and which therefore seem and feel vital and important to them whilst they are to everybody else the deadest and dreariest rubbish (this is the great secret of academic dryasdust) that to this day they remain blind to a new technical factor in the art of popular stage-play making which every considerable playwright has been thrusting under their noses night after night for a whole generation. This technical factor in the play is the discussion. Formerly you had in what was called a well made play an exposition in the first act, a situation in the second, an unravelling in the third. Now you have exposition, situation, and discussion; and the discussion is the test of the playwright. The critics protest in vain. They declare that discussions are not dramatic, and that art should not be didactic.

Neither the playwrights nor the public take the smallest notice of them. The discussion conquered Europe in Ibsen's Doll's House; and now the serious playwright recognizes in the discussion not only the main test of his highest powers, but also the real centre of his play's interest. Sometimes he even takes every possible step to assure the public beforehand that his play will be fitted with that newest improvement.

This was inevitable if the drama was ever again to be raised above the childish demand for fables without morals. Children have a settled arbitrary morality: therefore to them moralizing is nothing but an intolerable platitudinizing. The morality of the grown-up is also very largely a settled morality, either purely conventional and of no ethical significance, like the rule of the road or the rule that when you ask for a yard of ribbon the shopkeeper shall give you thirty-six inches and not interpret the word yard as he pleases, or else too obvious in its ethics to leave any room for discussion: for instance, that if the boots keeps you waiting too long for your shaving water you must not plunge your razor into his throat in your irritation, no matter how great an effort of selfcontrol your forbearance may cost you.

Now when a play is only a story of how a villain tries to separate an honest young pair of betrothed lovers; to gain the hand of the woman by calumny; and to ruin the man by forgery, murder, false

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witness, and other commonplaces of the Newgate Calendar, the introduction of a discussion would clearly be ridiculous. There is nothing for sane people to discuss; and any attempt to Chadbandize on the wickedness of such crimes is at once resented as, in Milton's phrase, "moral babble."

But this sort of drama is soon exhausted by people who go often to the theatre. In twenty visits one can see every possible change rung on all the available plots and incidents out of which plays of this kind can be manufactured. The illusion of reality is soon lost: in fact it may be doubted whether any adult ever entertains it: it is only to very young children that the fairy queen is anything but an actress. But at the age when we cease to mistake the figures on the stage for dramatis personæ, and know that they are actors and actresses, the charm of the performer begins to assert itself; and the child who would have been cruelly hurt by being told that the Fairy Queen was only Miss Smith dressed up to look like one, becomes the man who goes to the theatre expressly to see Miss Smith, and is fascinated by her skill or beauty to the point of delighting in plays which would be unendurable to him without her. Thus we get plays "written round" popular performers, and popular performers who give value to otherwise useless plays by investing them with their own attractiveness. But all these enterprises are, commercially speaking, desperately precarious. To

begin with, the supply of performers whose attraction is so far independent of the play that their inclusion in the cast sometimes makes the difference between success and failure, is too small to enable all our theatres, or even many of them, to depend on their actors rather than on their plays. And to finish with, no actor can make bricks entirely without straw. From Grimaldi to Sothern, Jefferson, and Henry Irving (not to mention living actors) we have had players succeeding once in a lifetime in grafting on to a play which would have perished without them some figure imagined wholly by themselves; but none of them has been able to repeat the feat, nor to save many of the plays in which he has appeared from failure. In the long run nothing can retain the interest of the playgoer after the theatre has lost its illusion for his childhood, and its glamor for his adolescence, but a constant supply of interesting plays; and this is specially true in London, where the expense and trouble of theatregoing have been raised to a point at which it is surprising that sensible people of middle age go to the theatre at all. As a matter of fact, they mostly stay at home.

Now an interesting play cannot in the nature of things mean anything but a play in which problems of conduct and character of personal importance to the audience are raised and suggestively discussed. People have a thrifty sense of taking away something from such plays: they not

only have had something for their money, but they retain that something as a permanent possession. Consequently none of the commonplaces of the box office hold good of such plays. Un vain does the experienced acting manager declare that people want to be amused and not preached at in the theatre; that they will not stand long speeches; that a play must not contain more than 18,000 words; that it must not begin before nine nor last beyond eleven; that there must be no politics and no religion in it; that breach of these golden rules will drive people to the variety theatres; that there must be a woman of bad character, played by a very attractive actress, in the piece; and so on and so forth. All these counsels are valid for plays in which there is nothing to discuss. They may be disregarded by the playwright who is a moralist and a debater as well as a dramatist. From him, within the inevitable limits set by the clock and by the physical endurance of the human frame, people will stand anything as soon as they are matured enough and cultivated enough to be susceptible to the appeal of his particular form of art. The difficulty at present is that mature and cultivated people do not go to the theatre, just as they do not read penny novelets; and when an attempt is made to cater for them they do not respond to it in time, partly because they have not the habit of playgoing, and partly because it takes too long for them to find out that the new theatre is not

like all the other theatres. But when they do at last find their way there, the attraction is not the firing of blank cartridges at one another by actors, nor the pretence of falling down dead that ends the stage combat, nor the simulation of erotic thrills by a pair of stage lovers, nor any of the other tomfooleries called action, but the exhibition and discussion of the character and conduct of stage figures who are made to appear real by the

art of the playwright and the performers.

[This, then, is the extension of the old dramatic form effected by Ibsen. Up to a certain point in the last act, A Doll's House is a play that might be turned into a very ordinary French drama by the excision of a few lines, and the substitution of a sentimental happy ending for the famous last scene: indeed the very first thing the theatrical wiseacres did with it was to effect exactly this transformation, with the result that the play thus pithed had no success and attracted no notice worth mentioning. But at just that point in the last act, the heroine very unexpectedly (by the wiseacres) stops her emotional acting and says: "We must sit down and discuss all this that has been happening between us." And it was by this new technical feature: this addition of a new movement, as musicians would say, to the dramatic form, that A Doll's House conquered Europe and founded a new school of dramatic art. 7

Since that time the discussion has expanded far

beyond the limits of the last ten minutes of an otherwise "well made" play. The disadvantage of putting the discussion at the end was not only that it came when the audience was fatigued, but that it was necessary to see the play over again, so as to follow the earlier acts in the light of the final discussion, before it became fully intelligible. The practical utility of this book is due to the fact that unless the spectator at an Ibsen play has read the pages referring to it beforehand, it is hardly possible for him to get its bearings at a first hearing if he approaches it, as most spectators still do, with conventional idealist prepossessions. Accordingly, we now have plays, including some of my own, which begin with discussion and end with action, and others in which the discussion interpenetrates the action from beginning to end. When Ibsen invaded England discussion had vanished from the stage; and women could not write plays. Within twenty years women were writing better plays than men; and these plays were passionate arguments from beginning to end. The action of such plays consists of a case to be argued. If the case is uninteresting or stale or badly conducted or obviously trumped up, the play is a bad one. If it is important and novel and convincing, or at least disturbing, the play is a good one. But any-how the play in which there is no argument and no case no longer counts as serious drama. It may still please the child in us as Punch and Judy

does; but nobody nowadays pretends to regard the well made play as anything more than a commercial product which is not in question when modern schools of serious drama are under discussion. Indeed within ten years of the production of A Doll's House in London, audiences had become so derisive of the more obvious and hackneyed features of the methods of Sardou that it became dangerous to resort to them; and playwrights who persisted in "constructing" plays in the old French manner lost ground not for lack of ideas, but because their technique was unbearably

out of fashion. 7

In the new plays, the drama arises through a conflict of unsettled ideals rather than through vulgar attachments, rapacities, generosities, resentments, ambitions, misunderstandings, oddities and so forth as to which no moral question is raised. The conflict is not between clear right and wrong: the villain is as conscientious as the hero, if not more so: in fact, the question which makes the play interesting (when it is interesting) is which is the villain and which the hero. Or, to put it another way, there are no villains and no heroes. This strikes the critics mainly as a departure from dramatic art; but it is really the inevitable return to nature which ends all the merely technical fashions. Now the natural is mainly the everyday; and its climaxes must be, if not everyday, at least everylife, if they are to have any importance for

the spectator. Crimes, fights, big legacies, fires, shipwrecks, battles, and thunderbolts are mistakes in a play, even when they can be effectively simulated. No doubt they may acquire dramatic interest by putting a character through the test of an emergency; but the test is likely to be too obviously theatrical, because, as the playwright cannot in the nature of things have much experience of such catastrophes, he is forced to substitute a set of conventions or conjectures for the feelings they really

produce.

[In short, pure accidents are not dramatic: they are only anecdotic. They may be sensational, impressive, provocative, ruinous, curious, or a dozen other things; but they have no specifically dramatic interest. There is no drama in being knocked down or run over. The catastrophe in Hamlet would not be in the least dramatic had Polonius fallen downstairs and broken his neck, Claudius succumbed to delirium tremens, Hamlet forgotten to breathe in the intensity of his philosophic speculation, Ophelia died of Danish measles, Laertes been shot by the palace sentry, and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern drowned in the North Sea. Even as it is, the Queen, who poisons herself by accident, has an air of being polished off to get her out of the way: her death is the one dramatic failure of the piece. Bushels of good paper have been inked in vain by writers who imagined they could produce a tragedy by killing everyone in the last act

accidentally. As a matter of fact no accident, however sanguinary, can produce a moment of real drama, though a difference of opinion between husband and wife as to living in town or country might be the beginning of an appalling tragedy or

a capital comedy.

It may be said that everything is an accident: that Othello's character is an accident, Iago's character another accident, and the fact that they happened to come together in the Venetian service an even more accidental accident. Also that Torvald Helmer might just as likely have married Mrs. Nickleby as Nora. Granting this trifling for what it is worth, the fact remains that marriage is no more an accident than birth or death: that is, it is expected to happen to everybody. And if every man has a good deal of Torvald Helmer in him, and every woman a good deal of Nora, neither their characters nor their meeting and marrying are accidents. Othello, though entertaining, pitiful, and resonant with the thrills a master of language can produce by mere artistic sonority, is certainly much more accidental than A Doll's House; but it is correspondingly less important and interesting to us. It has been kept alive, not by its manufactured misunderstandings and stolen handkerchiefs and the like, nor even by its orchestral verse, but by its exhibition and discussion of human nature, marriage, and jealousy; and it would be a prodigiously better play if it

were a serious discussion of the highly interesting problem of how a simple Moorish soldier would get on with a "supersubtle" Venetian lady of fashion if he married her. As it is, the play turns on a mistake; and though a mistake can produce. a murder, which is the vulgar substitute for a tragedy, it cannot produce a real tragedy in the modern sense. Reflective people are not more interested in the Chamber of Horrors than in their own homes, nor in murderers, victims, and villains than in themselves; and the moment a man has acquired sufficient reflective power to cease gaping at waxworks, he is on his way to losing interest in Othello, Desdemona, and Iago exactly to the extent to which they become interesting to the police. Cassio's weakness for drink comes much nearer home to most of us than Othello's strangling and throat cutting, or Iago's theatrical confidence trick. The proof is that Shakespear's professional colleagues, who exploited all his sensational devices, and piled up torture on murder and incest on adultery until they had far out-Heroded Herod, are now unmemorable and unplayable. Shakespear survives because he coolly treated the sensational horrors of his borrowed plots as inorganic theatrical accessories, using them simply as pretexts for dramatizing human character as it exists in the normal world. In enjoying and discussing his plays we unconsciously discount the combats and murders: commentators are never so astray (and

consequently so ingenious) as when they take Hamlet seriously as a madman, Macbeth as a homicidal Highlander, and impish humorists like Richard and Iago as lurid villains of the Renascence. The plays in which these figures appear could be changed into comedies without altering a hair of their beards. Shakespear, had anyone been intelligent enough to tax him with this, would perhaps have said that most crimes are accidents that happen to people exactly like ourselves, and that Macbeth, under propitious circumstances, would have made an exemplary rector of Stratford, a real criminal being a defective monster, a human accident, useful on the stage only for minor parts such as Don Johns, second murderers, and the like. Anyhow, the fact remains that Shakespear survives by what he has in common with Ibsen, and not by what he has in common with Webster and the rest. Hamlet's surprise at finding that he "lacks gall" to behave in the idealistically conventional manner, and that no extremity of rhetoric about the duty of revenging "a dear father slain" and exterminating the "bloody bawdy villain" who murdered him seems to make any difference in their domestic relations in the palace in Elsinore, still keeps us talking about him and going to the theatre to listen to him, whilst the older Hamlets, who never had any Ibsenist hesitations, and shammed madness, and entangled the courtiers in the arras and burnt them, and stuck hard to the

theatrical school of the fat boy in Pickwick ("I wants to make your flesh creep"), are as dead as

John Shakespear's mutton.

We have progressed so rapidly on this point under the impulse given to the drama by Ibsen. that it seems strange now to contrast him favorably with Shakespear on the ground that he avoided the old catastrophes which left the stage strewn with the dead at the end of an Elizabethan tragedy. For perhaps the most plausible reproach levelled at Ibsen by modern critics of his own school is just that survival of the old school in him which makes the death rate so high in his last acts. Do Oswald Alving, Hedvig Ekdal, Rosmer and Rebecca, HeddaGabler, Solness, Eyolf, Borkman, Rubeck and Irene die dramatically natural deaths, or are they slaughtered in the classic and Shakespearean manner, partly because the audience expects blood for its money, partly because it is difficult to make people attend seriously to anything except by startling them with some violent calamity? It is so easy to make out a case for either view that I shall not argue the point. The post-Ibsen playwrights apparently think that Ibsen's homicides and suicides were forced. In Tchekov's Cherry Orchard, for example, where the sentimental ideals of our amiable, cultured, Schumann playing propertied class are reduced to dust and ashes by a hand not less deadly than Ibsen's because it is so much more caressing, nothing more violent happens

than that the family cannot afford to keep up its old house. In Granville Barker's plays, the campaign against our society is carried on with all Ibsen's implacability; but the one suicide (in Waste) is unhistorical; for neither Parnell nor Dilke, who were the actual cases in point of the waste which was the subject of the play, killed himself. I myself have been reproached because the characters in my plays "talk but do nothing," meaning that they do not commit felonies. As a matter of fact we have come to see that it is no true dénouement to cut the Gordian knot as Alexander did with a stroke of the sword. If people's souls are tied up by law and public opinion it is much more tragic to leave them to wither in these bonds than to end their misery and relieve the salutary compunction of the audience by outbreaks of violence. Judge Brack was, on the whole, right when he said that people dont do such things. If they did, the idealists would be brought to their senses very quickly indeed.

But in Ibsen's plays the catastrophe, even when it seems forced, and when the ending of the play would be more tragic without it, is never an accident; and the play never exists for its sake. His nearest to an accident is the death of little Eyolf, who falls off a pier and is drowned. But this instance only reminds us that there is one good dramatic use for an accident: it can awaken people. When England wept over the deaths of little Nell

and Paul Dombey, the strong soul of Ruskin was moved to scorn: to novelists who were at a loss to make their books sell he offered the formula: When at a loss, kill a child. But Ibsen did not kill little Eyolf to manufacture pathos. The surest way to achieve a thoroughly bad performance of Little Eyolf is to conceive it as a sentimental tale of a drowned darling. Its drama lies in the awakening of Allmers and his wife to the despicable quality and detestable rancors of the life they have been idealizing as blissful and poetic. They are so sunk in their dream that the awakening can be effected only by a violent shock. And that is just the one dramatically useful thing an accident can do. It can shock. Hence the accident that befalls Eyolf.

As to the deaths in Ibsen's last acts, they are a sweeping up of the remains of dramatically finished people. Solness's fall from the tower is as obviously symbolic as Phaeton's fall from the chariot of the sun. Ibsen's dead bodies are those of the exhausted or destroyed: he does not kill Hilda, for instance, as Shakespear killed Juliet. He is ruthless enough with Hedvig and Eyolf because he wants to use their deaths to expose their parents; but if he had written Hamlet nobody would have been killed in the last act except perhaps Horatio, whose correct nullity might have provoked Fortinbras to let some of the moral sawdust out of him with his sword. For Shakespearean deaths in Ibsen you

must go back to Lady Inger and the plays of his nonage, with which this book is not concerned.

The drama was born of old from the union of two desires: the desire to have a dance and the desire to hear a story. The dance became a rant: the story became a situation. When Ibsen began to make plays, the art of the dramatist had shrunk into the art of contriving a situation. And it was held that the stranger the situation, the better the play. Ibsen saw that, on the contrary, the more familiar the situation, the more interesting the play. Shakespear had put ourselves on the stage but not our situations. Our uncles seldom murder our fathers, and cannot legally marry our mothers; we do not meet witches; our kings are not as a rule stabbed and succeeded by their stabbers; and when we raise money by bills we do not promise to pay pounds of our flesh. Ibsen supplies the want left by Shakespear. He gives us not only ourselves, but ourselves in our own situations. The things that happen to his stage figures are things that happen to us. One consequence is that his plays are much more important to us than Shakespear's. Another is that they are capable both of hurting us cruelly and of filling us with excited hopes of escape from idealistic tyrannies, and with visions of intenser life in the future?

Changes in technique follow inevitably from these changes in the subject matter of the play. When a dramatic poet can give you hopes and

visions, such old maxims as that stage-craft is the art of preparation become boyish, and may be left to those unfortunate playwrights who, being unable to make anything really interesting happen on the stage, have to acquire the art of continually persuading the audience that it is going to happen presently. When he can stab people to the heart by shewing them the meanness or cruelty of something they did yesterday and intend to do tomorrow, all the old tricks to catch and hold their attention become the silliest of superfluities. The play called The Murder of Gonzago, which Hamlet makes the players act before his uncle, is artlessly constructed; but it produces a greater effect on Claudius than the Œdipus of Sophocles, because it is about himself. The writer who practises the art of Ibsen therefore discards all the old tricks of preparation, catastrophe, denouement, and so forth without thinking about it, just as a modern rifleman never dreams of providing himself with powder horns, percussion caps, and wads: indeed he does not know the use of them. Ibsen substituted a terrible art of sharpshooting at the audience, trapping them, fencing with them, aiming always at the sorest spot in their consciences. Never mislead an audience, was an old rule. But the new school will trick the spectator into forming a meanly false judgment, and then convict him of it in the next act, often to his grievous mortification. When you despise something you ought to take off your hat to, or admire

and imitate something you ought to loathe, you cannot resist the dramatist who knows how to touch these morbid spots in you and make you see that they are morbid. The dramatist knows that as long as he is teaching and saving his audience, he is as sure of their strained attention as a dentist is, or the Angel of the Annunciation. And though he may use all the magic of art to make you forget the pain he causes you or to enhance the joy of the hope and courage he awakens, he is never occupied in the old work of manufacturing interest and expectation with materials that have neither novelty, significance, nor relevance to the experience or

prospects of the spectators.

Hence a cry has arisen that the post-Ibsen play is not a play, and that its technique, not being the technique described by Aristotle, is not a technique at all. I will not enlarge on this: the fun poked at my friend Mr. A. B. Walkley in the prologue of Fanny's First Play need not be repeated here. But I may remind him that the new technique is new only on the modern stage. It has been used by preachers and orators ever since speech was invented. It is the technique of playing upon the human conscience; and it has been practised by the playwright whenever the playwright has been capable of it. Rhetoric, irony, argument, paradox, epigram, parable, the re-arrangement of haphazard facts into orderly and intelligent situations: these are both the oldest and the newest arts of the drama; and your plot construction and art of preparation are only the tricks of theatrical talent and the shifts of moral sterility, not the weapons of dramatic genius. In the theatre of Ibsen weare not flattered spectatorskilling an idle hour with an ingenious and amusing entertainment: we are "guilty creatures sitting at a play"; and the technique of pastime is no more

applicable than at a murder trial. 7

The technical novelties of the Ibsen and post-Ibsen plays are, then: first, the introduction of the discussion and its development until it so overspreads and interpenetrates the action that it finally assimilates it, making play and discussion practically identical; and, second, as a consequence of making the spectators themselves the persons of the drama, and the incidents of their own lives its incidents, the disuse of the old stage tricks by which audiences had to be induced to take an interest in unreal people and improbable circumstances, and the substitution of a forensic technique of recrimination, disillusion, and penetration through ideals to the truth, with a free use of all the rhetorical and lyrical arts of the orator, the preacher, the pleader, and the rhapsodist.

NEEDED: AN IBSEN THEATRE

IT must now be plain to my readers that the doctrine taught by Ibsen can never be driven home from the stage whilst his plays are presented to us in haphazard order at the commercial theatres. Indeed our commercial theatres are so well aware of this that they have from the first regarded Ibsen as hopelessly uncommercial: he might as well never have lived as far as they are concerned. Even the new advanced theatres which now deal freely with what I have called post-Ibsenist plays hardly meddle with him. Had it not been for the great national service disinterestedly rendered by Mr. William Archer in giving us a complete translation of Ibsen's plays (a virtually unremunerated public service which I hope the State will recognize fitly), Ibsen would be less known in England than Swedenborg. By losing his vital contribution to modern thought we are losing ground relatively to the countries which, like Germany, have made his works familiar to their playgoers. But even in Germany Ibsen's meaning is seen only by glimpses." What we need is a theatre devoted

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primarily to Ibsen as the Bayreuth Festspielhaus is devoted to Wagner. I have shewn how the plays, as they succeed one another, are parts of a continuous discussion; how the difficulty left by one is dealt with in the next; how Mrs. Alving is a reply to your hasty remark that Nora Helmer ought to be ashamed of herself for leaving her husband; how Gregers Werle warns you not to be as great a fool in your admiration of Lona Hessel as of Patient Grisel. The plays should, like Wagner's Ring, be performed in cycles; so that Ibsen may hunt you down from position to position until you are finally cornered.

The larger truth of the matter is that modern European literature and music now form a Bible far surpassing in importance to us the ancient Hebrew Bible that has served us so long. The notion that inspiration is something that happened thousands of years ago, and was then finished and done with, never to occur again: in other words, the theory that God retired from business at that period and has not since been heard from, is as silly as it is blasphemous. He who does not believe that revelation is continuous does not believe in revelation at all, however familiar his parrot's tongue and pewsleepy ear may be with the word. There comes a time when the formula "Also sprach Zarathustra" succeeds to the formula "Thus saith the Lord," and when the parable of the doll's house is more to our purpose than the parable of the prodigal son. When Bunyan published The Pilgrim's Progress, his first difficulty was with the

literal people who said, "There is no such individual in the directory as Christian, and no such place in the gazetteer as the City of Destruction: therefore you are a liar." Bunyan replied by citing the parables: asking, in effect, whether the story of the wise and foolish virgins is also a lie. A couple of centuries or so later, when I myself wrote a play for the Salvation Army to shew them that the dramatic method might be used for their gospel as effectively as the lyric or orchestral method, I was told that unless I could guarantee that the persons in my play actually existed, and the incidents had actually occurred, I, like Bunyan, would be regarded by the elderly soldiers in the army as no better than Ananias. As it was useless for me to try to make these simple souls understand that in real life truth is revealed by parables and falsehood supported by facts, I had to leave the army to its oratorical metaphors and to its popular songs about heartbroken women waiting for the footsteps of their drunken husbands, and hearing instead the joyous step of the converted man whose newly found salvation will dry all their tears. I had not the heart to suggest that these happy pairs were as little authentic as The Second Mrs. Tanqueray; for I spied behind the army's confusion of truth with mere fact the old doubt whether anything good can come out of the theatre, a doubt as inveterate and neither more nor less justifiable than the doubt of our Secularists whether anything good can come out of the gospels.

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But I think Ibsen has proved the right of the drama to take scriptural rank, and his own right to canonical rank as one of the major prophets of the modern Bible. The sooner we recognize that rank and give up the idea of trying to make a fashionable entertainment of his plays the better. It ends in our not performing thematall, and remaining in barbarous and dangerous ignorance of the case against idealism. We want a frankly doctrinal theatre. There is no more reason for making a doctrinal theatre inartistic than for putting a cathedral organ out of tune: indeed all experience shews that doctrine alone nerves us to the effort called for by the greatest art. I therefore suggest that even the sciolists and voluptuaries who care for nothing in art but its luxuries and its executive feats are as strongly interested in the establishment of such a theatre as those for whom the What is always more important than the How, if only because the How cannot become really magical until such magic is indispensable to the revelation of an all-important What.

I do not suggest that the Ibsen theatre should confine itself to Ibsen any more than the Established Churchconfinesitself to Jeremiah. The post-Ibsenists could also be expounded there; and Strindberg should have his place, were it only as Devil's Advocate. But performances should be in the order of academic courses, designed so as to take audiences over the whole ground as Ibsen and his successors took them; so that the exposition may be consecutive. Otherwise

the doctrine will not be interesting, and the audiences will not come regularly. The efforts now being made to regenerate the drama are often wasted through lack of doctrinal conviction and consequent want of system, the net result being an irresolute halting between the doctrinal and the merely entertaining.

For this sort of enterprise an endowment is necessary, because commercial capital is not content in a theatre with reasonable interest: it demands great gains even at the cost of great hazards. Besides, nobody will endow mere pleasure, whereas doctrine can always commandendowment. It is the foolish disclaiming of doctrine that keeps dramatic art unendowed. When we ask for an endowed theatre we always take the greatest pains to assure everybody that we do not mean anything unpleasantly serious, and that our endowed theatre will be as bright and cheery (meaning as low and common) as the commercial theatres. As a result of which we get no endowment. When w have the sense to profit by this lesson and promit that our endowed theatre will be an important place. and that it will make people of low tastes and tribal or commercial ideas horribly uncomfortable by its efforts to bring conviction of sin to them, we shall get endowment as easily as the religious people who are not foolishly ashamed to ask for what they want.

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